CRIMINAL DEFENCE  ·  CRIMINAL

An e-newspaper director was charged for a Facebook post. The Supreme Court just shut it down.

The article accused a wealthy collector of land grab. But the FIR said it promoted 'enmity between groups' — even though it only named one person.

Quashed.

One man named.
Law misused.

TL;DR

The article accused a wealthy collector of land grab. But the FIR said it promoted 'enmity between groups' — even though it only named one person.

In this reading
1. The Facebook post that landed a director in court 2. One man, one allegation — but a law meant for mobs 3. The judges read the article themselves 4. Why the insult charge also collapsed 5. The Bhajan Lal test — a case that should never have begun 6. The line the court drew

A news portal published a Facebook post accusing a rich art collector of encroaching on government land. The collector filed a police complaint — and the director was charged with promoting enmity between groups. The question before the Supreme Court was deceptively simple: can a newspaper director be prosecuted for a story that names one person, not a community, under a law meant to stop riots between Hindus and Muslims?

The Facebook post that landed a director in court

March 2020. Journalist Gunanand Jakhmola posts on Facebook. His allegation: Rajeev Savara, a wealthy art collector, has encroached on government land in Uttarakhand. Worse, Savara is planning a foundation stone ceremony there — with the Chief Minister of Uttarakhand.

The post is picked up by the news portal Parvatjan. Shiv Prasad Semwal is the portal's director. He did not write the post. He did not edit it. But as the man in charge, he was responsible for what went up.

Savara did not file a defamation suit. He went to the police. His complaint alleged blackmail — a smear campaign to force a settlement. The police registered an FIR (a written complaint that starts a police investigation) at Muni Ki Reti police station in Tehri Garhwal district.

The charges were heavy: promoting enmity between different groups (Section 153A IPC), intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace (Section 504 IPC), defamation (Sections 500 and 501 IPC), and criminal conspiracy (Section 120B IPC).

One man, one allegation — but a law meant for mobs

The investigation progressed. The police dropped the defamation charges. But they kept the two most serious ones: Section 153A and Section 504. The question hung in the air: how did a story about one man encroaching on land become a case of promoting enmity between groups?

Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code has a specific purpose. It was designed to stop statements that could spark violence between religious communities, castes, or linguistic groups. Think of a speech calling for attacks on a minority, or a pamphlet spreading lies about a community. That is what Section 153A targets.

But the Parvatjan article did not mention any community. It did not name any religion, caste, or language group. It named one person: Rajeev Savara. The allegation was that he had encroached on government land. There was no call to violence, no group targeted, no communal angle.

Semwal approached the Uttarakhand High Court to have the FIR quashed. The High Court dismissed his petition. So he went to the Supreme Court.

The judges read the article themselves

The Supreme Court bench — Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice Sandeep Mehta — did something unusual. They read the offending article themselves. Not the police summary. Not the complainant's version. The actual words published.

What they found was simple: the article targeted a specific individual. It contained no reference to any group or community. There were no words that could be read as promoting enmity between Hindus and Muslims, or between any two identifiable groups.

The court applied the test from its own precedent in Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra. That case had established a clear rule: for Section 153A to apply, the words must target two or more identifiable groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste, or community. If the publication targets only a specific individual, the foundational ingredients of the offence are entirely missing.

Here, the article named one man. It accused him of encroachment. That might be defamation — but it was not promoting enmity between groups.

Why the insult charge also collapsed

Section 504 IPC has a specific requirement often overlooked. The insult must be of such a nature that it provokes the person insulted to breach public peace or commit another offence. It is not enough that the words were insulting. The prosecution must show that the insult could reasonably cause the complainant to lose control and disturb public order.

The FIR contained no such allegation. There was no claim that Savara was provoked to violence or that public peace was threatened. The court held that without this element, Section 504 could not stand.

And if the two main offences fell, the conspiracy charge under Section 120B fell with them. You cannot conspire to commit an offence that does not exist in the first place.

The Bhajan Lal test — a case that should never have begun

The court applied the principles from State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal — a landmark case that lists situations where a criminal case should be shut down immediately. One of those situations is when the allegations in the FIR, even if taken as completely true, do not make out any offence at all.

That was exactly the case here. Even if everything Savara alleged was true — that the article was published, that it accused him of encroachment, that it was meant to blackmail him — none of that added up to promoting enmity between groups or provoking a breach of peace.

The court called the continued prosecution a "gross abuse of process of law." It quashed FIR No. 31 of 2020 and all proceedings against Semwal.

The line the court drew

This judgment draws a clear line. A story that names one person and accuses that person of wrongdoing is not, by itself, a case of promoting enmity between groups. The police cannot stretch Section 153A to cover every controversial article. The law has a specific purpose — preventing group violence — and it cannot be used to silence individual criticism.

But the court left the defamation charges undisturbed. If Savara wants to pursue a civil defamation case or a criminal defamation complaint, that door remains open. The judgment does not give journalists a free pass to publish falsehoods. It only says: do not misuse a law meant for communal harmony to shut down reporting about a single person.

THE PLAY: If your publication is accused of promoting enmity between groups under Section 153A IPC, the first question to ask is: does the article name two or more identifiable communities? If it names only one individual, the charge cannot stand.

The article named one man. The court ended where it began: with a Facebook post, a land dispute, and a law that was never meant for this fight.

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Reviewed by Sharad Bansal on 15 · 05 · 2026

Sharad Bansal — Sharad Bansal is an advocate of the Delhi High Court with twenty years of practice in criminal defence and commercial litigation.

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