Speaker disqualified him. But the pension stayed — and the Court said why.

When a Speaker went too far: The pension that wasn't his to take

Gyandendra Kumar and three other Members of the 15th Bihar Legislative Assembly were disqualified by the Speaker on 1 November 2014. That much was within his power. But the Speaker's order didn't stop at removing them from the House. It also directed that they would lose all ex-MLA facilities — pension, travel, medical benefits, everything. The four men had been elected, then expelled, and then told they would be stripped of every benefit they had earned as legislators. The stakes were not just political. They were financial. And they were constitutional.

By the time the Supreme Court heard the appeals, the 15th Assembly had long dissolved. The 17th Assembly was in session. The Court could have ducked the entire matter as moot. Instead, it asked a narrower question: did the Speaker have the power to take away pension and benefits under the Tenth Schedule? The answer, delivered by a three-judge Bench of Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, and Justice J.B. Pardiwala, was a firm no.

The order that went one step too far

The Speaker of the 15th Bihar Legislative Assembly passed his disqualification order on 1 November 2014. The operative part, recorded in paragraphs 27 and 28 of that order, did two things. First, it disqualified the four MLAs under Para 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule — the anti-defection provision that kicks in when a member voluntarily gives up the membership of their political party. Second, it directed that the disqualified members would be denied all ex-MLA facilities, including pension and other benefits.

The four men — Gyandendra Kumar and his colleagues — immediately approached the Supreme Court. The Court granted an interim stay of the disqualification order. That stay meant the members continued to enjoy their benefits while the case was pending. But the clock was ticking. The 15th Assembly's term ran from 20 November 2010 to 20 November 2015. By the time the appeals reached final hearing, the Assembly had been dissolved for nearly seven years. The 17th Assembly was in session.

The Court was now faced with a curious situation. The disqualification itself was arguably moot — the Assembly whose membership was at issue no longer existed. But the ancillary direction denying pension and benefits was very much alive. If the Speaker had no power to issue that direction, it had to be set aside regardless of whether the disqualification was valid.

What each side argued

The disqualified MLAs, through their learned Counsel, argued that the Speaker had exceeded his jurisdiction. The Tenth Schedule, they said, only empowers the Speaker to decide whether a member has become disqualified. It does not confer any power to impose additional penal consequences — like stripping pension or barring re-election. The Speaker, they submitted, is not a court. He cannot issue directions that go beyond the narrow question of disqualification.

The respondents — the Bihar Legislative Assembly and others — defended the Speaker's order. They argued that the power to disqualify necessarily includes the power to decide the consequences of disqualification. If a member is disqualified, they cannot claim the benefits that flow from being a member. The Speaker, they said, was merely giving effect to the natural consequences of disqualification.

The Supreme Court was not persuaded. It noted that the question was not whether a disqualified member could claim benefits — that might be a separate issue for a different forum. The question was whether the Speaker, acting under the Tenth Schedule, had the jurisdiction to issue a direction denying those benefits. The answer, the Court held, was no.

The precedent that sealed the case

The Court relied on its earlier decision in Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly & Others, reported at (2020) 2 SCC 595. In that case, the Supreme Court had held that the Speaker exercising powers under the Tenth Schedule cannot impose additional penal consequences beyond disqualification — such as barring a disqualified member from contesting elections. The Constitution, the Court said in Patil, provides for specific eventualities. No 'inherent' power can be read into the Tenth Schedule to confer additional penal consequences.

Justice Lalit, writing for the Bench, quoted extensively from paragraphs 137 to 142 of Patil. The ratio was clear: the Speaker's jurisdiction under the Tenth Schedule is limited strictly to disqualification. It does not extend to ancillary directions like denying ex-MLA benefits. The Speaker of the Bihar Legislative Assembly had, therefore, exceeded his jurisdiction when he directed that the four disqualified MLAs would lose their pension and other facilities.

THE PLAY: When a Speaker disqualifies a member under the Tenth Schedule, the order must stop at disqualification. Any direction that strips pension, benefits, or other ex-member facilities is beyond the Speaker's jurisdiction and will be set aside by the Supreme Court.

The doctrine that mattered

The core legal principle in this case is about the scope of a Speaker's power under the Tenth Schedule. The Tenth Schedule was inserted into the Constitution to deal with defection. It empowers the Speaker to decide whether a member has become disqualified on grounds of voluntarily giving up party membership, voting against the party whip, or other specified grounds. That is all the Speaker can do.

The Speaker is not a court. He does not have plenary powers to decide the consequences of disqualification. If the Constitution wanted the Speaker to also decide on pension, benefits, or re-election eligibility, it would have said so. It did not. The Speaker's jurisdiction is a narrow, statutory one. It cannot be expanded by reading in 'inherent' powers.

This is a critical distinction for practitioners. When a Speaker passes a disqualification order, the order is valid only to the extent it decides the question of disqualification. Any additional direction — whether it denies pension, bars re-election, or imposes any other penalty — is ultra vires the Tenth Schedule. It can be challenged and set aside independently, even if the disqualification itself is not challenged or has become moot.

Why the Court left the disqualification open

The Court expressly declined to decide whether the disqualification itself was valid. The 15th Assembly had dissolved. The 17th Assembly was in session. Deciding the merits of a disqualification from a defunct Assembly would have been an academic exercise. The Court therefore left all questions on the disqualification open.

This is a pragmatic approach that future courts may follow. When an Assembly dissolves during the pendency of a disqualification challenge, the court can confine itself to examining ancillary issues — like whether the Speaker exceeded his jurisdiction — rather than deciding a moot disqualification question. The disqualification itself may be left to be decided if and when it becomes relevant again.

What this means in practice

For advocates, this judgment is a reminder that the Speaker's power under the Tenth Schedule is not a roving commission. If you are representing a disqualified MLA, check the operative portion of the Speaker's order carefully. If it contains any direction beyond disqualification — denying pension, barring re-election, or imposing any other penalty — that direction can be challenged and set aside, even if the disqualification itself is not under challenge.

For CFOs and founders, this case may seem distant. But the principle applies beyond politics. Whenever a statute confers a specific power on a specific authority, that authority cannot expand its own jurisdiction by adding consequences the statute did not provide. If a regulator, a board, or a committee tries to impose penalties beyond what the law allows, the affected party can challenge those penalties as ultra vires.

The Supreme Court set aside the directions in paragraph 28 of the Speaker's order — the part that denied ex-MLA facilities. The appeals were disposed of with no order as to costs. The disqualification question remains open. But the message is clear: a Speaker cannot take what the Constitution did not give him.

The bottom line: If you are disqualified by a Speaker under the Tenth Schedule, your pension and benefits are safe — the Speaker has no power to take them away, and the Supreme Court will strike down any such direction.