She taught for years. Got zero marks. The Supreme Court said that was legal.

When a Guest Lecturer’s Paycheck Became a Legal Battleground

Geetanjali Tiwari had spent years teaching Sanskrit at Allahabad University and its affiliated colleges. She was a guest lecturer, a contractual faculty member — the kind of academic who builds classrooms but rarely builds a permanent career. When she applied for an Assistant Professor post in 2022, the university shortlisted candidates for interview using a scoring table. Under that table, teaching experience earned marks — but only if the teacher had been paid at least the gross salary of a regular Assistant Professor. Tiwari had earned far less. She got zero marks. She wasn’t shortlisted.

At stake: not just one woman’s career, but the fate of thousands of contractual and guest faculty across India’s university system. Could a university deny them marks for years of teaching simply because their pay was low? And could a High Court rewrite a UGC regulation to save them?

The Rule That Cut Her Out

The UGC (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers) Regulations, 2018, contain a detailed scoring mechanism for shortlisting candidates for Assistant Professor posts. Tables 3A and 3B allocate marks for qualifications, research, and teaching experience. Clause 7 of those tables awards marks for “Teaching/Post-Doctoral experience.”

But Regulation 10 of the same set of rules — titled “Counting of Past Services” — lays down conditions for which teaching experience counts. Under Regulation 10(e), guest lecturer experience is explicitly excluded. Under Regulation 10(f)(iii), contractual teaching experience counts only if the teacher “has been paid at least the gross salary of a regular Assistant Professor.”

Tiwari’s contractual pay fell short. The university applied the regulation strictly. She got zero marks for teaching experience. She was not shortlisted.

She moved the Allahabad High Court.

The High Court’s Bold Move

Before a Single Judge, Tiwari lost. The judge rejected her prayer to direct the university to grant marks for her contractual teaching experience. But she appealed to a Division Bench, and there, she won — decisively.

On January 18, 2024, the Division Bench read down Regulation 10. It held that the regulation did not apply to shortlisting for Assistant Professor posts at all. The Bench reasoned that since no prior teaching experience was an eligibility condition for Assistant Professor, the university could not use teaching experience as a shortlisting criterion — or at least, could not apply the pay threshold from Regulation 10(f)(iii). The court directed that future shortlisting be done without applying Regulation 10 conditions.

It was a sweeping order. It effectively deleted “Assistant Professor” from the scope of Regulation 10. The university, which had followed the UGC’s own rules, was now told it had applied them wrongly.

Allahabad University appealed to the Supreme Court.

What the University Argued

The university’s case was straightforward: Regulation 10 expressly mentions “Assistant Professor.” Tables 3A and 3B expressly award marks for teaching experience. The two provisions must be read together. The High Court had no business deleting a category that the UGC had deliberately included.

The university also pointed out that the High Court had not declared Regulation 10 unconstitutional. It had not found it ultra vires Article 14 or any other constitutional provision. It had simply decided that the regulation was inconvenient for contractual faculty and read it down to remove that inconvenience.

That, argued the university, was impermissible judicial legislation.

What the Respondent Argued

Tiwari’s counsel argued that Regulation 10 was meant for counting past services for the purpose of appointment — that is, for determining seniority, pay fixation, and probation — not for shortlisting candidates for interview. Shortlisting, they said, was governed solely by Tables 3A and 3B, and those tables did not incorporate the pay threshold from Regulation 10(f)(iii).

They also argued that applying the pay threshold to contractual faculty was discriminatory under Article 14. A teacher who had taught for years but was paid less than a regular Assistant Professor was still a teacher. Denying her marks for that experience simply because her employer paid her poorly was arbitrary and unfair.

The Supreme Court’s Framework

Justice Dipankar Datta, writing for the two-judge Bench, did not mince words. The question was not whether Regulation 10 was fair or unfair. The question was whether the High Court had the power to read it down the way it did.

The Court began with first principles of statutory interpretation. It cited Girdhari Lal & Sons v. Balbir Nath Mathur (1986) 2 SCC 237: “Words are vehicles of thought; courts must find legislative intention. Where words are plain and unambiguous, effect must be given to them.”

