Supreme Court: Right to see hidden evidence exists even if states haven't adopted new rules

The prosecution had evidence they weren't showing the defence. The accused demanded it. The High Court said: the rules aren't adopted yet. The Supreme Court said: that doesn't matter.

Two judges of the Supreme Court have now made it clear that a constitutional right does not wait for a state government to finish its paperwork. The right of an accused person to see evidence the prosecution has chosen not to rely on—documents, statements, material that might help the defence—is guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution (the right to life and personal liberty, which includes the right to a fair trial). And that right exists whether or not a state has formally adopted the Draft Rules of Criminal Practice, 2021.

When the death sentence reached the High Court

The case began in a Sessions Court in Chennai. P. Ponnusamy and eight others were convicted for murder and criminal conspiracy. Some of them, including Ponnusamy, were sentenced to death. Under the law, a death sentence cannot be carried out until the High Court confirms it—Section 366 of the CrPC (the provision that requires every death sentence to be reviewed by the High Court) makes this automatic. The reference file, thick with trial records and the judgment of the Sessions Court, landed before the Madras High Court for confirmation.

But instead of the hearing moving forward, the accused's lawyers repeatedly asked for adjournments. The High Court grew impatient. The courtroom, heavy with the silence of waiting, saw the bench direct the hearing to proceed despite the defence's objections. Then something changed.

What Manoj v. State of MP changed

In 2022, the Supreme Court decided a case called Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh. In that judgment, the court held that an accused person has the right to demand from the prosecution not just the documents the prosecution intends to use, but also documents the prosecution has collected but decided not to rely on. The reasoning was simple: a fair trial means the defence gets to see everything that might help its case, not just what the prosecution chooses to share.

After that judgment, Ponnusamy's lawyer wrote a letter to the investigating officer. The letter, a single sheet of paper demanding documents not relied upon by the prosecution, cited Draft Rule 4 of the Criminal Practice Rules, 2021 (a proposed set of rules that would formally require this disclosure). The lawyer argued that without these documents, the trial could not be considered fair.

The High Court refused to delay the proceedings further. It directed the hearing to continue. Ponnusamy challenged this before the Supreme Court.

The question the Supreme Court had to answer

The appeal raised two questions. First, was the High Court wrong to refuse the request for documents? Second—and this was the bigger question—did the right to demand non-relied-upon documents depend on whether a state had formally adopted the Draft Rules?

The prosecution argued that the Draft Rules had not been adopted by the State of Tamil Nadu. Without formal adoption, they said, the rules had no legal force. The accused could not demand something that did not exist in law.

The defence argued that the right came from Article 21, not from a set of draft rules. The rules were merely a mechanism to implement a right that already existed. A state's failure to adopt them could not take away the right itself.

What the court decided—and why the split matters

The Supreme Court dismissed Ponnusamy's appeal unanimously. All three judges agreed that the request for documents at this stage was a dilatory tactic. The appeals had already been set down for hearing. The accused had had repeated opportunities to seek documents earlier. Writing a letter to the investigating officer—instead of filing a proper application before the court—was not the correct procedure. The High Court was right to refuse.

But the three judges disagreed on the larger question. As the bench delivered its split verdict, a brief silence fell over the courtroom—the two opinions diverging on the very foundation of the right.

Justice Bela M. Trivedi held that the Draft Rules have no force until they are formally adopted by the state. Until then, they cannot be pressed into service—especially not at the appellate stage. In her view, the right to demand non-relied-upon documents was contingent on the rules being adopted.

The Chief Justice of India, Uday Umesh Lalit, and Justice S. Ravindra Bhat disagreed. They held that the right to disclosure of material not relied upon by the prosecution is a constitutional right under Article 21. It does not depend on whether a state has adopted the Draft Rules. The rules are a procedural framework, not the source of the right. The source is the Constitution itself.

Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, writing for the majority, declared: "The right to a fair trial under Article 21 cannot be prejudiced by the failure of High Courts or State Governments to formally adopt the Draft Rules of Criminal Practice 2021." The words hung in the air, a clear signal that a constitutional right does not wait for bureaucratic approval.

