The 3-factor test Delhi HC uses to override a child's stated preference.

“I don’t want to meet him”: When a 13-year-old’s word is not the last word

When the father walked into the Family Court at Saket in May 2023, he was not asking for full custody. He was not even asking for overnight visits. He simply wanted his 13-year-old adopted son to be produced in the court’s children’s room so that he could see him. The boy, who had lived with both parents until 2021, had not met his father in nearly two years. The Family Court judge spoke to the child, found him “mature enough,” noted his reluctance, and dismissed the father’s application. The father had lost his son twice—once to separation, once to a court order that treated the child’s “no” as final.

But the Delhi High Court saw something the Family Court missed: a 13-year-old’s preference, however sincerely expressed, is not a veto. In Appellant/Father v. Respondent/Mother (2023:DHC:6794-DB), a Division Bench of Justice Suresh Kumar Kait and Justice Neena Bansal Krishna reversed the order and directed supervised visitation on the first and third Saturdays of every month. The judgment is a short, sharp reminder that Section 17(3) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 is directory, not mandatory—and that the welfare of a child sometimes means overriding what the child says he wants.

The two-hour Sunday that never happened

The couple married in 2004. In 2011, they adopted a son. By 2021, the marriage had broken down irretrievably, and the mother retained exclusive custody of the child. The father filed a petition under Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, seeking custody. Pending that petition, the Family Court passed an interim order on 16 August 2022 granting the father visitation rights every Sunday from 12 noon to 2 PM.

It looked like a workable arrangement. It was not.

The father claimed that the mother never complied. The Sunday visits, he said, simply never materialised. Instead of filing a contempt petition, he took a more pragmatic route: he moved an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, praying that the child be produced in the court’s children’s room so that he could at least meet him in a neutral, supervised setting.

What the Family Court heard—and what it did not

The Principal Judge, Family Court, South-East, Saket, decided to interact with the child personally. The boy was 13 years old. The judge found him “sufficiently mature” and recorded that the child expressed a clear reluctance to meet his father. Relying on that interaction, the Family Court dismissed the father’s application on 22 May 2023.

The reasoning was straightforward: the child had spoken, the child was old enough, and the court should respect his wishes. Section 17(3) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, after all, requires the court to consider the preference of a minor who is “old enough to form an intelligent preference.” The Family Court treated that preference as decisive.

The father appealed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984.

The Delhi High Court’s intervention: A different reading of Section 17(3)

The Division Bench did not mince words. The Bench observed that Section 17(3) is “couched in directory language.” The court cannot always be dictated by what the child states to be his preference. The child’s preference is one factor among several, and must be evaluated in the context of surrounding circumstances—including the period of separation and the potential for tutoring or alienation.

This is the doctrinal heart of the judgment. The High Court held that where a child has lived with both parents for a substantial period—in this case, from 2011 to 2021—and the separation is relatively recent, two years of separation cannot justify total alienation. The welfare of the child requires that the bond with the non-custodial parent be preserved and restored. The custodial parent has a duty to facilitate that restoration.

The Bench also made an observation that will resonate with any family law practitioner: “It is common knowledge that where acrimony permeates in the relationship between husband and wife, the worst victim is the child who is directly or indirectly impacted or affected by the acrimonious relationship and is also tutored against the separated parent.”

That is not a finding of fact in this case. It is an obiter—but it signals a judicial awareness of parental alienation that may be invoked in future cases to discount a child’s stated preference where alienation is suspected.

The test the High Court applied

The High Court did not lay down a rigid formula, but the reasoning yields a clear test for trial courts: when a child expresses reluctance to meet a non-custodial parent, the court must ask three questions before treating that reluctance as determinative.

First, how long did the child live with both parents? If the child spent most of his life in a two-parent household, a recent separation cannot erase that history.

Second, what is the duration of the estrangement? Two years of no contact, in a 13-year-old’s life, is significant—but it is not irreversible.

Third, is there evidence of tutoring or alienation? The court need not find deliberate coaching. It is enough that the child has been “directly or indirectly impacted” by the acrimony between the parents.

If the answer to these questions points toward preservation of the parent-child bond, the court must order supervised visitation—even if the child says no.

THE PLAY: When a child’s reluctance to meet a non-custodial parent is rooted in recent separation and potential alienation, the court must order supervised visitation to preserve the parent-child bond—Section 17(3) preference is directory, not mandatory.

What the court ordered—and why it matters

The operative order is precise and pragmatic. The impugned order dated 22 May 2023 was set aside. The child is to be produced in the Children’s Room at Saket Courts on every first and third Saturday from 3:00 PM to 5:00 PM for interaction with the father in the presence of a counsellor. If a scheduled Saturday falls on a court holiday, the meeting is to be held on the next working Saturday or compensated on another day by mutual convenience.

The mother was directed to “make every endeavour to restore the child’s strained relationship with the father.” The father was given liberty to seek modification before the Family Court once rapport is established.

Notice what the court did not do. It did not grant custody. It did not even grant unsupervised visitation. It ordered two hours, twice a month, in a court room, with a counsellor present. That is the minimum intervention required to keep the door open.

Why this judgment matters for practitioners

For advocates handling custody and visitation disputes, this judgment is a useful tool in three situations.

First, when a Family Court dismisses a visitation application solely on the basis of a child’s stated preference, this judgment provides a direct ground for appeal. The High Court has made it clear that Section 17(3) is directory, and the child’s preference must be weighed against other factors—especially the duration of the parent-child relationship and the potential for alienation.

Second, when a custodial parent resists visitation by claiming the child does not want to meet the other parent, this judgment places an affirmative obligation on the custodial parent to facilitate restoration of the bond. The obiter about the mother’s role “to help forge and restore the lost/diminished affection” can be cited in contempt or custody modification proceedings.

Third, when a non-custodial parent faces a reluctant child, this judgment offers a practical remedy: supervised visitation in the court’s children’s room. It is a low-cost, low-conflict solution that keeps the relationship alive while the court assesses the larger custody dispute.

The bottom line for founders and CFOs

If you are a founder or CFO reading this, you might wonder why a family law judgment matters to you. It matters because the same principle applies in commercial disputes: a party’s stated preference—whether it is a child refusing to meet a parent or a vendor refusing to negotiate—is not always the last word. Courts look at context, at the history of the relationship, and at the underlying dynamics. If a party has been alienated or coached, the court will intervene to restore the relationship, even if the party says no.

In family law, as in business, the question is not always what someone says they want. The question is what is in their best interest—and whether the court has the courage to say so.

THE BOTTOM LINE: A 13-year-old’s “no” is not a veto—when the parent-child bond is at stake, the court must order supervised visitation to preserve it, even if the child resists.