One bidder rejected for a 1-day notary gap. Another got months to submit missing papers.

The Power of Attorney was notarized one day after signing. The other bidder didn't submit audited reports at all—until BCCL asked for them months later. In a courtroom in October 2024, a Supreme Court bench led by Justice Bela M. Trivedi and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma was about to decide whether a government coal company could treat two bidders so differently that the Constitution itself would step in.

The question was this: can a state-owned enterprise reject one company's bid because a notary stamp was dated one day after the signature, while letting a rival bidder submit mandatory financial documents months after the deadline? The answer would turn on a single question: how much arbitrariness does Article 14 — the constitutional right to equal treatment by the state — tolerate in a government tender?

When the notary stamp became a wall

In August 2023, Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL) — a government-owned coal mining company — floated a tender for a 25-year coal mining project. The Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) dated 16.08.2023 set out detailed eligibility criteria under Clause 10. Banshidhar Construction Pvt. Ltd., a civil engineering firm, submitted its bid before the deadline. Everything seemed in order.

Then came the rejection letter. On May 6, 2024, BCCL's Technical Bid Committee ruled that Banshidhar's bid was non-compliant. The reason: the Power of Attorney (POA) — the legal document authorizing a person to sign on behalf of the company — authorizing the person who signed the bid documents had been notarized one day after the bid documents were signed. The committee treated this as a violation of Clause 10 of the NIT. The rejection letter bore the date stamp of that May morning, a crisp bureaucratic finality. On the original POA, the notary's seal — a red circle with a date — sat next to the signature, the ink of the stamp still dark against the paper.

But here is the detail that mattered: the POA was executed before the bid documents were signed. The notarization — a notary's seal and signature affirming the document's authenticity — happened before the entire bid was uploaded to the portal. The NIT did not say that notarization had to happen before signing — only that the POA had to be validly executed. Banshidhar had done everything before the submission deadline.

The bidder who got a second chance

While Banshidhar's bid was being rejected for a one-day notary gap, another bidder — Respondent No. 8 — was being treated very differently. At the time of bidding, Respondent No. 8 had not submitted its mandatory audited annual reports — the independently verified financial statements that prove a company's financial health. These were not minor documents; they were part of the mandatory qualification criteria under the very same Clause 10 of the NIT.

BCCL did not reject Respondent No. 8's bid. Instead, months after the bid submission deadline, BCCL asked Respondent No. 8 to submit the missing audited reports. The company complied, sending them in a thick file that arrived long after the tender's closing date. BCCL then declared Respondent No. 8 technically qualified and, on May 7, 2024 — the very next day — opened its financial bid. Respondent No. 8 was declared the successful bidder.

Banshidhar Construction approached the Jharkhand High Court under Article 226 — the High Court's power to review government decisions. In the High Court at Ranchi, the courtroom filled with the rustle of paper as lawyers argued the case. The judge's bench, elevated and wooden, seemed to weigh the arguments silently. The High Court dismissed the petition on July 18, 2024. Banshidhar then appealed to the Supreme Court, filing Civil Appeal No. 11005 of 2024.

The bench sees a different picture

Before the Supreme Court, Banshidhar's lawyers argued that BCCL had violated Article 14 of the Constitution — the right to equality before the law. The argument was simple: you cannot hold one bidder to a strict standard while giving another bidder a relaxed one, especially when both are governed by the same tender condition.

BCCL defended its decision by arguing that the Power of Attorney issue was a genuine non-compliance. It claimed that the POA notarized after the signing date was invalid. As for Respondent No. 8, BCCL argued that the audited reports were merely "shortfall documents" that could be submitted later under the tender's provisions.

But the Supreme Court saw a different picture. The Court examined the NIT's Clause 10 and found that it did not require notarization before signing. The POA was validly executed before the bid was submitted. The notarization — which happened one day after signing but before upload — did not make the POA invalid. The rejection was based on a condition that did not exist in the tender document. The bench, led by Justice Trivedi, listened as the file was opened, the pages of the NIT spread across the dais. The courtroom fell silent as the judges examined the clause itself.