Why the majority's reasoning changes the game

The majority's position is significant. It means that in every state—whether or not the Draft Rules have been adopted—an accused person can demand documents the prosecution has chosen not to rely on. The right exists now, not when a state government gets around to notifying rules. The stack of undisclosed documents that the prosecution might have kept in its file, unexamined by the defence, must now be opened to scrutiny.

But the court also set limits. The disclosure requirement applies at the trial stage, after charges are framed (the stage where the court formally tells the accused what crimes they are accused of). The accused gets one opportunity to seek disclosure. At the appellate stage, the right is narrower—it must be worked out within the framework of Section 391 of the CrPC (the provision that allows an appellate court to take further evidence if necessary). The trial court can refuse a request if the material sought is irrelevant or if the request is clearly aimed at delay.

The court also clarified that a request for production of documents made through a letter to the investigating officer—without filing an appropriate application under proper procedure—constitutes a dilatory tactic. The operative order noted that the appellant could have sought recourse by filing an appropriate application well in time, but the request at this late stage appeared to prolong the hearing.

What this means for criminal trials going forward

For defence lawyers, the message is clear: you can demand non-relied-upon documents at the trial stage, and you do not need to wait for your state to adopt the Draft Rules. But you must make the request in time, through the proper procedure—a formal application before the court, not a letter to the investigating officer.

For prosecutors, the message is equally clear: withholding documents that might help the defence is no longer a matter of discretion. The right to see them is constitutional. If the prosecution has material that could assist the accused, it must be disclosed—whether or not the state has adopted the rules.

The court also drew on several precedents to reinforce this position. In Criminal Trials Guidelines Regarding Inadequacies and Deficiencies, In re v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., the court had already laid down guidelines for fair trials. In Siddharth Vashisht @ Manu Sharma v. State of NCT Delhi, the court emphasised the prosecution's duty to disclose all relevant material. In Manjeet Singh Khera v. State of Maharashtra and V.K. Sasikala v. State, the court reiterated that a fair trial requires complete disclosure. And in P. Gopalkrishnan v. State of Kerala, the court held that the right to a fair trial is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. These cases together form a chain of authority that the majority in P. Ponnusamy relied upon to hold that the right to disclosure is inherent in Article 21.

The procedural texture of the case also reveals the careful balancing the court undertook. The trial court had convicted the accused under Sections 302 (murder), 120-B (criminal conspiracy), 109 (abetment), 341 (wrongful restraint), and 34 (common intention) of the Indian Penal Code. The death sentence had been referred to the High Court under Section 366 CrPC. The High Court, while dealing with the death reference and the appeals, had declined to direct production of documents. The Supreme Court, while dismissing the appeal, used the opportunity to clarify the law on disclosure.

The court also engaged with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sections 207 and 208 CrPC require the supply of documents to the accused at the commencement of the trial. Section 173 CrPC requires the police to file a report on completion of investigation, along with all documents. Section 91 CrPC allows the court to summon documents. Section 391 CrPC allows the appellate court to take further evidence. The Draft Rule 4 of the Criminal Practice Rules, 2021, sought to operationalise these provisions by requiring the prosecution to supply a list of all documents in its possession, including those not relied upon. The majority held that the right under Article 21 subsumes this requirement, regardless of the formal adoption of the Draft Rules.

THE PLAY: File a formal application under Sections 207/208 CrPC (the provisions for supply of documents to the accused) at the trial stage, after charges are framed, demanding all material in the prosecution's possession—including material not relied upon—and cite Article 21 as the source of the right, not the Draft Rules.

The court ended where it began: with evidence the prosecution was not showing, and a right that does not wait for a state to say yes. The letter Ponnusamy's lawyer wrote, the silence in the courtroom when the split emerged, the stack of undisclosed documents that the prosecution held back—all of it now stands as a reminder that the Constitution does not pause for procedural delays.