CRIMINAL DEFENCE  ·  CRIMINAL

A cop's carbine fired 5 rounds during a scuffle. Was it murder or accident?

Two eyewitnesses said the gun went off accidentally when the deceased grabbed it. The Supreme Court had to decide if a life sentence was justified.

9

years.

Acquitted. After nine years.
TL;DR

Two eyewitnesses said the gun went off accidentally when the deceased grabbed it. The Supreme Court had to decide if a life sentence was justified.

In this reading
1. When the motive appeared 2. Two eyewitnesses who said the same thing 3. Why the Supreme Court said this was not murder 4. The res gestae point: a statement, not a confession 5. The procedural journey: from FIR to acquittal 6. The final verdict: negligence, not murder 7. The walk-off

A police constable playfully grabbed his colleague's carbine. Then five rounds went off.

The man who carried that weapon spent nine years in prison for murder. The Supreme Court had to decide one thing: was this a killing, or a catastrophe?

On 28 December 1994, Constable Mohd. Rashid was on the official telephone at the I.P. Estate Police Station in Delhi. Sub-Inspector Shashi Bala, the duty officer, asked another constable, Arvind Kumar, to tell Rashid to wrap it up. Arvind walked over and put a hand on Rashid's shoulder. Rashid did not shrug him off. He reached out and grabbed Arvind's carbine — a semi-automatic weapon called a SAF, designed for controlled, deliberate fire. The two men scuffled. The carbine got tangled in a chain attached to Arvind's belt. The change lever — the mechanism that switches between safety, single-shot, and automatic fire — caught on the belt chain, rotating the selector to automatic. Then it discharged. Five rounds in quick succession. One struck Rashid in the neck. He died on the spot.

The metallic clatter of the chain against the carbine's body, the sudden crack of the first round splitting the station's silence, the smell of cordite filling the room — these were the sensory fragments that the two eyewitnesses would later describe. The court would have to piece them together to decide whether this was a killing or a catastrophe.

When the motive appeared

Initially, the police registered a case under Section 304A IPC (causing death by negligence — a crime where there is no intent to kill, only carelessness). Then Rashid's father filed a complaint. He claimed his son had once caught Arvind and Sub-Inspector Shashi Bala in a compromising position, and that Arvind had held a grudge. The case was upgraded to murder under Section 302 IPC (punishment for intentional killing).

The Sessions Court convicted Arvind of murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The court applied the 'thirdly' clause of Section 300 IPC (murder committed with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death). The High Court of Delhi confirmed the conviction — though it noted something curious: it disbelieved the alleged motive. Yet it still upheld the murder charge.

By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, Arvind had already spent nearly nine years in prison. The question before the bench of Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Rajesh Bindal was not whether a death had occurred — it was whether the law could call this murder.

The courtroom fell silent as the bench began its analysis. The file before them was thick with procedural history — an FIR under Section 304A that had been upgraded, a trial that had convicted, an appeal that had confirmed. But beneath the layers of paperwork lay a single, stark question: could a scuffle that ended in accidental discharge ever be murder?

Two eyewitnesses who said the same thing

The Supreme Court did something the lower courts had not: it went back to the evidence. Two eyewitnesses — PW-12 and PW-25 — had given consistent accounts. Both said the firing was accidental. Both described the scuffle, the chain entanglement, the sudden discharge. The prosecution had no witness who saw Arvind deliberately pull the trigger.

The ballistic evidence supported the defence. The carbine's change lever was not in the safety position. When the carbine got caught in the chain, the entanglement could cause accidental discharge — the change lever caught on the belt chain, rotating the selector to automatic. The court noted that this was a real possibility — not a far-fetched theory.

And then there was a deeper problem. The prosecution's entire case of intentional firing had never been put to the accused during his examination under Section 313 CrPC (the stage where a court asks the accused to explain the evidence against him). This is a fundamental procedural safeguard. If the court is going to convict someone of murder, the accused must at least be asked: "Did you intend to kill?" The prosecution had skipped that step.

