RTI-certified copy not enough for court evidence

She got a Xerox certified by the RTI officer. The court said: that's not a certified copy.

The party walked into court holding a photocopy of a private document. The copy bore a rubber stamp — circular, purple ink — with the Public Information Officer's (PIO — the officer designated to answer information requests under the transparency law) signature scrawled beneath it. A file number was pencilled in the corner. They thought the stamp was enough. The courtroom fell quiet as the judge picked up the paper, glanced at it, and set it down. The court disagreed.

The question was simple but consequential: can a photocopy certified by an RTI officer be treated as a "certified copy" under the Evidence Act, and therefore be admitted as secondary evidence (a copy used when the original cannot be produced)? The answer, the court ruled, is no — and the reasoning has implications for every litigant who reaches for the RTI Act as a shortcut to evidence.

When the RTI stamp wasn't enough

In Datti Kameswari v. Singam Rao Sarath Chandra, the party seeking to introduce the copy stood before the court holding a Xerox of a private document. The copy had been certified as a true copy by the PIO under the Right to Information Act, 2005. Counsel for the party argued that this certification made the copy admissible as secondary evidence — meaning they could rely on it without producing the original. The courtroom smelled of old paper and dust; the file on the judge's desk was thin.

The court examined the nature of the copy. Under the RTI regime, a citizen can request access to records held by a public authority. The PIO is required to provide the information, often by supplying photocopies of documents from the department's files. These copies are stamped "true copy" by the PIO. The stamp on the copy in this case was neat, official — but the court was not persuaded.

The court drew a sharp distinction. A copy certified by a PIO, it held, is merely a true copy of a private document that happens to be in the records of a government department. It is not a "certified copy" within the meaning of Section 65 of the Evidence Act (the provision that lists when secondary evidence — copies or oral accounts of a document's contents — can be used instead of the original). The court observed that "these copies are merely true copies of private documents available in the records of a particular Department. They are not certified copies within the meaning of the provisions of Section 65 of the Evidence Act."

The judge's tone was measured but firm. Counsel for the party pressing the evidence pressed the point: the PIO had certified it, the stamp was official, why was it not enough? The court responded by pointing to the language of the Evidence Act. The PIO's certification, the court said, only confirms that the copy is a true reproduction of a document in the department's records. It does not confirm the document's legal status or satisfy the conditions for secondary evidence.

What Section 65 actually requires — and what the parties argued

The argument of the party's counsel rested on a simple proposition: the RTI Act is a law of the land, and a certification under it should carry evidentiary weight. The court disagreed. It held that "the condition prescribed under the clauses (a), (b) or (c) of Section 65 of the Act must be fulfilled before marking the true copies obtained under the Right to Information Act." The mere fact that a PIO certified the copy does not bypass this requirement. The party must still establish a valid reason for the non-production of the original — such as that it is lost, destroyed, or in the possession of an adverse party who refuses to produce it.

Section 65 of the Evidence Act governs the circumstances in which secondary evidence may be given. The key clauses — (a), (b), and (c) — require the party seeking to use secondary evidence to first lay a foundation: they must explain why the original document cannot be produced. For instance, if the original is lost or destroyed, or is in the possession of a person who refuses to produce it despite a legal notice, the court may allow a copy instead.

Counsel for the party had not filed any such application. There was no affidavit stating that the original was lost, or that the opposing party held the original and had refused to produce it. The court noted this gap. The foundation required by Section 65 was missing, and the PIO's stamp could not fill it.

The court's logic was straightforward: the RTI Act is a transparency law, not an evidence law. It does not alter the nature of a private document or its requirements for proof. A private document remains a private document, even if it sits in a government file and is certified by a PIO. The copy in the party's hand — stamped, signed, numbered — was still just a photocopy until the proper legal foundation was laid.

The same logic in another case

The court drew support from an earlier decision in Kumarpal N. Shah v. Universal Mechanical Works. In that case too, the party trying to introduce the evidence had brought photocopies of private documents obtained under RTI, certified as true copies by the PIO. The court rejected the argument that these copies could be equated with certified copies under the Evidence Act. The file in that case was similarly thin — a few sheets of paper, each bearing the same purple stamp.

The court observed that "under RTI, the applicant typically receives Photostat copies of documents certified as true copies. They cannot be equated with certified copies mentioned in the Evidence Act." The RTI Act does not inherently alter the nature of the document or its requirement for proper proof. A private document obtained through RTI remains a private document, and the party relying on it must still show why the original is not available.

In Kumarpal N. Shah, the court's reasoning was clear: "if an official under RTI certifies and supplies a private document, it still remains a private document." The RTI Act does not transform it into a certified copy under the Evidence Act. The party relying on RTI copies of private documents must adhere to the standard secondary evidence rules, particularly showing the reason for the non-production of the original.

The procedural trap for litigants

Consider a typical scenario. A litigant in a property dispute needs a copy of a sale deed that was registered years ago. The original is with a family member who refuses to hand it over. The litigant files an RTI application with the sub-registrar's office. The PIO supplies a photocopy of the sale deed from the department's records, stamped and certified. The litigant walks into court confident that the stamp makes the copy evidence. The judge asks: where is the original? The litigant says it is with the family member. The judge asks: did you give notice to produce? The litigant says no. The judge sets the copy aside.

That is the trap this judgment exposes. The RTI route gives the litigant a copy — but not a shortcut. The litigant must still file an application under Section 65 explaining why the original is unavailable. Without that step, the certified copy from the PIO is, in the eyes of the court, just a piece of paper with a stamp that carries no evidentiary weight.

The courtroom in such cases often sees the same scene: a party holding a stamped photocopy, expecting it to be accepted without question. The judge's tone in Datti Kameswari was final: the stamp was not enough, and the law required more.

What this means for litigants

The practical impact is significant. Many litigants, especially in property disputes, contractual claims, and family matters, use the RTI route to obtain copies of documents held by government departments — sale deeds, agreements, letters, and other private records. They assume that the PIO's certification makes the copy automatically admissible.

This judgment clarifies that assumption is wrong. The RTI-certified copy is a starting point, not an end point. The party must still comply with the secondary evidence rules under Section 65. That means filing an application explaining why the original cannot be produced — for example, that it is lost despite a diligent search, or that it is in the possession of the opposing party who has refused to produce it despite a notice to produce.

Without that foundation, the court may refuse to mark the copy as evidence, leaving the party without proof of their case. The court's verdict in Datti Kameswari established that "the mere certification by an Information Officer under RTI does not elevate a private document copy to the status of a certified copy under the Evidence Act, and the foundation for the non-production of the original must still be established."

THE PLAY: Before marking an RTI-certified copy of a private document as evidence, file an application under Section 65 of the Evidence Act explaining why the original cannot be produced — the PIO's stamp alone is not enough.

The court ended where it began: with a Xerox copy and a purple stamp that said less than the party hoped. The file was closed, the courtroom empty, and the lesson was clear — the law of evidence does not bend to the convenience of a rubber stamp.