One trial's evidence can't convict a co-accused tried separately: SC

The High Court read the evidence from one trial and convicted all six accused. But the sixth man had been tried separately—his case had its own record. The Supreme Court said: that's not how justice works.

On a March morning in 1998, customs officers in Tuticorin kicked open the doors of a warehouse. Inside, stacked floor to ceiling, were 476 cartons of sandalwood billets and Mangalore tiles — worth nearly a crore of rupees, all packed for illegal export to Singapore. Six men were arrested. But what happened next in the courtroom would take over two decades to untangle, and would force the Supreme Court to answer a deceptively simple question: can a judge convict a man using evidence he never had a chance to challenge?

When one accused went missing

The Customs Department filed criminal complaints under the Customs Act, 1962 — specifically Sections 132 (false declarations), 135(1)(a)(ii) (evasion of duty), and 135A (preparation for prohibited export). But one of the six accused had disappeared. Under Indian criminal procedure, a trial cannot proceed against an absconding accused unless special provisions are invoked. So the trial court in Madurai did the only practical thing: it split the case into two separate trials — one for five accused (CC No. 2/2003), and another for the sixth man, K.M.A. Alexander (CC No. 4/2004).

Each trial had its own record. Its own witnesses. Its own evidence. Its own opportunity for each accused to cross-examine the people who testified against them. That separation, seemingly administrative, would become the legal fault line.

Both trials, one verdict: acquittal

In May 2008, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate in Madurai delivered a single result across both trials: all six accused were acquitted. The evidence, the magistrate found, did not prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. The Customs Department, dissatisfied, appealed to the Madras High Court.

Here is where the procedural machinery began to misfire. The High Court took up all the appeals — from both trials — together. And on October 19, 2019, a single judge passed a common judgment reversing the acquittals. All six men were convicted under Section 135(1)(a)(ii) read with 135A of the Customs Act. Each was sentenced to one year in prison and a fine of Rs. 50,000. The conviction under Section 132 (false declarations) was left undisturbed — meaning the court did not interfere with the trial court's acquittal on that count.

But here was the problem: the High Court had examined the evidence from only one of the two trials. It did not specify which trial's record it had read. And it used that single set of evidence to convict all six men — including the sixth accused, who had been tried separately, on a different record, with different witnesses and different cross-examination.

The question that broke the case

When the matter reached the Supreme Court, the three-judge bench — Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, and Justice B.V. Nagarathna — had to decide whether this procedural shortcut violated the most basic guarantee of a criminal trial: the right of an accused to have evidence recorded in his presence (Section 273 of the CrPC), and the right to cross-examine that evidence.

The Customs Department argued that since all six were charged with the same offence arising from the same seizure, the evidence was interchangeable. One trial's record, they said, could fairly be used to judge all accused. The defence countered that this logic destroyed the very purpose of holding separate trials. If evidence from one case could be imported into another, why hold separate trials at all?

The Supreme Court found itself looking at a deeper principle. Under Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, evidence recorded in one proceeding is relevant in a subsequent proceeding only under specific conditions — for instance, if the witness is dead or cannot be found. That section did not apply here. The witnesses were alive. The sixth accused had never had the chance to cross-examine the witnesses who testified in the other trial.

Why the High Court's shortcut failed

The bench held that the High Court had committed a fundamental error. Evidence recorded in a criminal trial against any accused is confined to the culpability of that accused only. It does not have any bearing upon a co-accused who has been tried separately, even if for the commission of the same offence. The court cited its own precedent in Karan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Jayendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra to reinforce this point.

The court also noted that in a criminal appeal against conviction, the appellate court's scope does not go beyond the evidence available before it in the form of the trial court record of the particular case under appeal. Unless specific provisions like Sections 367 or 391 of the CrPC (which allow the appellate court to take additional evidence) are invoked, the judge cannot look outside that record.

And here was the clincher: where a common judgment is set aside for one criminal appeal on account of procedural illegality, it cannot be upheld for another appeal. There cannot be severance of the judgment — particularly in criminal cases where the rights of the accused are paramount. If the procedure was bad for one accused, it was bad for all.

What the Supreme Court ordered

On October 29, 2021, the bench allowed the appeals. The High Court's judgment of October 19, 2019 was set aside entirely. The cases were remanded — sent back — to the Madras High Court for fresh hearing. The court directed that the appeals be heard afresh, with each appeal decided on the basis of the evidence recorded in its own trial. All questions of law and fact were left open, meaning the High Court must start from scratch, without being bound by its earlier findings.

THE PLAY: When a trial is split because one accused is absconding, the evidence from one trial cannot be used to convict an accused in the other — each case must be decided on its own record, or the conviction is void for violating the right to a fair trial.

The principle that protects every accused

For practitioners, this judgment is a reminder that procedural rules are not technicalities — they are the architecture of fairness. The right to have evidence recorded in your presence and to cross-examine witnesses is not a formality that can be dispensed with by judicial convenience. Even when the same crime, the same seizure, and the same witnesses are involved, a separate trial means a separate record. And a separate record means a separate judgment.

The sandalwood never reached Singapore. But the case reached the Supreme Court, and the court ended where it began: with six men, two trials, and one rule that cannot be broken.