Police refused to file her FIR. Magistrate said no. Then the Supreme Court stepped in.

She went to the police. They did nothing. She went to the Magistrate. He turned her into a complaint case. Then the Supreme Court said—no.

She was a yoga instructor at a national sports institute in Gwalior. In October 2019, she walked into PS Gole Ka Mandir. She told them the Vice-Chancellor had touched her inappropriately in March that year. The police took her statement. Then nothing. The silence in the police station that day was heavy, the complaint form lying on the desk like a dead thing.

She went back. Again. Again. She wrote to the Superintendent of Police. Silence. For months, the system that was supposed to protect her refused to move. The question that landed before the Supreme Court in August 2022 was brutally simple: Can a police officer decide not to register an FIR when a woman says she has been sexually harassed? And if the police won't act, can a Magistrate force them to?

When the police station door stayed shut

She alleged the Vice-Chancellor touched her inappropriately in March 2019. She did not go to the police immediately — many survivors don't. But by October 2019, she had gathered the courage. She filed a complaint under Section 154 CrPC (the provision that requires police to register an FIR when someone reports a serious crime). The cold bench outside the police station waiting room offered no comfort as she waited for a response that never came.

Nothing happened. She filed another complaint. Then another. She wrote to the Superintendent of Police. Still nothing. The police station door stayed shut.

By the time she finally approached a lawyer, months had passed. The CCTV recordings from the Vice-Chancellor's chamber — evidence that could have shown exactly what happened — were allegedly taken by the accused himself. The institute demanded them back. They were never returned. The DVR, gathering dust somewhere, held the truth that no one would retrieve.

The Magistrate's strange decision

In November 2021, the yoga instructor approached the Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC) in Gwalior under Section 156(3) CrPC (a provision that lets a Magistrate order the police to investigate a crime). She asked for one thing: direct the police to register an FIR and investigate.

The Magistrate looked at her complaint. He found that a prima facie case (a case that appears to have enough evidence to proceed) had been made out. The offences — sexual harassment — were cognizable (serious enough that police can arrest without a warrant). The evidence, including the missing CCTV DVRs, was in the accused's possession and could only be retrieved through police powers.

Then the Magistrate did something strange. Instead of ordering a police investigation, he converted the application into a complaint case under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC (a procedure where the Magistrate himself examines the complainant and witnesses, then decides whether to issue process). In plain English: he told the woman to become her own prosecutor, collect her own evidence, and prove her case without police help. The cold wooden bench of the Magistrate's court felt no different from the police station's.

The yoga instructor went to the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The High Court, exercising its powers under Section 482 CrPC (the High Court's inherent power to prevent abuse of process), upheld the Magistrate's order. She was now trapped between a police force that wouldn't act and a court that wouldn't make them.

What the Supreme Court heard

By August 2022, the case reached the Supreme Court. A bench of Justice Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud and Justice J.B. Pardiwala heard the appeal. The woman's lawyer argued a simple point: the police had a duty to register an FIR when a cognizable offence was disclosed. The Magistrate had the power to order investigation. Both had failed.

The Vice-Chancellor's lawyers argued the opposite: the Magistrate had discretion under Section 156(3) CrPC. He could choose between ordering a police investigation or treating the complaint as a complaint case. The High Court had upheld that discretion. That should be the end of it.

The Supreme Court asked a sharper question: what happens to critical evidence — like CCTV recordings — that is in the accused's possession and can only be retrieved through police powers? If the Magistrate converts the case into a complaint case, who gets that evidence back? The complainant cannot. The accused will not. The evidence disappears.

Why discretion became a duty

The Supreme Court's reasoning cut through the procedural fog. The bench held that a police officer has no discretion when a complaint discloses a cognizable offence. The FIR must be registered. Questions about whether the complaint is true are for investigation and trial — not for the police station reception desk. This was not a new principle. The court had said the same thing in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2014), a landmark judgment that made registration of FIR mandatory in cognizable offences.

