Can you ask for more time after the deadline has passed? SC says yes

The High Court said the arbitrator's power had already ended — so the request for more time was too late. The Supreme Court disagreed.

Here was a commercial arbitration that had survived a pandemic, months of shutdowns, and a full hearing. Then it hit a wall that no one saw coming: a calendar. The Gujarat High Court had ruled that because the company filed its extension application after the arbitrator's mandate (the legal authority to act) had expired, the request was dead on arrival. The arbitrator, the High Court said, had no power left to extend — the clock had run out, and no application could revive it.

The question before the Supreme Court was deceptively simple: Can you ask for more time after the deadline has already passed?

When the clock started ticking

The story begins in February 2018, when a private company called Ajay Protech sent a notice to a government entity. The two had entered into a works contract, and disputes had arisen. The company wanted arbitration — a private dispute resolution process where a neutral third party, the arbitrator, decides the case instead of going to court.

The Gujarat High Court appointed a sole arbitrator in February 2019. Proceedings began in June 2019. By October 9, 2019, both sides had completed their pleadings (the formal written statements of their claims and defences). That date mattered because, under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the 12-month clock for the arbitrator to deliver the award starts ticking from the day pleadings are completed.

The arbitrator had until October 2020 to make the award. But before that first year was even halfway through, something happened that no contract could have predicted.

When the pandemic froze everything

In March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic shut down the country. Courtrooms closed. Arbitral hearings stopped. The arbitrator's chamber sat silent — no lawyers' voices, no shuffling of papers, no arguments echoing off the walls. The Supreme Court, in a landmark order called Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, excluded the period from March 15, 2020 to February 28, 2022 from all legal time limits. That meant the 12-month clock for the arbitrator's award was effectively paused for nearly two years.

Hearings resumed only in 2022. By May 2023, the arbitrator had heard both sides completely. The case was ready for the award. But the statutory period — the time allowed by law to make the award — had long passed, even after accounting for the pandemic exclusion.

Both parties agreed before the arbitrator that they needed to ask the court for more time. The company filed an application under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration Act (a provision that allows a court to extend the arbitrator's deadline) in August 2023. The envelope was date-stamped, the court registry received it, and the legal machinery began to turn once more.

Why the High Court said no

The Gujarat High Court dismissed the application. Its reasoning was straightforward: the arbitrator's mandate — the legal authority to act — had already terminated. The law gives the arbitrator 12 months to make the award, extendable by another 6 months if both parties agree. After that, the mandate ends. The High Court calculated that the 18-month period had expired, and since the extension application came after that expiry, there was nothing left to extend. The judge might have glanced at a physical calendar on the desk, noting the dates, seeing only the numbers — not the pandemic, not the shutdowns, not the hearings that had actually been completed.

The company appealed to the Supreme Court.

What the Supreme Court saw differently

The Supreme Court bench — Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Sandeep Mehta — identified two errors in the High Court's approach.

First, the High Court had miscalculated the time. It had not excluded the pandemic period from March 15, 2020 to February 28, 2022, as the Supreme Court's own order required. When that period was removed, the 18-month combined period had not actually expired when the extension application was filed.

Second, and more importantly, the Supreme Court held that the timing of the application does not determine whether it can be filed at all. The court relied on its own recent judgment in Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd. (2024), which had already settled this question.

In Rohan Builders, the Supreme Court had examined Section 29A(4) closely. That case, too, involved a party seeking extension after the mandate had expired. The court in Rohan Builders had held that the provision does not impose a deadline for filing the application — it only says the mandate terminates if the court refuses to extend it. The logic was simple: if Parliament had wanted applications to be filed only before expiry, it would have said so. It did not. The Rohan Builders precedent established that the court's power to extend is not defeated by the mere passage of time; what matters is whether the court finds sufficient cause to grant the extension.

Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration Act, the court explained, allows a party to apply for extension of the arbitrator's mandate. The provision does not say the application must be filed before the mandate expires. It says the mandate terminates only if the court refuses to grant an extension — not if the application is filed late. The termination is conditional on the court's decision, not on the timing of the request. The court further noted that the language of Section 29A(4) is permissive: it uses the word "may" when describing the court's power to extend. This indicates that the court retains discretion, unfettered by any artificial cut-off date for filing.