It cited Reserve Bank of India (as noted in the judgment): “Interpretation must depend on text and context; statute must be read as a whole; every word must have a place.”

And it cited Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust v. A.G. Syed Mohideen (2010) 2 SCC 513: “Statutes must be read as they are without adding, substituting, or omitting words; courts cannot alter or amend law.”

The message was clear: a court cannot rewrite a regulation because it thinks the regulation is harsh.

The Limits of Reading Down

The Supreme Court then turned to the doctrine of reading down. It acknowledged that reading down is a legitimate tool — used to save a statute from unconstitutionality. It cited CST v. Radhakrishan (1979) 2 SCC 249, which held that reading down is permissible to save a statute from being struck down.

But the Court also cited Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600: “Reading down is limited: used to save statute from unconstitutionality or resolve vagueness. Cannot be used when language is definite and unambiguous.”

And Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Secy., Revenue Deptt., Govt. of A.P.: “Reading down arises only if provision is found ultra vires as it stands.”

The High Court had not found Regulation 10 ultra vires. It had not held it unconstitutional. It had simply decided that the regulation should not apply to Assistant Professor shortlisting. That, the Supreme Court held, was not reading down — it was rewriting.

THE TEST: Before reading down a statutory provision, a court must first find it unconstitutional as it stands. If the language is clear and the provision is not ultra vires, the court cannot delete words or categories to make it more palatable.

Why the High Court’s Reasoning Failed

The High Court had reasoned that since no prior teaching experience was an eligibility condition for Assistant Professor, the university could not use teaching experience as a shortlisting criterion — or at least, could not apply the pay threshold. The Supreme Court rejected this logic.

Eligibility and shortlisting, the Court explained, serve different purposes. Eligibility determines who can apply. Shortlisting determines who among the applicants is most qualified to be called for interview. A university can use teaching experience as a shortlisting criterion even if it is not an eligibility condition. That is not arbitrary — it is rational. It allows the university to select candidates who have actually taught, rather than those who have only researched or studied.

The Court also noted that Regulation 10 expressly refers to “Assistant Professor.” The UGC, when it drafted the regulation, knew what it was doing. It could have excluded Assistant Professor from the scope of Regulation 10. It did not. The High Court could not do what the UGC chose not to do.

What This Means for Universities

The Supreme Court’s reasoning strongly suggests that the High Court’s order will be set aside. Regulation 10(f)(iii) — the pay threshold — will apply to shortlisting for Assistant Professor posts. Universities that have been following the UGC’s rules were right to do so.

But the Court also made an important observation: universities are not powerless. They can prescribe enhanced norms for shortlisting, so long as those norms are not illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory, or contrary to UGC Regulations. If a university wants to give marks for teaching experience without the pay threshold, it can — but only if it amends its own ordinances or statutes to do so, and only if those amendments comply with the UGC framework.

In other words, the solution is not judicial rewriting. It is regulatory reform.

The Practitioner Takeaway

For advocates advising universities: the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that shortlisting criteria under Tables 3A/3B must be read with Regulation 10. If your client is a university that has been applying the pay threshold, you are on solid ground. If your client is a contractual faculty member challenging the threshold, your argument must be constitutional — not interpretive. You must show that Regulation 10(f)(iii) is itself arbitrary and violates Article 14. You cannot ask a court to pretend the provision does not exist.

For advocates advising faculty: the door is not closed. The Supreme Court left open the question of whether Regulation 10(f)(iii) is constitutionally valid. That fight can still be fought — but it must be fought on constitutional grounds, not through reading down.

For universities: if you want to give marks to contractual faculty without the pay threshold, amend your ordinances. The Supreme Court has said you can, as long as the new norms are not arbitrary or discriminatory. But do not expect a court to do your legislative work for you.

The Bottom Line

The Supreme Court has drawn a bright line: reading down cannot become rewriting. If a regulation says what it means and means what it says, a court cannot delete a category to make it fairer. The remedy for an unfair regulation is constitutional challenge, not judicial amendment.