CBI sought sanction for 22 months. Court says: delay is okay, but not for quashing case

CBI asked the government to okay a corruption case. The government took 22 months. The accused said: case over. The Supreme Court said—no. But the answer wasn't simple. And it changed how every public servant accused of corruption will read the clock.

The file sat in one office. Then another. Then a third. For nearly two years, nobody said yes. Nobody said no. And when the government finally granted permission, the accused did not walk into trial. He walked into court to argue that the delay itself had killed the case.

The file that travelled for twenty-two months

September 2015. The CBI walked into the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) with a proposal. Prosecute Vijay Rajmohan, a Central Secretariat Service officer. Between 2005 and 2012, the CBI said, he had amassed assets worth Rs 79 lakhs—far more than his salary could explain. An FIR had been registered in November 2012. The investigation was complete. One thing remained: the government's formal permission, called prosecution sanction (the mandatory approval needed before a court can take cognisance of a corruption case against a public servant).

Under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, no court can hear a corruption case against a public servant without this sanction. It is the government's gate. The CBI expected an answer in three months. The law, after a 2018 amendment, said so explicitly.

The DoPT did not decide in three months. It did not decide in six. It wrote to the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), the government's anti-corruption watchdog, asking for advice. The CVC asked for more documents. The CBI sent them. The CVC asked again. The file moved back and forth between three government offices for twenty-two months. The file, stamped 'CONFIDENTIAL' in red ink, sat on a desk for months at a time, gathering dust between one query and the next reply.

July 2017. The DoPT finally granted the sanction. Rajmohan was charged under Section 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (criminal misconduct by acquiring disproportionate assets) and Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code (abetment).

The trial court said: case thrown out

Rajmohan did not wait for trial. He walked into the special CBI court in Chennai and asked to be discharged—to have the case thrown out before it began. Two arguments.

First: the DoPT had not applied its own mind. It had rubber-stamped whatever the CVC said. That made the sanction invalid. Second: the delay of 22 months violated the mandatory timeline of three months (extendable by one month for legal consultation) set by the proviso to Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. If the government could not decide on time, the case should fall.

The trial court agreed. December 2018. The special judge discharged Rajmohan. The DoPT, the judge held, had acted under the CVC's dictation. It had not independently applied its mind. The case, it seemed, was dead. The judge's glasses reflected the courtroom lights as he read the order, the file before him still bearing the marks of its long journey.

The High Court reversed everything

The CBI appealed to the Madras High Court. January 2022. The High Court reversed the trial court's order. The DoPT had, in fact, applied its mind independently. Consulting the CVC was not the same as surrendering to it. The discharge was set aside. Rajmohan would have to face trial.

He appealed to the Supreme Court.

Two questions. One answer.

October 2022. A bench of Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha heard the case. Two questions.

First: does consulting the CVC before granting sanction mean the government has surrendered its independent judgment? Second: if the 3+1 month timeline is mandatory, does missing it automatically kill the prosecution?

Rajmohan's counsel argued both points aggressively. On the first, he relied on the Supreme Court's own precedent in Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat (1997)—sanction must be granted by the competent authority after applying its own mind, not on the dictate of a superior. On the second, he pointed to the plain language of the proviso: "three months" was not a suggestion. It was a command.

The CBI and the DoPT countered. The Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, specifically Sections 8(1)(f) and 8(1)(g), gave the CVC the power to review sanction applications and tender advice. Consulting the CVC was not abdication—it was part of the process. On delay, they argued that the timeline was directory, not mandatory. Missing it could not be a get-out-of-jail-free card.

The CBI officer's pen hovered over the sanction letter, waiting for a signature that took 22 months to come. In the courtroom, the weight of that delay hung in the air as the judges considered whether it could undo the entire prosecution.

The CVC consultation: not a surrender

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court. Consulting the CVC does not vitiate the sanction. The CVC's opinion is advisory—valuable input, but not a command. The final decision must still be the sanctioning authority's own, reached by independent application of mind.

The court examined the integrated statutory scheme: the Criminal Procedure Code, the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, the Prevention of Corruption Act, the CVC Act, and the Lokpal Act all fit together. Section 8(1)(g) of the CVC Act explicitly empowers the Commission to tender advice to the central government. The appointing authority calling for, seeking, and considering that advice before deciding on sanction cannot be termed "acting under dictation."

The precedents Rajmohan cited—Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan, Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh (2012), and CBI v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (2014)—were distinguished. In those cases, the sanctioning authority had mechanically adopted the CVC's opinion without independent thought. Here, the DoPT had examined the material, sought clarifications, and then decided. That was enough.

The 3+1 month timeline: mandatory, but not a death sentence

This was the harder question. The proviso to Section 19(1), inserted by the 2018 amendment, says the competent authority must convey its decision on sanction within three months, extendable by one month for legal consultation. The language is unequivocal: "shall."

The Supreme Court held that this timeline is mandatory, not directory. The court stated: "the period of three months... is mandatory, not directory." The word "shall" means what it says. The authority cannot treat the deadline as a casual suggestion.

But here came the crucial distinction. The court further held that "non-compliance... shall not automatically lead to quashing of criminal proceedings." The consequence is different: the sanctioning authority becomes accountable. The delay can be challenged in judicial review (a court's power to check whether a government decision was lawful). The CVC can act under Section 8(1)(f) of the CVC Act (its power to review the progress of sanction applications). The aggrieved party—whether the complainant, the accused, or the victim—can approach a writ court for directions on the sanction request and for corrective measures to fix accountability.

In other words: the clock is mandatory. But missing it does not let the accused walk free. It makes the government answer for the delay.

The court also cited several other precedents to support its reasoning: Vineet Narain & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr. (1998) on the CVC's role in anti-corruption oversight, Mahendra Lal Das v. State of Bihar & Ors. (2002) and Ramanand Chaudhary v. State of Bihar & Ors. (2002) on the nature of sanction, and State of Punjab & Anr. v. Mohd. Iqbal Bhatti (2009) on the consequences of procedural non-compliance. These authorities together reinforced the court's conclusion that while procedural timelines matter, they serve accountability rather than providing an automatic escape for the accused.

What this means for every corruption case

For defence lawyers, this judgment closes one door. The argument that "the sanction was delayed, therefore the case is dead" no longer works. The Supreme Court has shut it firmly. The timeline is mandatory, but the remedy is accountability of the sanctioning authority, not discharge of the accused.

For prosecutors and government departments, the message is equally clear: the 3+1 month timeline is not optional. The court has called it mandatory. Future delays will invite judicial scrutiny and CVC action. The days of letting a sanction file gather dust for 22 months may be numbered.

THE PLAY: If you are defending a public servant in a corruption case, do not waste time arguing that delayed sanction automatically kills the prosecution—instead, use the delay to build a case for judicial review of the sanctioning authority's accountability, while preparing to fight the sanction on its merits.

The Supreme Court dismissed Rajmohan's appeal. The High Court's order stood. The trial would proceed. But the judgment left behind a rule that every government department and every accused will now have to live with: the clock is real, but it is not an escape hatch.