The bench also clarified the relationship between Section 29A(4) and Section 29A(5). Sub-section (5) requires the court to be satisfied that "sufficient cause" exists for the delay before granting an extension. But this requirement is about the reasons for the delay, not about when the application was filed. The two inquiries are separate: first, whether the application is maintainable (yes, even after expiry); second, whether the delay is justified (to be decided on merits).

The court also addressed the practical consequences of the High Court's approach. If every post-expiry application were rejected outright, parties would be forced to file protective applications before the mandate expired — even when they did not yet know whether an extension would be needed. This would flood courts with premature petitions and defeat the efficiency that arbitration is meant to achieve. The better rule, the court held, is to allow applications after expiry and decide them on their merits, with the "sufficient cause" requirement acting as a safeguard against abuse.

Why 'sufficient cause' matters

The court also addressed the requirement under Section 29A(5) that the party seeking extension must show "sufficient cause" for the delay. The High Court had found no sufficient cause. The Supreme Court disagreed.

The court said "sufficient cause" must be interpreted in a way that helps resolve disputes, not creates technical barriers. The pandemic was an extraordinary circumstance. The proceedings were substantially complete — both sides had been heard. The delay was not due to negligence or gamesmanship. It was caused by a global health emergency that shut down the legal system for two years.

If the court refused to extend the mandate now, the entire arbitration — years of work, fees paid, hearings conducted — would be wasted. The parties would have to start from scratch. That, the court said, would defeat the very purpose of arbitration: quick and efficient dispute resolution. The court emphasised that the objective of the Arbitration Act is to facilitate the resolution of disputes through a mechanism chosen by the parties. Where the parties have participated in the process in good faith and the proceedings are substantially complete, the court should lean in favour of extending the mandate rather than letting the effort go to waste.

The court also noted that both parties had consented to seeking an extension before the arbitrator. This was not a case where one party was trying to delay proceedings unfairly. The consent demonstrated that both sides recognised the value of the work already done and wanted the arbitrator to deliver the award rather than start a fresh arbitration from scratch.

What the court ordered

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Gujarat High Court's order, and extended the arbitrator's mandate until December 31, 2024. The parties were directed to bear their own costs. In its operative order, the court stated: "We allow the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 2272/2024 and set aside the order and judgment passed by the High Court in MCA No. 1/2023 dated 03.11.2023, and extend the period for making of the award by the Arbitral Tribunal till 31st December, 2024. The parties shall bear their own costs."

The judgment also carries implications beyond this single case. For every arbitration in India where the pandemic caused delays, this ruling provides a clear path forward: parties can approach the court even after the mandate has expired, and the court will consider the merits of their request rather than rejecting it on procedural grounds. The decision reinforces the principle that procedural rules are meant to serve the ends of justice, not to create traps for litigants who have acted in good faith.

The court also clarified the calculation of time limits under Section 29A(1) and (3). The 12-month period under sub-section (1) and the additional 6-month consensual extension under sub-section (3) must both be computed after excluding the pandemic period from March 15, 2020 to February 28, 2022. This exclusion applies automatically, without requiring a separate application from the parties. The High Court had erred by not applying this exclusion, which led to its erroneous conclusion that the mandate had expired.

THE PLAY: An application under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act can be filed even after the arbitrator's mandate has expired — the court must decide on merits, not reject it as time-barred.

THE TEST: Courts must exclude the pandemic period (15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022) when computing statutory time limits under Section 29A, and must interpret "sufficient cause" in light of the objective of facilitating dispute resolution rather than creating technical barriers.

WHAT THIS MEANS: For parties in stalled arbitrations, this judgment offers a second chance. If the mandate has expired but the proceedings are substantially complete and the delay was due to circumstances beyond control, the court can — and should — extend the mandate rather than force the parties to start over.

The arbitrator's power had not ended when the calendar said it did. It ended only when the court said it could.