A dying man's last words to a witness: admissible or not?

A man is shot. He tells a witness: 'My nephew fired at me.' But he didn't say it in court—he was too injured. So can the witness repeat those words?

The answer turned on a single, razor-thin distinction: how much time passed between the bullet and the words. The Supreme Court ruled that the statement was admissible—because it was made while the man was still inside the event, not outside it.

When the nephew's name left the victim's mouth

The facts were brutal and simple. A man was shot. Bleeding, he turned to a witness and said his nephew had fired at him. The victim survived long enough to make that statement, but not long enough to testify in court. By the time the trial began, the only person who could repeat the accusation was the witness who had heard it.

The prosecution wanted that witness to take the stand and say: He told me his nephew shot him.

The defence objected. This was hearsay, they argued—a statement made outside court, by a person who could not be cross-examined (questioned by the other side). The law, they said, does not allow one person to repeat another's words as proof of what happened.

The trial court admitted the statement. The accused appealed. The question climbed all the way to the Supreme Court in Sukhar v. State of U.P.

The rule against hearsay—and the exception that swallowed it

Indian evidence law has a firm rule: you cannot testify about what someone else told you, because the person who actually saw or heard something must be in court to be questioned. That rule is called the hearsay bar.

But like every rule, it has exceptions. One of those exceptions is Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It allows a statement to be admitted as evidence if it was made during the course of the same transaction—what lawyers call res gestae (things done as part of the same event). The key is spontaneity. If the statement was made at the moment of the incident, or so close to it that there was no time to fabricate, it becomes part of the event itself. The witness who heard it can repeat it.

The Supreme Court had to decide whether the injured man's accusation—made after he was shot but before he died—was spontaneous enough to qualify.

Why the court said yes

The Court observed that the rationale for admitting a statement under Section 6 is "the spontaneity and immediacy of that statement in relation to the fact in issue." The question was not whether the statement was true—that was for the trial judge to decide. The question was whether it was made so close in time and place to the shooting that it could be considered part of the same event.

The Court held that if the statement was made contemporaneously with the acts constituting the offence, or immediately thereafter, it would be admissible. But there was a catch. The Court added: "If there was an interval, however slight, which was sufficient enough for fabrication, the statement would not be considered part of res gestae."

In other words, the test is not just about time. It is about opportunity. Even a few seconds can be too long if the injured person had time to think, to choose his words, to shift blame. The statement must be the raw, unmediated product of the event itself.

The Court concluded that the witness could repeat what the injured man said. The statement was admissible under Section 6 because it was part of the same transaction.

When the line is drawn: the phone call that came too late

The Supreme Court has drawn the line sharply in other cases. In Vasa Chandrasekhar Rao v. Ponna Satyanarayana, the father of the accused called the father of the deceased and said that the accused had killed the deceased. The question was whether this telephone call was admissible under Section 6.

The Court said no. There was no evidence that the call was made at the time of the crime or immediately after. The information lacked the necessary spontaneity and immediacy. The gap—however long it was—gave room for fabrication. The statement could not be considered part of the same transaction.

The difference between Sukhar and Vasa Chandrasekhar Rao is the difference between a man bleeding on the ground and a man picking up a phone. One is still inside the event. The other has stepped outside it. In the former, the words are still part of the transaction. In the latter, they are a report on a transaction that has already closed.

When the witness arrived after the body was found

A contrasting situation, yet one that reinforces the same principle of immediacy, arose in Bishna v. State of West Bengal. In that case, besides the eye-witnesses, two additional witnesses—designated as PW-16 and PW-19—were examined. These witnesses arrived at the place of occurrence immediately after the incident had taken place. They found the dead body of Prankrishna and the injured Napal in an unconscious state. They did not see the attack. But they heard about it from people who were present.

Specifically, PW-16 found the mother of Prankrishna and Nepal weeping, and he heard about the entire incident, including the roles played by the appellants, from Chepulal. PW-19 also corroborated the prosecution testimonies, stating he heard about the incident from Subhas Mahato. The Supreme Court observed that the evidence of these two witnesses—who recounted statements made immediately following the event—was admissible in terms of Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act. The principle affirmed was that statements closely connected in time and place to the fact in issue are relevant.

Notice what the Court did not require: that the witness see the crime. PW-16 and PW-19 saw only the aftermath—a dead body, an unconscious man, a weeping mother. The witness only needed to hear the statement while the event was still unfolding, or so close to it that the statement was part of the event, not a reflection on it. The words were still hot. They were admissible under Section 6.

The practical test for trial lawyers

The Sukhar case gives trial lawyers a clear framework. If a client has a witness who heard an injured person's accusation, the first question is not whether the statement is true. The first question is: When was it made? If it was made at the scene, while the victim was still in the grip of the event, it is admissible. If there was a gap—even a short one—the statement may be excluded.

The burden is on the prosecution to show spontaneity. The defence should probe the timeline: How long after the shooting did the victim speak? Was he conscious? Did anyone speak to him before he made the statement? Any opportunity for coaching or reflection destroys the exception. The court's own language is instructive: even a slight interval "sufficient enough for fabrication" is fatal to admissibility.

In Bishna, the defence might have argued that PW-16 and PW-19 were repeating what they heard from Chepulal and Subhas Mahato—who were themselves not eye-witnesses in the strict sense. But the Court held that the immediacy of the statements, made at the scene moments after the attack, was sufficient. The chain of hearsay did not matter because each link was forged in the same transaction.

In Vasa Chandrasekhar Rao, by contrast, the telephone call was made from a different location, at an unspecified time after the crime. There was no finding that the information was given either at the time of the commission of the crime or immediately thereafter, so as to form the same transaction. The lack of temporal connection meant the statement did not possess the necessary spontaneity and immediacy. The Court concluded that due to this missing link, the evidence could not be considered relevant under Section 6 of the Evidence Act.

What this means for practitioners

The three cases together form a coherent framework. Sukhar establishes the core principle: a statement made by an injured person to a witness, while still within the event, is admissible under Section 6. Bishna extends that principle to statements heard by witnesses who arrive immediately after the event, even if they did not see the crime themselves. Vasa Chandrasekhar Rao draws the outer boundary: once the event has ended and a report is made from a different time or place, the statement loses its spontaneity and falls outside Section 6.

For the prosecution, the strategy is clear. Lead evidence to establish the precise timeline. Show that the statement was made at the scene, within moments of the incident. Call the witness who heard the words to describe the victim's condition—bleeding, disoriented, still in shock. The more raw the moment, the stronger the case for admissibility.

For the defence, the strategy is equally clear. Cross-examine on the gap. Ask: How long after the shooting did you hear the statement? Was the victim conscious? Did anyone speak to him before he spoke to you? Was there time for someone to suggest what he should say? If the prosecution cannot rule out fabrication, the statement must be excluded.

THE PLAY: To admit a hearsay statement under Section 6, prove that the words were spoken while the event was still happening—not after it had ended and the speaker had time to think. The test is not the clock alone, but whether there was any opportunity for fabrication.

The man who was shot never testified. But his last words, spoken in the moment, were enough. The witness who heard them could repeat them in court, not because the words were proven true, but because they were part of the same transaction—the same burst of violence that had felled the speaker. The law, in that moment, trusted the raw evidence of the event itself.