Can arbitrators get more time after the deadline has already passed? SC says yes.

The arbitrator's deadline expired. The parties missed it. But the Supreme Court just said — they can still ask for more time.

A construction company in Kolkata had been locked in an arbitration (a private dispute resolution process where parties choose an arbitrator instead of going to court) with a paint manufacturer. The twelve-month clock ran out before the arbitrator could deliver the award. The company rushed to the Calcutta High Court asking for an extension — but was told it was too late. The arbitrator's mandate had ended, the court said, and no judge could revive it. The Calcutta High Court order dated September 6, 2023, rejecting the application, left the company with no immediate remedy.

That decision set off a chain reaction across India. Five other High Courts had already reached the opposite conclusion. The question landed before the Supreme Court: can an arbitrator get more time after the deadline has already passed?

When the clock ran out on a Kolkata dispute

Rohan Builders (India) Private Limited and Berger Paints India Limited were in the middle of an arbitration under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The law says arbitrators must deliver their final decision — called an award — within twelve months. The parties can agree to extend that by another six months. After that, only a court can grant more time.

In Rohan Builders' case, the twelve months expired. The arbitrator had not passed the award. The company filed an application under Section 29A(4) read with Section 29A(5) — provisions that allow a court to extend the time for making an award. But the Calcutta High Court, in its order dated September 6, 2023, in Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Limited (AP/328/2023), said no. Once the deadline passed, the arbitrator's authority ended. No application for extension could be filed after that point. The Patna High Court agreed in a separate case — South Bihar Power Distribution Company Limited v. Bhagalpur Electricity Distribution Company Private Limited (CWJC No. 20350/2021), decided on April 26, 2023. Both courts read the word "terminate" in Section 29A(4) as absolute, meaning the arbitrator's mandate (the authority to act) was extinguished forever the moment the deadline passed, leaving no room for a court to revive it.

But the Delhi High Court (in ATC Telecom Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd., 2023:DHC:8078), the Bombay High Court (in Nikhil H. Malkan v. Standard Chartered Investment and Loans (India) Limited, 2023:BHC-OS:14063), the Kerala High Court, the Madras High Court, and the Jammu & Kashmir High Court had all taken the opposite view. They said a party could apply for more time even after the deadline had expired. Their reasoning was rooted in the specific language of Section 29A(4), which uses the phrase "either prior to or after the expiry of the period." They argued that if Parliament had intended to bar post-expiry applications, it would not have explicitly included the words "after the expiry." The split meant that a construction dispute in Kolkata was treated differently from one in Mumbai. The Supreme Court took up all these appeals together — arising from SLP (C) No. 23320 of 2023 and connected matters — to settle the conflict once and for all.

The two readings of Section 29A(4)

The key provision is Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration Act. It says that if the award is not made within the twelve-month period (or the extended eighteen-month period), "the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate unless the court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified, extended the period."

The Calcutta and Patna High Courts read the word "terminate" as absolute. Once the mandate ended, they said, the arbitrator ceased to exist in the eyes of the law. No court could breathe life back into a dead mandate. The only way to continue was to appoint a new arbitrator under Section 29A(6) — a process that would start the arbitration from scratch. This strict reading, the courts reasoned, was necessary to enforce the legislative intent of speedy disposal. Allowing post-expiry applications would undermine the statutory time limits and encourage parties to ignore deadlines.

The other High Courts read the provision differently. They focused on the phrase "either prior to or after the expiry of the period." If Parliament intended to bar post-expiry applications, they reasoned, why would it explicitly say "after the expiry"? The word "terminate" was not irreversible — it was conditional. The mandate ended only if no one applied for an extension. If an application was filed, even after the deadline, the court could still step in. They also pointed to Section 29A(5), which speaks of "sufficient cause" — a standard that inherently contemplates situations where the deadline has already passed. A party cannot show cause for a delay that has not yet occurred. The very existence of this provision, they argued, implies that post-expiry applications are maintainable.