Why the Supreme Court said this was not murder

The court examined Section 299 IPC (culpable homicide — the foundation of murder). To convict someone of culpable homicide, three things must be present: intention to cause death, intention to cause a bodily injury likely to cause death, or knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. The court found none of these.

The bench's reasoning was precise. As the judgment recorded: "None of the three ingredients of Section 299 IPC (intention to cause death, intention to cause likely-fatal injury, or knowledge of likely death) are met in such circumstances." This single line — drawn from the ratio — captured the essence of the court's conclusion.

Even if Arvind knew the safety lever was off — and the court accepted that he did — that knowledge alone could not mean he knew the gun would fire. The intervening act was unforeseeable: Rashid grabbing the weapon during a playful scuffle. A person cannot be said to have the "knowledge" that death is likely when the immediate trigger is someone else's sudden, unexpected action.

The court also considered Section 80 IPC (accident in doing a lawful act — a defence that applies when something happens without criminal intent or negligence). But here, the court drew a line. Arvind was carrying a sophisticated automatic weapon. He had a duty to ensure the safety lever was engaged at all times. His failure to do so was gross negligence — not an accident.

The res gestae point: a statement, not a confession

The bench also made a significant observation about evidence law. A statement made by an accused immediately after the incident — what the law calls res gestae (facts forming part of the same transaction under Section 6 of the Evidence Act) — can be relevant and admissible. But it cannot be treated as a confession of guilt. It is merely a piece of conduct that helps the court understand what happened in the moment.

This distinction mattered in Arvind's case. Whatever he said immediately after the firing — the shock, the exclamation, the attempt to explain — could be used to show his state of mind and the sequence of events. But it could not be twisted into an admission of murder. The court was careful to separate conduct from confession, ensuring that the law's evidentiary framework did not punish a man for his first, panicked words.

The procedural journey: from FIR to acquittal

The case began on 28 December 1994, when the I.P. Estate Police Station registered an FIR under Section 304A IPC — a straightforward case of negligence. But the investigation was soon transferred to the Crime Branch of the Delhi Police, and the chargesheet was upgraded to include Section 302 IPC, based on the deceased's father's complaint alleging a motive. The Sessions Court, in its judgment, accepted the upgraded charge and convicted Arvind of murder, applying the 'thirdly' clause of Section 300. The High Court of Delhi, in appeal, confirmed the conviction, though it disbelieved the alleged motive — a contradiction that the Supreme Court would later find significant. By the time the matter reached the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 2390 of 2010, the case had wound through nearly three decades of litigation, the file growing thick with judgments, witness statements, and ballistic reports.

The final verdict: negligence, not murder

The Supreme Court set aside the murder conviction. It held Arvind guilty under Section 304A IPC (causing death by negligence), which carries a maximum sentence of two years. By the time of the judgment — 17 July 2023 — Arvind had already served nearly nine years, far exceeding the maximum. The court ordered his immediate release.

The operative order was brief and final: "The appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of IPC is set aside and he is held guilty of committing the offence punishable under Section 304A of IPC. The appellant has undergone the maximum sentence prescribed for the said offence. Hence, his detention in prison is no longer required. Hence, his bail bonds are cancelled."

Nine years for a crime that carried a two-year maximum. The law had taken its time, but it had finally arrived at the right destination.

THE PLAY: If you carry a weapon — especially an automatic one — the law will hold you to a higher standard of care. Failing to engage the safety mechanism is not an accident; it is gross negligence, and if someone dies, you face a criminal conviction even if you never intended to fire.

The walk-off

A playful grab, a tangled chain, and five rounds that rewrote a man's life — the court ended where it began: with a carbine that should never have been ready to fire. The metallic clatter of the chain, the sudden crack of the first round, the smell of cordite, the silence that followed — these were not the sounds of murder. They were the sounds of a catastrophe that the law, after nearly three decades, finally understood.

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Reviewed by Sharad Bansal on 15 · 05 · 2026

Sharad Bansal — Sharad Bansal is an advocate of the Delhi High Court with twenty years of practice in criminal defence and commercial litigation.

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