A 2019 deed was signed after the 2011 death. The court said: arbitrate.
The Supreme Court held that a dispute over a conveyance deed executed years after the husband's death is covered by arbitration clauses in agreements from 2007 and 2008.
8
years.
The Supreme Court held that a dispute over a conveyance deed executed years after the husband's death is covered by arbitration clauses in agreements from 2007 and 2008.
He died in 2011. But the deed his wife and son wanted to cancel was signed in 2019. The court's answer: take it to arbitration.
Shivkumar Daga had been dead for eight years when a conveyance deed was registered in his company's name. The 2019 deed, signed in a quiet registrar's office years after the man's death, was the document his wife and son wanted a court to tear up. They called it fraudulent. The Supreme Court told them they had to go to arbitration — a private dispute resolution process outside the court system — because the dead man had signed agreements years earlier that said any dispute would be handled that way.
The 2007 promise that outlived him
In 2006, a husband and wife incorporated a real estate development company called EAPL. The next year, the husband and a businessman named Madhurkumar Bajaj signed two tripartite agreements — on 31 March 2007 and 25 July 2008 — with the company. These were foundational agreements: they laid out how the two men would acquire and develop properties together. Buried in the 2007 tripartite agreement was an arbitration clause — a promise that if any dispute arose, it would be settled by an arbitrator, not a court.
Over the years, the parties executed several development agreements and, finally, a conveyance deed on 17 December 2019. By then, the husband was dead. His estate had passed to his wife and son.
In 2021, the wife and son filed a civil suit in a Mumbai trial court. They wanted two things: a declaration that the 2019 conveyance deed was null and void, and a declaration that the five development agreements had been validly terminated. Their case rested on allegations of fraud.
The Section 8 move that shifted the battlefield
The defendants — Bajaj and others — responded not by filing a written statement, but by moving an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the provision that allows a court to refer parties to arbitration when a valid arbitration agreement exists). They pointed to the arbitration clauses in the 2007 and 2008 tripartite agreements. Their argument was simple: the disputes the wife and son had raised were covered by those clauses. The court had no business hearing the case.
The trial court agreed. On 13 October 2021, it allowed the Section 8 application and referred the entire dispute to arbitration. The wife and son challenged this order before the Bombay High Court, which dismissed their writ petition on 10 December 2021. They then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Three questions, one answer
The appeal raised three distinct legal questions. First, could an arbitration clause in agreements signed in 2007 and 2008 cover a dispute about a deed executed in 2019 — years after one of the signatories had died? Second, was a suit seeking cancellation of a conveyance deed even capable of being resolved through arbitration? And third, did allegations of fraud automatically take the dispute out of the arbitrator's hands?
The wife and son argued that the 2019 conveyance deed was a separate, independent document. The arbitration clauses in the older tripartite agreements, they said, could not reach a dispute about a deed that did not exist when those agreements were signed. They also argued that a suit for cancellation of a deed was a proceeding in rem (a legal action that determines rights against the whole world, not just between the parties), and such proceedings could only be decided by a court, not an arbitrator.
The defendants countered that the tripartite agreements were foundational. The development agreements and the conveyance deed were all executed "pursuant to" those foundational agreements. The arbitration clause was broad — it covered "any dispute in relation to or touching or arising from" the agreement. That language, they said, was wide enough to sweep in disputes about documents that came later.
The fraud plea that didn't stop the arbitrator
The Supreme Court's reasoning turned on the nature of the fraud alleged. The court drew a distinction that has become critical in Indian arbitration law: fraud that "permeates" the entire contract — including the arbitration agreement itself — can oust the arbitrator's jurisdiction. So can fraud that has implications in the public domain. But bald, unsubstantiated allegations of fraud are not enough.
The wife and son had alleged fraud in their plaint, but the court found the allegations vague and unsupported. The bench held that the fraud plea was unsubstantiated and not serious enough to oust arbitral jurisdiction. There was no claim that the arbitration agreement itself was procured by fraud. The fraud alleged was about the execution of the 2019 conveyance deed — a dispute that fell squarely within the scope of the arbitration clause. The court held that the arbitrator was competent to examine the fraud plea under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act (the provision that gives an arbitral tribunal the power to rule on its own jurisdiction).
The court also rejected the argument that cancellation of a deed was an action in rem. Citing its own precedents — Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Limited (2011), Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn. (2021), NTPC Ltd. v. SPML Infra Ltd. (2023), and Smt. M. Hemalatha Devi & Ors. v. B. Udayasri (2023) — the court held that a suit for cancellation of a deed is an action in personam (a legal action that determines rights only between the specific parties to the dispute). Such disputes are arbitrable.
The court further relied on BSNL v. Nortel Networks (2021), Deccan Paper Mills v. Regency Mahavir Properties (2021), Rashid Raza v. Sadaf Akhtar (2019), and Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Ltd. v. Northern Coal Field Ltd. (2020) to reinforce the principle that broad arbitration clauses in foundational agreements cover disputes arising from subsequent documents executed pursuant to those agreements.
The narrow door left for courts after 2015
The court emphasised that after the 2015 amendment to the Arbitration Act, the scope of judicial scrutiny at the stage of a Section 8 application is extremely narrow. The court's job is limited to checking two things: whether a valid arbitration agreement exists, and whether the dispute is manifestly non-arbitrable. If both conditions are satisfied, the court must refer the parties to arbitration. It cannot conduct a mini-trial on the merits of the dispute.
The court also engaged with other provisions of the Arbitration Act. Section 5 — which limits the extent of judicial intervention — supported the court's restrained approach. And Section 11 — which deals with appointment of arbitrators — was cross-referenced to reinforce the principle that the court's role at the referral stage is minimal. Additionally, the court interpreted Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (the provision dealing with cancellation of instruments), holding that a suit for cancellation of a deed is an action in personam and therefore arbitrable.
The full procedural journey
The case travelled through three levels of the judicial system. It began in a Mumbai trial court, where the civil suit was filed in 2021. The defendants immediately moved a Section 8 application, which the trial court allowed on 13 October 2021, referring the entire dispute to arbitration. The wife and son then filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court, which dismissed it on 10 December 2021. Finally, they appealed to the Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal on 15 December 2023. At every stage, the courts held that the arbitration clause in the foundational tripartite agreements covered the disputes raised by the wife and son.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on 15 December 2023. A bench of Justice Aniruddha Bose and Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia held that the arbitration clause in the tripartite agreements was broad enough to cover the disputes raised by the wife and son. The 2019 conveyance deed, though executed after the husband's death, was a document that flowed from the foundational agreements. The dispute was arbitrable. The fraud plea was insufficient to oust the arbitrator's jurisdiction. And the arbitrator, under Section 16, was fully competent to decide whether it had jurisdiction to hear the case.
THE PLAY: When drafting arbitration clauses in foundational commercial agreements, use broad language — "any dispute in relation to or touching or arising from this agreement" — to ensure that disputes about subsequent documents executed pursuant to the agreement are also covered.
The deed signed eight years after the man's death would be examined not by a judge in a courtroom, but by an arbitrator in a hearing room — exactly where the dead man's signature had sent it, fourteen years before.