The Supreme Court had to decide which reading was correct.

Why the Supreme Court chose flexibility

A bench of Justice Sanjiv Khanna and Justice R. Mahadevan delivered the judgment on September 12, 2024. The court held that an application for extension of time can indeed be filed after the expiry of the arbitration deadline. The court noted that the application in Rohan Builders was filed after the expiry of the 12-month period, which was precisely the factual context for the legal question.

As the ratio decidendi states: "The word 'terminate' in Section 29A(4) does not denote absolute or irreversible termination of the arbitral mandate; it is qualified by the word 'unless' and the expression 'either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified,' making termination conditional upon non-filing of an extension application rather than a bar on post-expiry applications."

The court pointed to the phrase "either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified" in the same sub-section. If Parliament wanted to bar post-expiry applications, it would not have included those words. The provision was designed to give courts the flexibility to extend time even after the deadline, provided the party showed "sufficient cause" — a valid reason for the delay.

The judgment also looked at the purpose of the Arbitration Act. The law was meant to speed up dispute resolution, not to create technical traps that would kill arbitrations mid-way. If a party could not apply for an extension after the deadline, the only option would be to start a fresh arbitration with a new arbitrator. That would waste months or years — exactly what the Act was trying to avoid. The court also examined the legislative history of Section 29A, noting that it was introduced by the 2015 amendment to replace the earlier system under the Arbitration Act, 1940, where no such time limits existed. The 2015 amendment aimed to impose discipline, but the court held that discipline should not come at the cost of destroying the arbitration itself. The practical consequence of the strict view would be that a single missed deadline could nullify months of work by the arbitrator and the parties, forcing them to restart the entire process — a result that serves no one's interests.

The court clarified that post-expiry extensions are not automatic. The judge must be satisfied that there is sufficient cause for the delay. This judicial discretion acts as a safeguard against abuse. A party cannot simply sit on its rights and then ask for more time at the last minute. But if there is a genuine reason — a complex dispute, a change in circumstances, or a procedural delay beyond anyone's control — the court can grant the extension. The court also noted that it has the power under Section 29A(8) to impose costs on the party seeking the extension, which serves as an additional deterrent against frivolous or belated applications.

The judgment further clarified that the extension, if granted, applies to the same arbitrator or tribunal. There is no need to appoint a new arbitrator under Section 29A(6) unless the court specifically decides to do so. This avoids the disruption of replacing an arbitrator who is already familiar with the case. The court emphasized that the reconstituted tribunal, if any, would be deemed a continuation of the original proceedings under Section 29A(7), ensuring that no time or effort is wasted.

What this means for every arbitration in India

The decision resolves a split that had created uncertainty for businesses, lawyers, and arbitrators across the country. A party in Calcutta can now file an extension application after the deadline, just like a party in Delhi or Mumbai. The law is uniform.

For practitioners, the key takeaway is this: do not assume that a missed deadline is the end of the road. But do not rely on the court's flexibility as a safety net either. The court will grant an extension only if you show sufficient cause — and the longer you wait, the harder that becomes. The court's discretion under Section 29A(5) is a double-edged sword: it can save an arbitration that is genuinely delayed, but it will not rescue a party that has been negligent or indifferent.

The judgment also sends a broader message about the interpretation of procedural statutes. The Supreme Court has made it clear that procedural rules are meant to facilitate justice, not to obstruct it. A technical reading that defeats the purpose of the law will not be preferred over a purposive reading that advances the legislative intent. This principle will likely influence how other procedural provisions in the Arbitration Act are interpreted in the future.

THE PLAY: If your arbitration deadline has passed, file an extension application under Section 29A(4) immediately — the Supreme Court has confirmed it is maintainable, but delay weakens your case for "sufficient cause."

The arbitrator's clock had stopped. The Supreme Court just gave it a second wind.