A 14-year-old had a baby. The High Court called it 'romance' and freed the man.

A 25-year-old man had a child with a 14-year-old girl. The High Court said it was 'adolescent romance' and let him go. The Supreme Court didn't just reverse that decision. It took the extraordinary step of calling the High Court's own judgment "perverse" and "shocking" — words judges almost never use about each other.

The question at the heart of this case is brutally simple: Can a court call a sexual relationship between a 25-year-old man and a 14-year-old girl "romance" and set the man free? The Supreme Court's answer, delivered on August 16, 2024, was a resounding no.

The child who became a mother

2018. South 24 Parganas, West Bengal. A 14-year-old girl left her home. She went to live with a 25-year-old man. Soon, she was pregnant. A child was born. The physical reality of a child giving birth — the weight of that small body, the clinical smell of a hospital ward, the silence of a delivery room where the mother is still a child herself — was the unspoken backdrop of the entire legal battle.

The victim's mother filed an FIR (a written complaint that starts a police investigation) on May 29, 2018. The text of that FIR, a formal document on police station letterhead, set the procedural machinery in motion. Police arrested the man. The case went to trial before a Special Judge under the POCSO Act (the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012) in Baruipur. The trial court convicted the man under Section 6 of the POCSO Act (punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault) and under Sections 363, 366, and 376 of the Indian Penal Code (kidnapping, kidnapping to compel marriage, and rape).

The man appealed to the Calcutta High Court. What happened next stunned everyone who read the judgment.

When the High Court called it 'romance'

A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, on October 18, 2023, acquitted the man on all counts. But it did not stop there. The judgment contained extensive observations about adolescent sexuality, the "duties of female adolescents," and something the judges called "hormonal biology." The courtroom must have fallen into a stunned silence when those words were read out, the rustle of the judgment pages as the bench read aloud the only sound breaking the stillness — a judgment that seemed to ignore the law it was meant to uphold.

The High Court used its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution (the power of High Courts to issue writs) and Section 482 of the CrPC (the High Court's inherent powers to prevent abuse of process) to quash the conviction — even though it found the offences were proved. The file that held that judgment, thin as it was in legal reasoning, carried the weight of a child's entire future.

In essence, the High Court said: This was consensual. This was adolescent romance. The girl chose to go with him. So the man should go free.

The Supreme Court saw the judgment and took suo motu cognizance (acted on its own, without anyone filing an appeal). It registered a writ petition — Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2023 — and called for the records.

The law that consent cannot touch

The legal framework here is unforgiving by design. Under Section 375 of the IPC (the definition of rape), the sixth clause says: penetrative intercourse with a woman under 18 years of age is rape — with or without her consent. The romantic nature of the relationship is legally irrelevant. The POCSO Act reinforces this: any sexual act with a person under 18 is an offence, period.

The man was also charged under Section 5(j)(ii) of the POCSO Act (aggravated penetrative sexual assault that results in pregnancy) and Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC (repeated rape) and Section 376(3) (rape of a victim under 16).

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's approach was fundamentally wrong. The inherent powers under Article 226 and Section 482 CrPC cannot be used to acquit someone when heinous offences like rape and aggravated penetrative sexual assault have been proved. The Court relied on the precedent of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. — (2012) 10 SCC 303 — which, while allowing for quashing of some cases, does not permit the High Court to override a conviction for serious, non-compoundable offences. A settlement between the accused and the victim does not allow the High Court to quash prosecution for serious offences. The consent of a 14-year-old is a legal nullity.

When the Supreme Court tore the judgment apart

Justice Abhay S. Oka, writing for the bench, did not mince words. The High Court's observations on adolescent sexuality, rights-based approaches, and the duties of female adolescents were found to be "perverse" and "shocking" — the Supreme Court used that exact phrase in its judgment, calling the High Court's reasoning "perverse" and "irrelevant." The bench's tone during the suo motu hearing was likely one of restrained fury, a judge forced to correct a decision that had fundamentally misunderstood the purpose of the law.

The Supreme Court laid down a clear ratio decidendi (the principle of law on which a case is decided). It held that an appellate court dealing with conviction appeals must contain concise facts, evidence analysis, a proper reappreciation of evidence, and cogent reasons. It cannot contain personal opinions, advisory pronouncements, or irrelevant material. The High Court judgment was reversed insofar as it acquitted the accused under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 376(2)(n)/(3) of the IPC, and the conviction under those provisions was restored.

However, the Supreme Court upheld the acquittal under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC (kidnapping and kidnapping to compel marriage) because there was insufficient evidence that the girl was taken against her will from lawful guardianship — a technical distinction that did not change the man's fate, since the rape conviction carried a far heavier sentence.

The State that forgot its duty

The Supreme Court did not stop at reversing the acquittal. It turned its attention to the State of West Bengal. Under Section 19(6) of the POCSO Act, when a child is a victim of a sexual offence, the police must immediately report the matter to the Child Welfare Committee (CWC). The CWC, in turn, has powers and responsibilities under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 — the JJ Act — to provide care, protection, and rehabilitation. The Court analyzed the State's obligations under every relevant provision of the JJ Act framework for child victims.

The girl, at 14, was a "child in need of care and protection" under Section 2(14) of the JJ Act. The State was obligated to take her into protective custody, provide shelter, medical care, and counselling. Instead, the victim's mother had abandoned her, and the girl was living with the accused — the man who had been convicted of raping her. The CWC had failed to exercise its powers under Section 29 (powers of the Committee) and Section 30 (functions and responsibilities of the Committee) to declare her a child in need of care and protection and to provide her with immediate shelter. It had also failed in its duty under Section 39 (process of rehabilitation and social re-integration) to create a plan for her long-term recovery, and under Section 46 (after care of children leaving child care institution) to ensure she had support even after any formal care period ended.

The Supreme Court noted that the State had failed in its duty. The Court directed the State to ensure the victim and her child received proper care and rehabilitation.

THE PLAY: If you are a lawyer handling a POCSO appeal, the High Court cannot use its inherent powers to acquit an accused once the offence is proved — consent is irrelevant when the victim is under 18, and the State's duty to protect the child does not end with the conviction.

The Supreme Court ended where the law begins: with a 14-year-old girl who was a child, not a romantic partner. The High Court's judgment was not just wrong — it was a failure of the very protection the law was designed to provide.