CRIMINAL DEFENCE  ·  CRIMINAL

Can a court deny bail because the accused didn't file a quashing petition?

The Supreme Court says no—and calls such reasoning 'perverse' in activist Teesta Setalvad's case, granting her regular bail.

12

months.

Set aside. After twelve months.
TL;DR

The Supreme Court says no—and calls such reasoning 'perverse' in activist Teesta Setalvad's case, granting her regular bail.

In this reading
1. When the High Court said no—twice 2. The contradiction that broke the case 3. Why the Supreme Court called it perverse 4. What the court ordered 5. What this means for every bail hearing

The High Court told her: you can't challenge the case at bail stage unless you first file a petition to quash the FIR. The Supreme Court disagreed—hard. On 19 July 2023, social activist Teesta Setalvad walked out of a Gujarat courtroom not because a judge believed her innocent, but because the country's highest court had just shredded a legal argument so flawed it called the very idea of bail into question. The courtroom fell silent as the three-judge bench read its order, the stack of documents on the dais shifting under the weight of a judgment that would reshape bail jurisprudence.

The question was deceptively simple: Could a judge deny bail simply because the accused hadn't first asked the court to throw out the entire case against her?

When the High Court said no—twice

Teesta Setalvad had been arrested on 25 June 2022, a day after the Supreme Court made observations in another case suggesting she and others had abused the legal process in connection with the 2002 Gujarat riots investigations. The FIR, date-stamped that same day by the Crime Branch in Gujarat, accused her of fabricating evidence, forging documents, and influencing witnesses to file false affidavits that allegedly implicated senior government officials. The smell of old paper and fresh ink hung over the file as it moved from the police station to the magistrate's court.

She was charged under a battery of serious provisions: Section 194 IPC (giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure a conviction for a capital offence), Sections 468 and 469 (forgery for cheating and for harming reputation), Section 471 (using a forged document as genuine), Section 211 (filing a false charge with intent to injure), Section 218 (a public servant framing an incorrect record to save someone from punishment), and Section 120B (criminal conspiracy). The chargesheet, filed after custodial interrogation, ran into hundreds of pages, each document carrying the weight of allegations stretching back to 2002.

The Sessions Court rejected her bail on 30 July 2022. She went to the Gujarat High Court, which issued notice on 3 August 2022 but didn't grant interim relief. The file sat on the judge's desk, gathering dust, as the legal machinery ground slowly. So she approached the Supreme Court, which on 2 September 2022 granted her interim bail, noting that her custodial interrogation was complete and the alleged offences dated back to 2002-2012. The court's order was crisp: the evidence was documentary, the chargesheet was filed, and continued detention served no purpose.

Then came the High Court's regular bail hearing. The single judge took nearly a year to decide. When the order finally came on 1 July 2023, it contained a contradiction that the Supreme Court would later call "perverse." The courtroom that day was tense—the accused had been on interim bail for ten months, and the High Court's order directed her to surrender immediately.

The contradiction that broke the case

The High Court first held that assessing whether a prima facie case existed against the accused was impermissible at the bail stage. Then, in the very same order, it proceeded to find that a prima facie case under Section 194 IPC was indeed made out against Setalvad. The judge's pen had written two irreconcilable statements on the same page.

But the High Court didn't stop there. It added a second, more troubling reason: Setalvad had not filed a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC (the High Court's inherent power to quash an FIR or chargesheet that is an abuse of process) or under Articles 226/32 of the Constitution (the power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to issue writs). Because she hadn't first asked to quash the case, the High Court reasoned, she couldn't challenge the existence of a prima facie case at the bail stage.

This logic, the Supreme Court would later hold, was fundamentally wrong. The High Court had, in effect, created a procedural trap: to get bail, you must first file a quashing petition—but to file a quashing petition, you must first be out on bail. The circular reasoning left the accused with no exit.

Why the Supreme Court called it perverse

A three-judge bench—Justice B.R. Gavai, Justice A.S. Bopanna, and Justice Dipankar Datta—heard Setalvad's appeal on 19 July 2023. The court found the High Court's reasoning so flawed that it used the word "perverse" in its judgment. The bench's silence as it read the operative portion of the order was heavier than any spoken word.

The Supreme Court's central holding was straightforward: An accused person's failure to file a petition to quash an FIR or chargesheet under Section 482 CrPC or Articles 226/32 of the Constitution has no relevance whatsoever in deciding a bail application. If such a proposition were accepted, the court reasoned, no pre-trial bail application could ever be entertained unless the accused first filed quashing proceedings. That would turn the bail process on its head, making bail a reward for challenging the case itself rather than a right to be considered on its own merits.

The court also noted that the circumstances that existed when it granted interim bail in September 2022—the documentary nature of the evidence, the fact that the chargesheet had been filed, and that Setalvad had not been called for investigation even once during her interim bail period—continued to subsist unchanged. Where those considerations remain the same, the court held, bail ought not to be refused. The file on the bench was the same file that had been examined months earlier; nothing new had emerged to justify continued detention.

The court cited its earlier precedent in Niranjan Singh and Another v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote and Others, which held that the nature of the accusation and the severity of the punishment are relevant at the bail stage, but that a court cannot shut its eyes to the evidence entirely. The High Court, by first refusing to assess the prima facie case and then doing exactly that, had violated this basic principle.

What the court ordered

The Supreme Court quashed the High Court's order and granted Setalvad regular bail on the same terms as her interim bail. Her passport would remain with the Sessions Court, and she was directed not to influence witnesses. The order was dated 19 July 2023, and the case number—Criminal Appeal No. 2022/2023 (@ SLP (CRL) No. 8503/2023)—was stamped on every copy that left the registry that afternoon.

The court left the question of whether the charges under Section 194 IPC and other provisions were actually made out—that is, whether the evidence truly supported them—to be decided at trial. It did not express any opinion on the merits of the case itself. The door to trial remained open; the Supreme Court had only cleared the procedural hurdle that should never have been erected.

What this means for every bail hearing

For lawyers and accused persons, this judgment settles a dangerous idea that had begun creeping into bail jurisprudence: that a person must first challenge the very existence of the case before asking for release. The Supreme Court has now made clear that bail and quashing are separate remedies, serving different purposes. A person can seek bail without first asking the court to kill the case entirely. The two remedies run on parallel tracks, not in sequence.

The judgment also reinforces a basic principle of bail law: a court cannot say one thing and do the opposite. If a judge believes that assessing prima facie case is not allowed at the bail stage, that judge cannot then turn around and find a prima facie case exists. Such contradictory reasoning, the Supreme Court held, vitiates the entire order. The judgment in Teesta Atul Setalvad v. State of Gujarat, cited as 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 554, now stands as a warning against such judicial inconsistency.

The case also highlights the importance of timing in bail proceedings. The Supreme Court had granted interim bail in September 2022, yet the High Court took nearly a year to decide the regular bail application. By that time, the circumstances had not changed—the chargesheet was still the chargesheet, the evidence was still documentary, and the accused had not been called for investigation. The delay, the Supreme Court implied, should not work to the accused's disadvantage.

THE PLAY: Never let a court hold your client's failure to file a quashing petition against them at a bail hearing—the Supreme Court has now called that reasoning perverse.

The High Court had built a wall where no wall should stand. The Supreme Court knocked it down. The sound of that wall falling echoed through every courtroom in the country, reminding judges and lawyers alike that bail is a right, not a reward for filing the right paperwork.

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Reviewed by Sharad Bansal on 15 · 05 · 2026

Sharad Bansal — Sharad Bansal is an advocate of the Delhi High Court with twenty years of practice in criminal defence and commercial litigation.

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