But the court went further. It held that when a Magistrate finds a prima facie case and the facts show that critical evidence is in the accused's possession — retrievable only through police powers — the Magistrate's discretion under Section 156(3) CrPC converts into a duty to direct police investigation. The Magistrate cannot wash his hands of the matter by converting it into a complaint case. He must use the police to retrieve evidence that the complainant cannot reach.

Justice Chandrachud, writing for the bench, observed: "The Magistrate's discretion under Section 156(3) CrPC converts into a duty to direct investigation where cognizable offences are prima facie established and critical evidence is in the accused's possession." The courtroom fell silent as those words were read. The Magistrate's order was set aside. The High Court's order was set aside. The investigation was directed to proceed under the supervision of a woman officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police.

New rules for how courts must treat sexual assault complainants

The Supreme Court did not stop at reversing the orders. It issued a set of guidelines for the sensitive handling of sexual offence trials — rules that every trial court in India must now follow:

• Trials must be conducted in camera (in a closed courtroom, not open to the public) where appropriate, as required by Section 327 CrPC.
• The court must allow a screen or other arrangement so the complainant does not have to see the accused while testifying.
• Cross-examination must be respectful. Questions about the complainant's sexual history with persons other than the accused are not permitted.
• Cross-examination should be completed in one sitting as far as possible, to minimize the trauma of repeated court appearances.

These guidelines built on the court's earlier judgment in Aparna Bhat v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2021), where the court had already warned against bail conditions that forced sexual assault survivors to "mediate" or "compromise" with their attackers.

For the yoga instructor, the judgment meant one thing: after nearly three years of knocking on doors that would not open, the police would finally investigate. A woman SP would supervise. The CCTV recordings — if they still existed — would be retrieved. The case would move forward.

The court also held that in cases alleging sexual harassment or assault where the victim is already traumatized, courts should not burden the complainant further and must press upon the police to investigate, especially when critical evidence is beyond the complainant's reach. Trial courts were directed to conduct proceedings in camera where appropriate, allow screens or separation from the accused, ensure respectful cross-examination without questions on sexual history, and complete cross-examination in one sitting as far as possible.

The procedural journey had been long: from the police station at PS Gole Ka Mandir, Gwalior in October 2019, where no FIR was registered despite multiple complaints; to the JMFC, Gwalior in November 2021, where the application under Section 156(3) CrPC was converted to a complaint case; to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Gwalior Bench) in January 2022, where the Section 482 CrPC application was dismissed; and finally to the Supreme Court in August 2022, where Criminal Appeal No. 1184 of 2022 was allowed, setting aside both the High Court and JMFC orders.

The court applied several provisions: Section 154 CrPC (information in cognizable cases), Section 156(3) CrPC (Magistrate's power to order investigation), Section 173 CrPC (report of police officer on completion of investigation), Sections 200 and 202 CrPC (complaint case procedure), Section 327 CrPC (in camera trials for sexual offences), Section 482 CrPC (inherent powers of High Court), and cross-referenced Sections 376, 376A, 376B, 376C, 376D IPC as well as the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Protection and Redressal) Act, 2013.

Among the precedents cited were Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 2 SCC 1, Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409, Srinivas Gundluri v. SEPCO Electric Power Construction Corpn. (2010) 8 SCC 206, Virender v. State of NCT of Delhi 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3083, Aparna Bhat v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2021 SCC OnLine SC 230, State of Maharashtra v. Bandu @ Daulat (2018) 11 SCC 163, and Smruti Tukaram Badade v. State of Maharashtra 2022 SCC OnLine SC 78.

THE PLAY: If you are a Magistrate and a sexual assault complainant shows you a prima facie case where critical evidence is in the accused's possession, your discretion to order police investigation becomes a duty — you cannot convert the case into a complaint case and leave the survivor to gather evidence alone.

The police station door finally opened. It only took the Supreme Court to push it.