She never showed up. He still lost. The High Court reversed it.

One day to prove cruelty. One judgment to dismiss it. One appeal to rewrite the case.

When Suman Talukder walked into the Additional District Judge’s court in Asansol, he was one man against a marriage he said had turned into a nightmare. His wife, Namita Paul Talukder, never showed up. Not at the trial. Not at the appeal. Not once. The trial court heard Suman’s evidence on March 28, 2022, reserved judgment, and delivered it — all on the same day. The suit was dismissed. Suman lost his chance at divorce, not because his wife contested, but because the court found his proof too thin. Sixteen years of marriage, allegations of cruelty, a wife who had walked out — and the judge said it wasn’t enough. Suman appealed to the Calcutta High Court. The stakes: a second chance to prove his case, or a dead marriage he could never escape.

What the trial court actually saw

Suman Talukder filed Matrimonial Suit No. 227 of 2019 before the Additional District Judge, Asansol, District Paschim Bardhaman. He sought divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) and Section 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — cruelty and desertion. His wife Namita was served notice. She never appeared. The trial proceeded ex parte.

Suman examined himself as P.W.1 and his mother as P.W.2. He alleged that Namita had subjected him to cruelty — she had filed false complaints at his workplace, she had left the matrimonial home without consent, she had refused to return. He claimed she had been hospitalised at some point, that he had travelled to bring her back, that her behaviour had made life unbearable.

The trial judge heard the evidence, reserved judgment, and delivered it the same day. The suit was dismissed. The judge held that Suman had failed to prove his case. No documentary evidence. No independent witnesses. The mother’s testimony was weak. The cruelty ground collapsed. The desertion ground was barely argued.

Suman was left with a decree of dismissal and a marriage that, in law, was still alive.

Why the High Court saw it differently

Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, writing for the Division Bench with Justice Uday Kumar concurring, did not simply reverse the trial court. He dissected the evidence, the procedure, and the law — and found three distinct problems.

Problem one: the mother’s testimony was hearsay

Suman’s mother, P.W.2, lived in Paschim Bardhaman. The events she described — the hospitalisation, the travel, the workplace complaints — all occurred in Tezpur, Assam. She was not present. Her affidavit merely copied Suman’s version, changing the first person to second person. The High Court held that her testimony could not constitute genuine corroboration. It was hearsay. A witness who lives in a different state and has no direct knowledge of the events cannot corroborate the plaintiff’s story. The trial court was right to disregard it.

Problem two: vital allegations needed documentary proof

Suman alleged that Namita had filed false complaints at his workplace. He said she had been hospitalised. He claimed he had travelled to bring her back. None of these were supported by hospital records, travel documents, or any independent third-party witness. The High Court held that in a divorce suit on the ground of cruelty, such vital factual allegations must be backed by documentary evidence or independent witnesses. Mere oral testimony of the plaintiff and an interested witness is insufficient. The trial court’s finding on cruelty was correct.

Problem three: the trial court rushed the process

Here is where the High Court intervened. The trial judge had concluded evidence, reserved judgment, and delivered it on the same day — March 28, 2022. The judgment contained no reflection of arguments. The plaintiff was denied any real opportunity to present his case after the evidence was closed. Justice Bhattacharyya held that this constituted a violation of natural justice. A litigant is entitled to a fair hearing, which includes the chance to argue after the evidence is complete. The trial court’s haste had denied Suman that right.

THE PLAY: If your trial court reserves and delivers judgment on the same day as evidence, and the judgment shows no arguments were heard, you have a natural justice ground for appeal — even if your evidence was weak.

The desertion ground the trial court missed

The High Court then turned to desertion. Suman had pleaded desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The trial court had not seriously considered it. But the High Court noticed something striking: Namita had never appeared in the trial court despite service. She had not appeared in the appeal either. She had filed no written statement. She had made no effort to contest the divorce.

Justice Bhattacharyya observed that this consistent and deliberate abstinence from the proceedings indicated an utter absence of animus revertandi — the intention to return to the matrimonial home. Desertion under the Hindu Marriage Act requires two elements: the fact of separation and the intention to desert (animus non revertandi). Here, the wife’s persistent absence from both the trial and the appeal furnished strong evidence of that intention. The trial court had failed to consider this at all.

The obiter that signals a shift

In a striking passage, the High Court noted that although irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a statutory ground for divorce in India, jurisprudence in other countries — such as the UK — incorporates it as an aspect of cruelty. Justice Bhattacharyya observed that it is “probably high time” that components of irretrievable breakdown should be read into the grounds of desertion and cruelty under Indian law, to ensure that parties are not forcibly kept bound to dead marriages.

This is not the ratio of the case. It is obiter. But it signals a judicial appetite for reform. If the legislature does not act, courts may begin to read irretrievable breakdown into existing provisions. For practitioners, this is a warning: the ground of desertion may soon be interpreted more broadly, and the wife’s continued absence from proceedings may itself become a powerful factor.

What the High Court actually ordered

The appeal was allowed. The judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Asansol, dated March 28, 2022, were set aside. The matter was remanded to the trial court for a fresh hearing. Suman was granted liberty to amend his plaint to incorporate the developments regarding desertion — specifically, the wife’s continued absence from the proceedings. The trial court was directed to rehear the suit, granting both parties an opportunity to substantiate their cases on cruelty and desertion. No order as to costs.

Why this matters in practice

For advocates handling divorce cases, this judgment offers three concrete lessons.

First, corroboration matters. If your client’s key witness lives in a different state and has no direct knowledge of the events, that testimony is hearsay. You need documentary proof or independent witnesses for vital allegations — hospital records, travel tickets, workplace complaints. Without them, the cruelty ground will fail.

Second, natural justice is a live ground. If the trial court rushes the process — concluding evidence and delivering judgment on the same day without hearing arguments — you have a strong appeal point. The High Court will set aside such a judgment even if the evidence was weak, because the procedure was flawed.

Third, desertion can be proved by the respondent’s absence. If the spouse never appears despite service, that persistent absence itself indicates animus non revertandi. You can amend your plaint to include this as evidence of desertion. The trial court must consider it.

The bottom line

If your divorce suit is dismissed because your evidence is weak, but the trial court rushed the process and ignored the respondent’s consistent absence, you have a viable appeal — and a chance to amend your case to turn that absence into proof of desertion.