The Court also examined the treatment of Respondent No. 8. Under Clause 2.1.6 and Clause 2.2.5 of the Request for Bid (RFB) Instructions to Bidders, the mandatory audited annual reports were qualification criteria. The Court held that permitting a bidder to submit such documents after opening of technical bids under the guise of 'shortfall documents' amounted to a violation of the mandatory terms of the NIT.

Why the court found the discrimination gross

The Supreme Court's reasoning cut to the heart of the matter. The bench observed that the audited annual reports were mandatory qualification criteria under the NIT. They were not minor or procedural documents. By allowing Respondent No. 8 to submit these documents months after the deadline, BCCL had effectively rewritten the tender conditions for one bidder while enforcing them strictly against another.

The Court cited its own precedent in Central Coalfields Ltd. v. SLL-SML (Joint Venture Consortium) (2016) 8 SCC 622, where it had held that mandatory qualification criteria cannot be relaxed after the bid deadline. The Court also referred to Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India (1979) 3 SCC 489, which established that the state must act fairly and non-arbitrarily in contractual matters. Other precedents cited included Sterling Computers Ltd. v. M/s M & N Publications Ltd. (1993) 1 SCC 445, Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651, ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. (2004) 3 SCC 553, Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa (2007) 14 SCC 517, and Mihan India Ltd. v. GMR Airports Ltd. (2022) SCC Online SC 574 — each reinforcing the principle that the state's discretion in tender matters is not absolute.

The bench found that BCCL's differential treatment was "grossly arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Article 14." The Court set aside BCCL's decision of May 6, 2024, which had rejected Banshidhar's technical bid and declared Respondent No. 8 as the successful bidder. The entire tender process was quashed, and BCCL was directed to initiate a fresh tender process. The Court held: "The rejection of the appellant's bid was grossly arbitrary and discriminatory."

The ratio decidendi of the judgment established three clear principles: First, where a tender condition under the NIT relates to mandatory qualification criteria, its non-compliance by one bidder cannot be condoned by the tender authority while simultaneously rejecting another bidder for alleged non-compliance of the same clause. Such differential treatment is grossly arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Article 14. Second, where a Power of Attorney is executed before the signing of bid documents and notarized before the submission or upload of bid documents, the bid cannot be rejected on the ground that the POA was notarized after the date of signing, unless the NIT specifically requires notarization before signing. Third, mandatory documents relating to qualification criteria under the NIT must be submitted before the deadline; permitting a bidder to submit such documents after opening of technical bids under the guise of 'shortfall documents' amounts to a violation of the mandatory terms of the NIT.

The operative order of the Court, dated October 4, 2024, in Civil Appeal No. 11005 of 2024 (@ SLP (Civil) No. 17383/2024), cited as 2024 INSC 757, set aside the impugned decision of BCCL dated May 6, 2024. Any action, process, or agreement entered into pursuant to that decision also stood set aside. It was left open for BCCL to initiate a fresh tender process for the project in accordance with law. The appeal was allowed.

What this means for every government tender

For companies bidding on government contracts, this judgment sends a clear signal: the state cannot apply different standards to different bidders under the same tender condition. A technicality that is not actually required by the tender document cannot be used to reject a compliant bid. And a mandatory qualification criterion cannot be waived for one bidder while being enforced against another.

For government tendering authorities, the message is equally sharp: consistency is not optional. It is a constitutional requirement. When you reject one bidder for a gap in documentation, you must apply the same standard to every other bidder. If you allow late submission for one, you must allow it for all — or face the entire process being struck down.

THE PLAY: Before rejecting a bid on a technical ground, ask: does the tender document actually require what we are enforcing? And if we have allowed any other bidder to cure a similar defect, we must allow every bidder the same opportunity.

The Power of Attorney was notarized one day after signing. The other bidder never submitted audited reports at all — until BCCL asked for them months later. The Supreme Court ended where it began: with two bidders, one tender, and a Constitution that does not permit the state to hold two different scales.