A lawyer got a convict's underwear as evidence. Then it didn't fit.

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In 1990, a man was caught with charas in his underwear. The underwear was released to a junior lawyer. Then it came back—and didn't fit.

Andrew Salvatore, an Australian national, was stopped at Thiruvananthapuram airport. Inside his underwear, hidden like a smuggler's secret, was charas—cannabis resin, a psychotropic substance. He was convicted under the NDPS Act (the law that criminalises possession of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances). His personal belongings, including the underwear marked as material evidence Mo2, were released to a junior lawyer named Antony Raju. Routine. Or so it seemed.

Then the underwear was returned to the court clerk. But when it was examined during Salvatore's appeal, something was wrong. The underwear didn't fit him. Not even close. The courtroom fell silent as the garment was produced—it hung loose, an absurd mismatch that made the judges lean forward in their chairs.

When the High Court smelled a rat

In 1991, the Kerala High Court acquitted Salvatore. The judges didn't just let him go—they smelled something rotten. The evidence looked planted. Tampered. The court directed an inquiry into how a key piece of evidence in custodia legis (evidence held under the court's custody and control) could change size between a conviction and an appeal.

Three years later, on 5 October 1994, an FIR was registered—FIR No.215/1994. The accused: the court clerk who received the underwear back from Antony Raju, and Antony Raju himself. The charges read like a prosecutor's laundry list: criminal conspiracy (Section 120B IPC—an agreement to commit an illegal act), cheating (Section 420 IPC—fraudulently inducing delivery of property), causing disappearance of evidence (Section 201 IPC—destroying or concealing evidence to screen an offender), giving false evidence (Section 193 IPC—fabricating false evidence with intent to mislead a court), a public servant disobeying the law (Section 217 IPC—a public servant knowingly disobeying a direction of law), and common intention (Section 34 IPC—shared criminal intent).

It took twelve years for the police to file a chargesheet—24 March 2006. Then another eight years for the magistrate to take cognizance (formally accept the case for trial) in 2014, as C.C. No.811/2014 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate-I, Nedumangad. By then, the underwear was a ghost. But the legal question was very much alive.

The procedural journey was a study in delays: the original NDPS case began with FIR No.60/1990 at Valiyathura Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram, under Section 20(b)(ii) NDPS Act. The Sessions Court, Thiruvananthapuram, convicted Salvatore in SC No.147/90. The High Court of Kerala acquitted him on 5 February 1991. Then, after the tampering FIR in 1994, the chargesheet took until 2006, and cognizance until 2014. The quashing petitions reached the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam, which allowed them on 10 March 2023, but directed the Registry to take fresh steps under Section 195. That order was challenged before the Supreme Court in SLP(Crl.)No.4887/2024 and SLP(Crl.)No.7896/2023.

The legal trap: Section 195(1)(b)

The accused went to the Kerala High Court in 2022, arguing that the entire criminal case was dead on arrival. Their weapon: Section 195(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code (a provision that bars a court from taking cognizance of certain offences—like giving false evidence or tampering with evidence—unless the court itself files a formal complaint).

Their logic was simple: You can't prosecute someone for cheating the court or destroying evidence unless the court that was cheated writes a complaint. A police FIR and a magistrate's order aren't enough. The High Court agreed. In March 2023, it quashed the proceedings—but then did something strange. It directed its own Registry to take fresh steps under Section 195. A kind of do-over.

The Supreme Court didn't like that.

Why the Supreme Court reversed

In November 2024, a bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice C.T. Ravikumar heard the appeals in M.R. Ajayan v. State of Kerala & Ors. (with Antony Raju v. State of Kerala & Anr.). The question was narrow but potent: Could criminal proceedings for evidence tampering survive when the High Court itself had directed the inquiry, even without a formal complaint under Section 195(1)(b)?

The Supreme Court said yes. And it said it with clarity.

The Court held, in its ratio decidendi, that "where proceedings originate from a judicial order of the High Court directing inquiry into evidence tampering, the bar under Section 195(1)(b) does not apply." The High Court's own direction—its judicial order—satisfies the statutory requirement of a complaint by "that Court or some other Court to which that Court is subordinate."

The Court followed its own precedents: CBI v. M. Sivamani (2017) 14 SCC 855 and Perumal v. Janaki (2014) 5 SCC 377. The key insight: there is no distinction between a judicial order and an administrative order for the purposes of Section 195(1)(b). When the High Court speaks, its word is enough. The Court also relied on P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam & Anr. (1980) 3 SCC 141, National Commission for Women v. State of Delhi & Anr. (2010) 12 SCC 599, Amanuallah & Anr. v. State of Bihar & Ors. (2016) 6 SCC 699, Naveen Singh v. State of U.P. (2021) 6 SCC 191, Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar (1998) 2 SCC 493, and M.S. Ahlawat v. State of Haryana & Anr. (2000) 1 SCC 278.

The Court directly quoted from its reasoning: "For the purposes of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC, there is no distinction between a judicial order and an administrative order by 'a Court to which that Court is subordinate.' The nature of the order (judicial vs. administrative) does not determine whether the Section 195 bar applies when the direction emanates from the High Court."

The bigger picture: tampering with justice

The Supreme Court didn't stop at the technicality. It went deeper. Alleged tampering with material evidence in custodia legis, the Court said, strikes at the foundation of the administration of justice. It erodes public trust. It compromises the rule of law.

This wasn't just about an underwear that didn't fit. It was about whether the system can protect its own evidence from being manipulated. If a court clerk and a lawyer can swap an exhibit and walk away because of a procedural bar, what's left of the trial process? The Court noted that "alleged tampering with material evidence in custodia legis, resulting in interference with criminal prosecution and compromising the sanctity of judicial proceedings, inherently involves public interest."

The Court also addressed the standing of the appellant, M.R. Ajayan, who wasn't a party to the original NDPS case. It held that in cases involving serious allegations of interference with judicial processes, the Court should be liberal in allowing third parties with a bona fide connection to maintain appeals under Article 136 (the Supreme Court's special leave jurisdiction). Public interest demands it.

The court clerk's hands, as he returned the underwear to the courtroom, must have been steady—but the evidence itself told a different story. The silence in the courtroom when the garment was produced, the way it hung loose on the accused, the quiet shuffling of papers as the judges realised the implications—these moments became the foundation of a legal battle that would span three decades.

What this means for you

For practitioners, the ratio is straightforward: If the High Court directs an inquiry into evidence tampering, no separate complaint under Section 195(1)(b) is needed. The judicial direction itself is the complaint. The bar doesn't apply.

For litigants, the message is starker: Evidence in court custody is sacred. Touch it, and the system will come for you—even if it takes thirty-four years.

The operative order was clear: the impugned order of the High Court was set aside. The order taking cognizance in Crime No.215/1994 and all further proceedings pursuant to the same (C.C. No.811 of 2014) were restored on the files of Judicial First Class Magistrate-I, Nedumangad. The trial court was directed to conclude the trial within one year. The accused were directed to appear before the trial court on 20th December 2024 or the next working day. SLP(Crl.)No.4887/2024 was allowed; SLP(Crl.)No.7896/2023 was dismissed.

THE PLAY: When the High Court orders an inquiry into evidence tampering, the Section 195(1)(b) bar does not apply—the court's own direction serves as the complaint.

The underwear never fit. But the law finally did.

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