Man who served 9.5 years of 20-year rape sentence gets bail

He had already spent half his 20-year sentence behind bars. The High Court said no bail. The Supreme Court said—

Nine years, six months. That is how long a man convicted of gang-raping a 13-year-old child had already served when the Supreme Court of India finally heard his plea for bail. The Bombay High Court had dismissed his application in March 2024. The man had been convicted under the Indian Penal Code and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act, a law specifically designed to protect children from sexual abuse). He was serving a 20-year sentence. By the time the Supreme Court bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Pankaj Mithal took up his case on November 4, 2024, the question was no longer just about one man's liberty. It had become about a systemic failure: why trial courts across India were routinely ignoring a legal duty to compensate victims of sexual assault.

When the co-accused walked free

The facts of the case were brutal. A 13-year-old girl was gang-raped. The trial court convicted the man and sentenced him to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment. He appealed to the Bombay High Court in 2020, asking for suspension of sentence (a temporary halt to his imprisonment) and bail while his appeal was pending. The High Court said no. So he came to the Supreme Court.

By then, something had shifted. The co-accused in the same case had already been granted bail by the High Court. The appeal filed in 2020 was old, and the Supreme Court noted it was unlikely to be heard soon. Most importantly, there was no possibility that the appellate court would enhance his sentence — meaning the 20-year term was the maximum he could face. The man had already served more than half of it. The Supreme Court observed that the appellant had undergone approximately 50% of the substantive sentence, the co-accused was already on bail, the appeal was pending since 2020, and there was no likelihood of sentence enhancement. The Court held that where a convict has served approximately 50% of the sentence, the appeal is old and unlikely to be heard soon, the co-accused has been granted bail, and there is no chance of sentence enhancement, the convict is entitled to suspension of sentence and release on bail pending appeal. The Supreme Court allowed his appeal and directed the Sessions Court to release him on bail subject to conditions.

The question nobody had asked

But the case did not end there. An Amicus Curiae (a friend of the court, a lawyer appointed to assist the court on a legal issue) raised a critical point. The trial court that convicted the man had never ordered victim compensation under Section 357-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC — the law that governs criminal procedure in India). Section 357-A CrPC requires every state to create a Victim Compensation Scheme, and it empowers courts to direct the District Legal Services Authority (DLSA) to pay compensation to victims of crime. The corresponding provision under the new Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS, which replaced the CrPC) is Section 396. The POCSO Rules, 2012, under Rule 7, also mandate compensation for child victims of sexual offences. The trial court had not even considered it. The Supreme Court was not pleased.

The Amicus Curiae submitted that there was widespread non-compliance with Section 357-A CrPC across Sessions Courts in India. The courtroom fell into a heavy silence as the implications of this submission settled on the bench. The judges exchanged a glance; the file on the table seemed thin, almost inadequate for the weight of the issue it contained. The Court noted the submission and decided to act suo motu — on its own motion — to address the systemic failure.

Why the silence on compensation matters

Victim compensation is not a charity. It is a legal right. Section 357-A CrPC was inserted in 2009 precisely because the criminal justice system had historically focused only on punishing the accused, leaving the victim to bear the financial burden of medical treatment, trauma counselling, lost income, and rehabilitation. For a child victim of sexual assault, the costs are immense — and often lifelong. Yet, across India, trial courts routinely pass judgments of conviction or acquittal without a single line about compensation. The victim, often from a poor family, never receives a rupee. The Supreme Court noted that the trial court had failed to award victim compensation under Section 357-A CrPC or the POCSO Rules, and this failure was not an isolated incident.

The Court issued a sweeping direction: "A Sessions Court adjudicating cases concerning bodily injuries such as sexual assault, particularly on minor children and women, shall order victim compensation having regard to the facts and circumstances and evidence on record, while passing judgment either convicting or acquitting the accused. Such direction must be implemented by DLSA/SLSA in letter and spirit at the earliest." The words carried the weight of a mandate, not a suggestion. Every Sessions Court in India, when adjudicating cases involving bodily injuries such as sexual assault — particularly on minor children and women — must mandatorily consider ordering victim compensation while passing the judgment, whether the accused is convicted or acquitted. The compensation must be based on the facts, circumstances, and evidence on record. The DLSA or the State Legal Services Authority (SLSA) must implement the order in letter and spirit, at the earliest.

The order that changes how trials end

The Court's direction is not a suggestion. It is an order. The judgment was circulated to all High Courts for transmission to every Principal District Judge and Sessions Judge in the country. The Court also specifically directed that the victim in this case — referred to as Respondent No. 2 — was entitled to consideration for compensation under Rule 7 of the POCSO Rules, 2012 (or Rule 9 of the POCSO Rules, 2020, which replaced the earlier rules). The High Court was requested to consider granting interim compensation to the victim. The victim's family, who had waited years for justice, now had a legal pathway to financial relief — though the delay had already exacted its own toll.

The ratio decidendi (the court's central reasoning) on the bail question was straightforward: a convict who has served half the sentence, whose appeal is old, whose co-accused has been granted bail, and whose sentence cannot be enhanced, is entitled to suspension of sentence and bail. But the real weight of this judgment lies in the compensation direction. It transforms a routine bail order into a systemic reform. The Court also engaged Section 357-B CrPC, which clarifies that compensation under Section 357-A is to be in addition to any fine imposed under Sections 326-A or 376-D IPC, ensuring that the victim's right to compensation is not diluted by other penalties.

The appellant, convicted under Sections 376-D (gang rape) and 354 (assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty) of the Indian Penal Code, and Section 4 of the POCSO Act (punishment for penetrative sexual assault), had his appeal allowed and disposed of. The operative order directed that the appellant be produced before the concerned Sessions Court as early as possible, and that the Sessions Court shall release him on bail subject to such conditions as it may deem appropriate. The grant of relief was not to result in procrastinating the hearing of his appeal by the High Court. The Court also issued directions for victim compensation under Section 357-A CrPC to be mandatorily considered by all Sessions Courts in sexual assault cases.

THE PLAY: Every Sessions Court must now order victim compensation in every sexual assault case — conviction or acquittal — and the DLSA must pay it without delay.

The man who served 9.5 years walked out on bail. But the child who was 13 when the crime happened — she may finally get what the law always owed her.