Government officer can't be arbitrator in own dept's case: SC
A serving Principal Secretary was appointed as arbitrator for a dispute involving his own government agency. The Supreme Court said that's a no-go—and replaced the entire tribunal after 4 years of no award.
4
years.
A serving Principal Secretary was appointed as arbitrator for a dispute involving his own government agency. The Supreme Court said that's a no-go—and replaced the entire tribunal after 4 years of no award.
For 4 years, the arbitrator sat on the award. Then the Supreme Court discovered who he really was.
The tribunal had heard both sides. Everyone said the award was ready. But no one ever saw it. Four years passed. The contractor who had been waiting for a decision finally went to court asking for more time—and that's when the Supreme Court looked at who was sitting on the other side of the table. A serving Principal Secretary to the Government of Haryana, appointed by a government agency to decide a dispute involving that same agency. The Court didn't just call that a problem. It called the entire arbitration invalid and replaced the whole tribunal.
The bench—Justice Indu Malhotra, Justice L. Nageswara Rao, and Justice Ajay Rastogi—sat beneath the high dome of Courtroom No. 1. The hum of the air conditioner filled the pauses between arguments. The judges' glasses sat perched on the bench, catching the light as they examined the thin file that had travelled from Chandigarh.
When the digitisation project fell apart
In 2011, the Haryana Space Application Centre (HARSAC)—a government nodal agency—hired Pan India Consultants to digitise land records across the state. The contract was straightforward: complete the work by a set deadline. The contractor didn't. Even after two extensions, the job remained unfinished. HARSAC moved to encash the performance bank guarantee (a security deposit that a contractor puts up, which the client can claim if the work isn't done). The contractor challenged this in the Delhi High Court, which directed the parties to arbitration under Clause 6.11 of their Service Level Agreement.
An arbitral tribunal was set up in September 2016. HARSAC nominated a serving IAS officer—the Principal Secretary to the Government of Haryana—as its arbitrator. The contractor nominated a retired High Court judge. The tribunal heard both sides in a rented conference room with a long wooden table and fluorescent lights that flickered. Arguments concluded. The tribunal announced that the award was ready. But it never pronounced it. Days turned into months. Months turned into years. The award sat in a steel cabinet in the tribunal's office, gathering dust, the pages growing yellow at the edges.
Why the clock mattered
Under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, an arbitral tribunal is supposed to pass its award within 12 months of completing the pleadings. If it can't, the parties can agree to extend that by another 6 months. Beyond that, the court steps in. Here, the tribunal had already crossed the 18-month mark. The contractor went to the Additional District Judge in Chandigarh in November 2019 and got a 3-month extension under Section 29A(4) (a provision that allows a court to give the tribunal more time to deliver the award). HARSAC challenged that before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which granted another 4 months in August 2020. Still no award.
HARSAC then appealed to the Supreme Court. But by the time the case reached the top court, the question had shifted. It was no longer just about whether the tribunal needed more time. It was about whether the tribunal should have existed at all.
The contractor's counsel, standing before the bench, argued that the delay had been unreasonable. The tribunal had heard arguments, had even said the award was ready, and yet nothing had been delivered. The contractor had been left in limbo, unable to enforce any rights, unable to move on. The extension granted by the lower courts had only prolonged the wait.
The problem with the government officer
The Supreme Court bench looked at the composition of the tribunal. The arbitrator nominated by HARSAC was a serving Principal Secretary to the Government of Haryana. That officer, the Court held, had a "controlling influence" over HARSAC, which is a government nodal agency. In plain terms: the government officer was effectively deciding a dispute involving his own department.
Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act says that a person who is ineligible to be an arbitrator under the Seventh Schedule cannot be appointed, no matter what. Item 5 of the Seventh Schedule lists as ineligible any person who is "a manager, director or part of the management, or has a similar controlling influence, of an entity that is a party to the arbitration agreement." The Court held that a serving Principal Secretary falls squarely within that description. The provision is mandatory. It cannot be waived by agreement. The appointment was invalid from the start.
The Court's reasoning was precise: "The appointment of a serving Principal Secretary to the Government as a nominee arbitrator of a government nodal agency is invalid under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with Item 5 of the Seventh Schedule, since such officer has a controlling influence on the entity that is a party to the dispute." The bench emphasised that Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule is mandatory and non-derogable—no agreement between the parties could save an appointment that violated this bar.
What the Court did about it
The Court didn't just remove the government officer. It replaced the entire tribunal. Under Section 29A(6) (a provision that allows the court to substitute an arbitrator when the tribunal fails to deliver the award within the extended time), the bench appointed Justice Kurian Joseph, a retired Supreme Court judge, as the sole arbitrator. The new arbitrator would take over from the stage the previous tribunal had reached—no need to rehear the entire case—and pass the award within 6 months. The fees would be split equally between the parties, as per the Fourth Schedule of the Act. The proceedings could be conducted virtually or at the seat of arbitration in Haryana.
The Court made one thing clear: the invalidity of the government officer's appointment didn't mean the earlier proceedings were a waste. The new arbitrator would continue from where the old tribunal left off. The arguments already heard would stand. Only the award needed to be written and pronounced. The Court exercised its power under Section 29A(6) to substitute the tribunal "with consent of parties, to proceed from the stage already reached."
The operative order was precise: the existing arbitral tribunal was substituted. Justice Kurian Joseph was appointed as sole arbitrator. The award was to be passed within 6 months. Fees would be shared equally. The proceedings would be conducted virtually or at the seat of arbitration in Haryana. The sole arbitrator was also required to make the declarations under Section 12 of the Act before commencing proceedings.
Why this matters for every government contract
This judgment sends a signal that cuts across every arbitration involving a government entity. If a government department appoints a serving officer as its nominee arbitrator, that appointment is void—not just questionable, not just challengeable, but void. The Seventh Schedule's list of ineligible persons is not a suggestion. It is a hard bar. And because Section 12(5) is non-derogable, even if both parties agreed to the appointment at the time, the agreement doesn't save it.
For practitioners advising government agencies or contractors, the lesson is simple: do not appoint a serving government officer as an arbitrator in a dispute involving that officer's department. The appointment will be struck down, and the entire tribunal may be replaced, wasting years of work and costs.
The case also highlights a practical reality: when an arbitral tribunal fails to deliver its award for an unreasonably long period—over 4 years in this instance—the court will not simply grant more extensions. It will examine the very validity of the tribunal's composition. A tribunal that is invalidly constituted cannot be saved by extensions of time.
The contractor's perspective is worth noting. Pan India Consultants had been waiting for a decision since 2016. They had argued their case, heard the tribunal say the award was ready, and then watched four years slip by. The extensions granted by the District Court and the High Court had only prolonged the uncertainty. When the case finally reached the Supreme Court, the contractor found relief not in an award, but in the invalidation of the entire tribunal and the appointment of a sole arbitrator who would finally deliver a decision.
For government agencies, the message is equally clear. The days of appointing senior government officers as nominee arbitrators are over—at least when the officer has a controlling influence over the entity that is a party to the dispute. The Supreme Court has drawn a bright line. Any appointment that crosses it is void from the start, and the consequences—years of wasted proceedings, costs, and delay—will fall on the party that made the invalid appointment.
THE PLAY: Before constituting an arbitral tribunal in any dispute involving a government entity, verify that the nominee arbitrator is not a serving officer with a controlling influence over that entity—or the appointment is void under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act.
The award that was ready for four years never came. But the Supreme Court's message did.