Tenant waited 22 years to question court's jurisdiction. Supreme Court shut him down.

The Tenant Who Waited 22 Years to Question the Court

Mumtaz Yarud Dowla Wakf leased its property for 33 years. When the lease expired, the tenants stayed put. The Wakf body sued for eviction before the Wakf Tribunal in Bhind. It won a decree in 2002. The tenants' revision was dismissed by the High Court. Then, in 2014, when the Wakf body finally moved to execute the decree, the tenants raised a new objection: the Wakf Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear the suit in the first place. The Executing Court rejected this. The High Court of Telangana reversed, nullifying the decree. The Wakf body appealed to the Supreme Court. The question: can a tenant who submitted to a court's jurisdiction for over two decades turn around and say the court was powerless?

The Lease, the Suit, and the Decree

In 1999, Mumtaz Yarud Dowla Wakf filed a suit for ejectment and recovery of possession against M/s Badam Balakrishna Hotel Pvt. Ltd. and another tenant. The suit was based on a registered lease deed that had run its full 33-year term. The tenants had no legal right to remain. The Wakf Tribunal, exercising its powers under the Wakf Act, 1995, decreed the suit on 13 November 2002. It ordered the tenants to vacate, pay arrears of rent, and damages.

The tenants challenged the decree in revision before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the revision, holding there was no legal basis for continued occupation after the lease expired. The decree became final. The Wakf body had won.

But winning a decree in India, as the Supreme Court itself observed in this case, is often the beginning of a litigant's difficulties. The Wakf body waited. It moved an execution petition — E.P. 29/2014 — only on 18 October 2014, twelve years after the decree.

The Jurisdiction Objection That Came Too Late

In the execution proceedings, the tenants filed an application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Their argument: the Wakf Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the original suit. They relied on a Supreme Court decision — Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf, (2010) 8 SCC 726 — which held that Sections 6 and 7 of the Wakf Act, 1995 did not confer jurisdiction on the Wakf Tribunal for eviction suits. The tenants argued that the decree was therefore a nullity and could not be executed.

The Executing Court dismissed the application. It held that the jurisdiction objection was not tenable at the execution stage. The tenants had submitted to the Tribunal's jurisdiction throughout the trial and the revision. They could not now approbate and reprobate.

The tenants went back to the High Court of Telangana in revision. This time, the High Court reversed. Relying on Ramesh Gobindram, it held that the Wakf Tribunal lacked inherent jurisdiction to try the suit. The decree was a nullity. The Executing Court could not enforce it. The Wakf body was back to square one.

The Supreme Court's Intervention

The Wakf body appealed to the Supreme Court. The core argument was simple: the tenants had participated in the proceedings before the Wakf Tribunal without any objection. They had challenged the decree on merits in revision and lost. They could not, after the decree became final, raise a jurisdiction challenge for the first time at the execution stage. The doctrine of approbate and reprobate barred such conduct.

The tenants, on the other hand, argued that Ramesh Gobindram was clear law. The Wakf Tribunal had no jurisdiction. A decree passed without jurisdiction is a nullity. It can be challenged at any stage, including execution. They also cited Faseela M. v. Munnerul Islam Madrasa Committee, (2014) 16 SCC 38, which followed Ramesh Gobindram.

The Supreme Court, in a judgment authored by Justice M.M. Sundresh, allowed the appeal. It set aside the High Court's order and restored the Executing Court's decision. The decree stood.

The Doctrine That Decided the Case

The Court applied the doctrine of approbate and reprobate, drawing from Union of India v. N. Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25. The principle: a party cannot accept the benefit of a proceeding and later reject the authority of the forum that granted it. The tenants had submitted to the Wakf Tribunal's jurisdiction without demur. They had taken the chance of a favourable outcome. Having lost, they could not now turn around and say the Tribunal was powerless.

The Court also held that an Executing Court cannot go beyond the decree. Interference on jurisdiction grounds must be very sparse. The onus lies heavily on the judgment-debtor to show the decree is inexecutable. The tenants had not discharged that onus.

THE PLAY: A party who submits to jurisdiction without objection through trial, revision, and into execution cannot raise lack of jurisdiction at execution stage — the doctrine of approbate and reprobate precludes such conduct.

Why Ramesh Gobindram Didn't Help the Tenants

The Court did not overrule Ramesh Gobindram. It explained it. The key: the 2013 amendment to the Wakf Act. By Act 27 of 2013, Parliament amended Sections 83 and 85 of the Wakf Act, 1995. The amendment clarified that the Wakf Tribunal has jurisdiction over all suits relating to Wakf properties, including eviction. The amendment was procedural — it changed the forum, not the substantive rights of the parties.

The Court relied on Rashid Wali Beg v. Farid Pindari, (2022) 4 SCC 414, which had already considered and explained Ramesh Gobindram in light of the 2013 amendment. Rashid Wali Beg held that the Wakf Tribunal's jurisdiction under Sections 83 and 85 is independent of Sections 6 and 7. The 2013 amendment merely clarified what was always the legislative intent.

But the Court went further. Even without the amendment, the tenants could not raise the jurisdiction challenge at the execution stage. The change of forum is procedural. It operates retrospectively. No litigant has a vested right in forum as against action. The Court cited New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra, (1975) 2 SCC 840, and Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602, for the principle that procedural statutes are presumed retrospective.

The Court's Duty to Check Jurisdiction

The Court also made an important observation about the court's inherent duty to check jurisdiction suo motu under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 9 provides that courts shall try all suits of a civil nature unless expressly or impliedly barred. The exclusion of civil court jurisdiction is an exception. The Court, relying on Vankamamidi Venkata Subba Rao v. Chatlapalli Seetharamaratna Ranganayakamma, (1997) 5 SCC 460, held that the court must satisfy itself as to jurisdiction at the institution stage. This duty exists to prevent parties from taking advantage of their own wrong.

But this observation was obiter. The Court did not need to decide the case on this ground. It had already decided on the doctrine of approbate and reprobate. Still, the observation signals that courts should be proactive in verifying jurisdiction early, reducing the scope for belated challenges.

What This Means for Practitioners

This judgment is a powerful tool for decree-holders facing frivolous objections in execution. The key takeaways:

• Submit to jurisdiction at your peril. If you participate in a proceeding without objecting to jurisdiction, you cannot raise the objection later. The doctrine of approbate and reprobate will bar you.
• Execution is not a second trial. An Executing Court cannot go beyond the decree. Jurisdiction challenges at the execution stage are severely limited. The onus is on the judgment-debtor to show the decree is a nullity.
• Forum changes are procedural. If Parliament changes the forum for a particular type of suit, the change applies retrospectively. No litigant has a vested right in a particular forum.
• Cite Rashid Wali Beg, not Ramesh Gobindram. For Wakf property disputes, Rashid Wali Beg is the current law. It explains and limits Ramesh Gobindram in light of the 2013 amendment.

The Bottom Line

A party who submits to a court's jurisdiction for over two decades cannot, at the execution stage, turn around and say the court was powerless — the doctrine of approbate and reprobate bars such conduct, and the Executing Court cannot go beyond the decree to entertain belated jurisdiction challenges.