2 cops beat a man to death in custody. 36 years later, they asked to 'settle' the case. The Supreme Court said no.

In 1985, two police officers beat a man with lathis all night at a station in Odisha. He died before morning. Thirty-six years later, they asked the Supreme Court to let them 'settle' the case. The judge's response shocked them.

Kasinath Naik and his relative Kusia Naik walked into Purighat Police Station in Cuttack one evening in May 1985. They had been summoned. What happened next would take thirty-six years to reach its final answer.

Two officers—Pratap Kumar Choudhury, the station in-charge, and Pravat Chandra Mohanty, a Senior Inspector—beat Kasinath Naik with lathis (heavy wooden sticks) and wooden battens through the night. The man suffered eleven injuries—eleven separate marks of a night-long assault. He passed stool and urine. He bled heavily. The floor was slick with blood and urine. Around midnight, they took him to a hospital. He died the same night.

Then the officers tried to cover it up. They filed a false FIR (a written complaint that starts a police investigation)—Case No. 272/1985—claiming the deceased had come to report an assault by unknown persons. The lie was meant to explain away his injuries. It didn't work.

When the trial court convicted them

The Sessions Court convicted both officers on August 29, 1988 under Section 304 Part II of the IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder—a killing that falls short of intentional murder but is still criminal) and other offences including Section 471 IPC (using a forged document as genuine) for the fabricated FIR. The trial court found that the officers had not only beaten a man to death but had then tried to manufacture evidence to escape accountability. The officers appealed to the Orissa High Court.

On November 9, 2020—thirty-five years after the killing—the High Court delivered a mixed verdict. It set aside the conviction for culpable homicide under Section 304 Part II and substituted it with a conviction under Section 324 IPC (voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means). The High Court reasoned that the evidence, while establishing a brutal beating, did not meet the threshold for culpable homicide. The court maintained the conviction under Section 471 IPC for the forged FIR. The sentence: one year in prison under Section 324.

Both officers, now over 75 years old, appealed to the Supreme Court. But they didn't just ask for acquittal. They asked for something far more unusual: permission to compound the offence under Section 320(2) read with Section 320(5) of the CrPC.

What 'compounding' means—and why it matters

Compounding is a legal mechanism under Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) that allows certain offences to be 'settled' between the victim and the accused. If the court grants permission, the case ends. The accused walks free. It's common in private disputes—a neighbourhood fight, a minor assault where both sides agree to move on.

But Section 320(5) CrPC adds a crucial condition: after a conviction, compounding requires the leave (formal permission) of the court. It is not automatic. The court must examine the nature of the offence, the evidence, and its effect on society before granting or refusing leave.

The officers argued that on the date of the offence in 1985, Section 324 IPC was a compoundable offence. The victim's legal heirs had agreed to the settlement. Why shouldn't the court allow it?

Why the Supreme Court said no

The bench of Justice Ashok Bhushan and Justice Ajay Rastogi did not agree. The court held that the grant of leave for compounding of offences under Section 320(5) CrPC is not automatic or mechanical upon receipt of a request agreed to by the victim. It is not a rubber stamp on a settlement agreement. The court has a duty to examine the nature of the offence, the evidence, and its effect on society before granting or refusing leave.

The court examined what had actually happened. Two police officers, inside a police station, had beaten a man to death with lathis and wooden battens. They had then fabricated documents to hide their crime. This was not a private dispute between neighbours. This was custodial violence—state violence committed by those sworn to protect the law.

The court called it what it was: a crime against humanity. Custodial violence by police officers, the bench held, is a matter of grave public concern. It strikes at the heart of Article 21 of the Constitution (the right to life). When the state's own officers kill a man in custody, the offence is not just against the victim. It is against every citizen who trusts the police to protect them. Such offences, the court ruled, cannot be compounded. The public interest in deterring custodial violence outweighs any private settlement between the parties.

The court cited several precedents to support its reasoning. In Provincial Government, Central Provinces and Berar v. Bipin Singh Choudhary, the principle was established that the court must examine the nature of the offence before granting compounding. In Yashwant and others v. State of Maharashtra (2019) and Gulab Das and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2011), the Supreme Court had held that offences involving public confidence and state authority cannot be treated as private disputes. The bench applied these principles to the facts before it: two police officers, a police station, a night of beating, a death, and a forged FIR.

Why the sentence was still reduced

But the court did not stop at refusing compounding. It also considered the officers' age—both over 75—and the fact that the victim's family had agreed to a settlement. While the settlement could not erase the crime, it could be considered for reducing the sentence. The court relied on Ishwar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008), which held that compromise between parties can be a mitigating factor in sentencing even when the offence itself cannot be compounded.

The court reduced the sentence under Section 324 IPC from one year to six months. But it enhanced the compensation. Each officer was ordered to pay Rs. 3.5 lakh to the legal heirs of the deceased, in addition to any compensation already awarded by the High Court.

The message was clear: the officers would not walk free, but the court acknowledged the passage of time and the advanced age of the accused.

What the court said about lathis and battens

The judgment also clarified an important point about weapons. The officers had argued that lathis and wooden battens were not inherently dangerous weapons under Section 324 IPC. The court disagreed. It held that wooden lathis and battens are instruments which, depending on the manner of use, can cause injuries likely to cause death. The manner of use here—beating a man through an entire night until he died—left no doubt. The court noted that the victim had suffered eleven injuries, and the force applied was sufficient to cause death. The use of such weapons in such a manner satisfied the requirements of Section 324 IPC regarding 'instrument which, used as weapon of offence, is likely to cause death'.

THE PLAY: If you are a police officer facing a custodial violence case, do not assume that a settlement with the victim's family will end the matter. The Supreme Court has made it clear: crimes committed by state officials against citizens in custody cannot be compounded. The public interest in deterring such violence overrides private settlements.

The walk-off

Kasinath Naik died in 1985. The Supreme Court's answer came on February 11, 2021, in Criminal Appeal No. 125 of 2021. The procedural journey had taken thirty-six years: from the FIR registered at Lal Bagh Police Station on May 5, 1985 under Sections 302, 342, 323, 294, 201 read with Section 34 IPC, to the trial court's conviction on August 29, 1988, to the High Court's partial allowance on November 9, 2020, and finally to the Supreme Court's partial allowance on February 11, 2021. The court had the final word: where the offence is committed by police officers in a police station involving custodial violence, the offence affects public confidence in law enforcement and constitutes a matter of grave public concern. Such offences cannot be compounded as they are crimes against humanity. The officers will not go to prison for long, but they will pay—and the law has drawn a line that cannot be crossed again.