Police officer ignored DNA test in POCSO case. High Court called him out. Supreme Court said: that's allowed.

A rape case was registered. The FSL report arrived with a note: 'get DNA done.' The Inspector never did. When the accused sought bail, the High Court noticed the missing report—and turned the spotlight on the cop.

That spotlight, trained on Station House Officer Sanjay Dubey, became the centre of a legal fight that reached the Supreme Court. The question: could a High Court, while deciding a routine bail application, call out a police officer for a shoddy investigation and order action against him? Or was that stepping beyond the narrow lane that bail law is supposed to travel?

When the FSL report came back with instructions

In July 2021, a serious case was registered at the Sleemanabad Police Station in Katni, Madhya Pradesh. A minor had been raped. The charges included Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (rape and criminal intimidation) and Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act (penetrative sexual assault on a child). FIR No. 424/2021 was lodged.

Sanjay Dubey was the Inspector in charge—the Station House Officer. His job included ensuring that forensic evidence was collected and analysed. On October 25, 2021, the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) sent a report back to the police station. It came with a clear instruction: get DNA examination done.

The Inspector never did.

Months passed. The accused, still in custody, applied for bail before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur. The court asked for the case diary—the daily record of investigation. That is when the judge noticed something was missing. The FSL report, with its instruction for DNA analysis, had not been acted upon. No DNA test had ever been ordered.

The High Court summoned the Superintendent of Police

The High Court did not let this pass. It summoned the Superintendent of Police of the district and the in-charge of the forensic lab. Both appeared. They confirmed the lapse: the Inspector had simply not gotten the DNA test done. The judge leaned forward, the case diary open on the bench, the silence broken only by the turning of pages as the SP confirmed the dereliction.

The SP told the court that he had already taken action. He had line-attached the Inspector—a disciplinary measure that removes a police officer from independent command—and initiated departmental proceedings. But the High Court, while dealing with the bail application, recorded its own findings against Inspector Dubey for dereliction of duty and directed that action be taken against him.

The Inspector appealed to the Supreme Court. His argument was straightforward: the High Court was hearing a bail application under Section 439 of the CrPC (the provision that gives High Courts and Sessions Courts the power to grant or refuse bail). That section, he argued, does not give a judge the power to make findings against a police officer or to direct departmental action. The High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction.

What the Supreme Court saw

The Supreme Court bench—Justice Krishna Murari and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah—heard the appeal in May 2023. The courtroom was still, the file on the bench thick with papers, as the Inspector's lawyers cited several precedents. In Sangitaben Shaileshbhai Datanta v. State of Gujarat and State Represented by Inspector of Police v. M. Murugesan, the Supreme Court had held that a High Court's jurisdiction in bail matters is limited to granting or refusing bail. You cannot, the argument went, use a bail hearing as a platform to investigate investigative lapses.

The court agreed with that principle—up to a point. "Ordinarily," it said, a court deciding a bail application should confine itself to the question of bail. But this was not an ordinary situation.

The High Court of Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court noted, is not just a court of session or a magistrate's court. It is a Constitutional Court, established under Article 214 of the Constitution, with powers under Article 226 (the power to issue writs like habeas corpus and mandamus) and Article 227 (the power of superintendence over all subordinate courts and tribunals in the state). A Constitutional Court, the bench held, cannot shut its eyes to grave lapses in investigation that could cause a miscarriage of justice.

"If a Constitutional Court notices something seriously wrong in a criminal investigation while hearing a bail plea," the court reasoned in effect, "it has the power—and perhaps the duty—to say something about it."

The bench also examined other precedents. In B S Hari Commandant v. Union of India, the Supreme Court had discussed the scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters. In State of Gujarat v. Kishanbhai, it had considered the powers of the High Court to direct investigations. In Sidhartha Vashist v. State (NCT of Delhi), the court had examined the limits of bail jurisdiction. In Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh, a recent decision, the court had reiterated the principles governing bail under Section 439. The bench also referred to Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh and BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Limited for the proposition that judicial observations must be confined to the matter at hand.

But none of these precedents, the court held, prevented a Constitutional Court from flagging a grave lapse when it encountered one. The key distinction was this: the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 439 is not hermetically sealed from its constitutional powers under Articles 226 and 227. A bail judge who is also a constitutional judge does not cease to be one simply because the proceeding is a bail application.

The caveat that saved the order

But the Supreme Court added an important qualification. When a High Court discovers investigative lapses during bail proceedings, the proper course is not to make final findings against the officer on the spot. Instead, the court should direct the institution of separate proceedings under Article 226, formulate the specific points for consideration, and refer the matter to the Chief Justice for placement before an appropriate bench—after giving the officer a full opportunity to be heard.

In this case, the High Court had not followed that procedure. Its observations against Inspector Dubey were made in the course of a bail application, without a separate hearing directed at him.

Yet the Supreme Court did not overturn the High Court's order. Why? Because the Superintendent of Police had already initiated disciplinary proceedings against the Inspector on his own. The High Court's direction was, in effect, merely reiterative—it was telling the department to do what it had already started doing. The precedents that limited a High Court's powers in bail matters, the bench said, did not apply here because the bail application was still pending when the impugned order was passed, and the departmental action was already underway.

The appeal was dismissed. But the Supreme Court added a critical caveat: the High Court's observations shall not be treated as findings against Inspector Dubey in the departmental proceedings. Those proceedings must take their own course, after providing the officer full opportunity to defend himself. The interim order dated November 23, 2022, was vacated. No order as to costs.

The procedural journey of the case reflected this layered outcome. The FIR had been registered on July 18, 2021, at Sleemanabad Police Station. The bail application had been filed before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, which passed the impugned order on September 21, 2022. The Supreme Court finally decided the appeal on May 11, 2023, in Criminal Appeal No. 1466 of 2023, reported as 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 435.

What this means for investigating officers

The message from the Supreme Court is layered. On one hand, it affirmed that a High Court, as a Constitutional Court, has wider powers than a Sessions Court even while deciding a bail application. It can flag investigative lapses that threaten the justice system. On the other hand, it made clear that such observations cannot become final findings against an officer without a separate, fair proceeding.

For investigating officers, the lesson is stark: a forensic lab's instruction to conduct a DNA test is not a suggestion. It is a critical step in building a case—especially in a POCSO matter where scientific evidence can be decisive. Ignoring it invites scrutiny not just from superiors but from constitutional courts. And while the shield of bail jurisdiction may protect an officer from summary condemnation, it does not shield him from accountability.

THE PLAY: A Station House Officer who ignores a forensic lab's instruction for DNA analysis in a POCSO case cannot argue that a High Court exceeded its bail jurisdiction by noticing the lapse—but the officer retains the right to a fair departmental inquiry where those observations are not treated as conclusive findings.

The court ended where it began: with a missing DNA test, a judge who noticed, and a cop who learned that a Constitutional Court's eyes do not close just because the case is about bail.