Army major accused in recruitment scam walks free after Supreme Court finds confession was forced
The court said an extra-judicial confession made after the scam was already in the news is weak evidence—and quashed the conviction that had cost him his career.
13
years.
The court said an extra-judicial confession made after the scam was already in the news is weak evidence—and quashed the conviction that had cost him his career.
He confessed to taking bribes to clear army recruits. But by the time he spoke, the scam was already all over the news. On a July afternoon in 2009, Major R. Metri, a Recruiting Medical Officer posted in Jhunjhunu, Rajasthan, sat before his superior officer and admitted to taking money to declare candidates medically fit during army recruitment rallies.
The confession was written on paper, signed, and witnessed — the ink still fresh as the headlines of the scam blazed across newspapers. It should have been the end of his career. Instead, it became the beginning of a legal battle that would reach the Supreme Court — and end with a question that haunts every extra-judicial confession in India: when the whole world already knows the crime, is a confession still free?
When the money trail surfaced
The story begins in 2008-2009, during army recruitment rallies in Rajasthan. Major Metri was part of a medical team that assessed candidates for fitness. Two fellow officers allegedly involved him in a scheme: candidates who paid would be declared fit, regardless of their actual health.
The money trail was specific. Rs. 65,000 was deposited in Major Metri's father-in-law's account. Another Rs. 20,000 went into his own account. The prosecution would later argue that these deposits were illegal gratification — payment for clearing unqualified candidates.
But Major Metri had an explanation. The Rs. 65,000 was repayment of a loan his father-in-law had given to a relative. The Rs. 20,000 was from the sale of a motorcycle. Whether those explanations were true or convenient would become central to the case.
The confession that came too late
In July 2009, the recruitment scam exploded. An FIR (a written complaint that starts a police investigation) was registered at Police Station Adarsh Nagar, Ajmer on July 11, 2009. Media reports followed. The scam was public knowledge.
It was only after this — after the FIR and the headlines — that Major Metri allegedly confessed to his superior officer. He spoke orally. He wrote it down, the words forming on paper after the news had already spread through every tea stall and barracks. The confession was detailed: he admitted to taking bribes, named the amounts, described the arrangement.
But the timing was everything. The Supreme Court would later note that a confession made after the accused's involvement is already publicly known is inherently suspect. When the world already knows you did it, admitting it proves nothing about your free will.
The court-martial that ended a career
The army moved fast. A Court of Inquiry on December 14, 2009, recommended disciplinary action. A General Court Martial (GCM) — the military's equivalent of a trial — convicted Major Metri on two of three charges on April 28, 2013. He was found guilty of taking illegal gratification under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (the law that punishes public servants for accepting bribes) read with Section 69 of the Army Act, 1950 (which makes civil offences punishable under military law).
The sentence was brutal: cashiering (dismissal from service with loss of all benefits) and one year of rigorous imprisonment. A decorated officer was reduced to a convict, the weight of the judgment settling like dust in the courtroom.
Major Metri appealed to the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT), the specialised court that hears disputes from military personnel. On March 2, 2017, the AFT partially agreed with him. It found that the extra-judicial confession was not voluntary — it had been made after the scam was already public, and there was evidence that it might have been extracted with assurances. The tribunal set aside the corruption conviction.
But the AFT did not acquit him entirely. It convicted him under a lesser charge: Section 63 of the Army Act (violation of good order and discipline). The punishment was forfeiture of seniority and a severe reprimand — less severe than cashiering, but still a stain on his record.
Both sides go to the Supreme Court
The Union of India appealed against the AFT's decision to set aside the corruption conviction. Major Metri appealed against the Section 63 conviction. Both sides wanted the Supreme Court to settle the matter.
The government argued that the AFT had overstepped its powers. Under Section 15(4) of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, the tribunal could only interfere with a court-martial's findings if they were "legally not sustainable." The government said the AFT had simply re-appreciated the evidence and substituted its own view — something it was not entitled to do.
Major Metri's lawyers argued the opposite: that the confession was involuntary, uncorroborated, and therefore worthless. They pointed to Article 20(3) of the Constitution (the protection against self-incrimination — no person can be compelled to be a witness against themselves). They said the conviction under Section 63 was also unsustainable because there was no evidence of any misconduct beyond the tainted confession. In the Supreme Court's corridors, the file felt thin — a single confession paper against a career.
What the Supreme Court decided
On April 4, 2022, a bench of Justice L. Nageswara Rao and Justice B.R. Gavai delivered its judgment. The courtroom fell silent as the operative order was read. The court dismissed the government's appeal and allowed Major Metri's appeal. He was acquitted of all charges. The court ordered his reinstatement with continuity of service but without back wages for the period he was out of employment.
The reasoning was precise. First, the court held that the AFT was entitled to re-appreciate evidence under Section 15(4). The power was not limited to merely taking a different view — the tribunal could examine whether the court-martial's findings involved a wrong decision on a question of law or resulted from a material irregularity causing miscarriage of justice.
Second, and more importantly, the court addressed the extra-judicial confession. It cited its own precedents — The State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (1962) and Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2012) — to hold that "an extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence". Unless it is found to be voluntary, trustworthy, and reliable, a conviction cannot be based solely on it without corroboration (other independent evidence supporting the same fact).
The court found that the circumstances here indicated the confession was not voluntary. The scam was already in the news. The FIR had been registered. The possibility existed that the confession was extracted with assurances. The AFT's finding on this point was a plausible view, and the Supreme Court would not disturb it.
Third, the court examined the corruption charge itself. The prosecution witnesses admitted that no candidate who was declared fit was subsequently found medically unfit. Major Metri was part of a team that only assisted independent medical members — he did not have the final say. And the money receipts were satisfactorily explained as loan repayments and a motorcycle sale. Without the confession, there was no evidence of corruption.
As for the Section 63 conviction, the court found it equally unsustainable. If the corruption charge failed, there was no basis for a conviction under the catch-all provision of "violation of good order and discipline." The judgment cited Union of India v. Sandeep Kumar (2019) and Chandra Kumar Chopra v. Union of India (2012) to reinforce the limits of military discipline provisions.
Why this case matters
For military lawyers and criminal practitioners, this judgment is a reminder that extra-judicial confessions carry little weight when the accused had reason to fear or hope. The timing of a confession — whether it comes before or after the news breaks — can determine its voluntariness. The Supreme Court's application of Article 20(3) here echoes the constitutional protection against self-incrimination first articulated in Kathi Kalu Oghad (1962): that no person can be compelled to be a witness against themselves.
For the armed forces, the case is a cautionary tale about the limits of court-martial proceedings. Even a confession, if tainted, cannot sustain a conviction. The procedural journey — from the FIR on July 11, 2009, through the Court of Inquiry on December 14, 2009, the GCM conviction on April 28, 2013, the AFT's partial relief on March 2, 2017, to the Supreme Court's final word on April 4, 2022 — spans over a decade of legal warfare.
THE PLAY: If you are defending a client in a court-martial where the only evidence is an extra-judicial confession made after the crime became public, argue that the confession is involuntary and uncorroborated — and cite Major R. Metri for the proposition that the AFT can re-appreciate evidence to reach that conclusion.
The officer who confessed to taking bribes walked free. But he walked free not because the system failed — but because it worked exactly as the Constitution intended. The bench's silence as the verdict was read spoke louder than any confession ever could.