Army doctor took bribes, confessed, was convicted. The Supreme Court just set him free.
The court found the confession was coerced—and the prosecution's own witnesses actually helped his case.
16
years.
The court found the confession was coerced—and the prosecution's own witnesses actually helped his case.
Major Metri admitted taking ₹85,000 to clear unfit candidates. But the Supreme Court said his confession wasn't voluntary—and acquitted him.
He was a Recruiting Medical Officer in Jhunjhunu, Rajasthan. During army recruitment rallies in 2008-2009, candidates were allegedly cleared as medically fit in exchange for money. Major R. Metri, the officer responsible for those medical checks, was named in a police FIR and in media reports. He then walked into his superior officer's office and confessed—orally, then in writing. That handwritten confession, perhaps scribbled under the weight of an impending interrogation, would become the only thing tying him to the crime.
The question that hung over the case: could a man be cashiered from the army and sent to prison for a year when the only evidence against him was a confession he gave after an FIR was already registered, after media had named him, and after he had reported threats to his superiors?
When the confession came under a cloud
The police registered FIR No. 125/2009 at Adarsh Nagar Police Station, Ajmer, on July 11, 2009, under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code (criminal breach of trust and cheating). A Court of Inquiry by the Army followed on December 14, 2009, which directed disciplinary action against Major Metri and others.
Major Metri challenged the Court of Inquiry before the Armed Forces Tribunal in Jaipur in April 2010. The Tribunal rejected his challenge. A General Court Martial (GCM) was convened. On April 28, 2013, the GCM convicted Major Metri on two charges: receiving illegal gratification of ₹65,000 and ₹20,000 to clear candidates, under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (a public servant taking a bribe) read with Section 69 of the Army Act (civil offences committed by army personnel). He was acquitted on a third charge. The sentence: cashiering (dismissal with disgrace) and one year's rigorous imprisonment. The GCM chamber, likely sparse and formal, must have felt heavy as the verdict was read.
The General Officer Commanding confirmed the findings and sentence on December 29, 2013, though the unexpired portion of the rigorous imprisonment was remitted.
Why the Tribunal saw it differently
Major Metri appealed to the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi. The Tribunal has jurisdiction under Section 15(4) of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 (the power to hear appeals against court-martial findings). On March 2, 2017, the Tribunal partly allowed his appeal.
The Tribunal set aside the conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It found that the extra-judicial confession (a confession made outside court, not recorded by a magistrate) was not voluntary. The reasoning: Major Metri had previously reported threats to his superiors. An FIR was already registered. Media reports had named him. Police interrogation was imminent. In those circumstances, the Tribunal held, the confession could not be considered free and voluntary. The Supreme Court later observed that this was "a plausible view that an appellate court will not disturb."
But the Tribunal did not acquit him entirely. It convicted him under Section 63 of the Army Act (conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline) instead. Both sides appealed to the Supreme Court—the Union of India challenging the acquittal under the PC Act, and Major Metri challenging the conviction under Section 63.
The prosecution's own witnesses helped the defence
Before the Supreme Court, the Union of India argued that the Armed Forces Tribunal had overstepped its jurisdiction. The Tribunal, the government said, could not reverse findings of a court-martial merely because a different view was possible. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. The court held that the Tribunal is entitled to reappreciate evidence (re-examine the facts) to determine whether findings are legally unsustainable, involve a wrong decision on law, or result from a material irregularity causing miscarriage of justice.
Then the court examined the evidence itself. And here, the prosecution's case unravelled.
The only evidence against Major Metri was his extra-judicial confession. The Supreme Court noted that an extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. A conviction based solely on such a confession, without corroboration (other independent evidence supporting the same fact), is not justified. As the court stated in its ratio, "an extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence and conviction solely on its basis, without corroboration, is not justified."
There was no corroboration. Worse, the prosecution's own witnesses undermined the case. They admitted that no candidate was found to have been wrongly declared fit. They admitted that Major Metri's role was only assistive—he was not the sole decision-maker on medical fitness. And crucially, no material established that the amounts received were illegal gratification.
Why the money wasn't a bribe
Major Metri had an explanation for the two transactions. The ₹20,000, he said, was a loan returned to him when he returned from travel. The ₹65,000 was repayment of a loan he had taken from the person who deposited it. The prosecution witnesses themselves corroborated this explanation. The Supreme Court held that where the accused provides an explanation for monetary transactions and prosecution witnesses corroborate it, the accused has discharged the burden of proof regarding the nature of those transactions.
The court also applied Article 20(3) of the Constitution (the protection against self-incrimination—no person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against themselves). Where the circumstances indicate that a confession was not voluntary—particularly where the confessor had reported threats, an FIR was already registered, media had named him, and police interrogation was imminent—the finding that such confession was involuntary is a plausible view that an appellate court will not disturb.
The Supreme Court's final word
On April 4, 2022, a bench of Justice L. Nageswara Rao and Justice B.R. Gavai dismissed the Union of India's appeal and allowed Major Metri's cross-appeal. The courtroom likely fell into a focused silence as the judgment was read, the pages rustling as the bench delivered its operative order. The conviction under Section 63 of the Army Act was quashed. Major Metri was acquitted of all charges. The court directed that he be reinstated forthwith with continuity of service, though without backwages for the period he was out of employment.
The bench cited four precedents: Union of India v. Sandeep Kumar (2019) on the scope of Tribunal jurisdiction; The State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (1962) on self-incrimination; Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2012) on extra-judicial confessions; and Chandra Kumar Chopra v. Union of India (2012) on court-martial appeals.
THE PLAY: An extra-judicial confession, without corroboration, cannot sustain a conviction—especially when the confessor reported threats, an FIR was already registered, and prosecution witnesses themselves support the accused's explanation for the money.
Major Metri walked free—not because the money was never paid, but because the law demands more than a coerced word against a man's career and liberty.