The 3-part test the Supreme Court used to choose which dying declaration wins.

Two dying declarations, one dead woman, and a husband who walked free

When Manjit Kaur married Makhan Singh in January 1996, she entered a household that would demand money with alarming regularity. First Rs.30,000. Then Rs.2 lakhs—used, the prosecution alleged, for a Moscow trip. After her husband returned in March 1998, the demand jumped to Rs.6 lakhs for a trip to the USA. On 21 April 1998, Manjit Kaur consumed a poisonous substance. She died on 9 May 1998. Her husband was convicted of dowry death under Section 304-B IPC. Sixteen years later, the Supreme Court of India acquitted him. The case turned on a single question: which of two contradictory dying declarations should the court believe?

The stakes were not academic. Makhan Singh had spent years in prison. The trial court had sentenced him to 10 years rigorous imprisonment. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh had confirmed the conviction, though it reduced the sentence to 7 years. By the time the Supreme Court heard Criminal Appeal No. 1290 of 2010 on 16 August 2022, the appellant had already served a substantial portion of his term. The Bench of Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha had to decide whether the conviction could stand.

What the first dying declaration actually said

On the very day Manjit Kaur consumed the poison—21 April 1998—a Judicial Magistrate recorded her statement. This was dying declaration Ex. DO/C. Before recording it, the Magistrate obtained a medical certificate from the doctor confirming that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement. The declaration was clear: Manjit Kaur said she had accidentally consumed the wrong medicine. She did not implicate her husband or her in-laws. The Magistrate recorded the statement in the presence of the doctor, and after completing it, verified that the deceased had made it voluntarily. No relatives were present during the recording.

Three days later, on 24 April 1998, a different Judicial Magistrate recorded a second dying declaration—Ex. PE. By this time, Manjit Kaur's parents had arrived. The second declaration told a different story: her husband and in-laws had forcibly administered the poison to her. An FIR was registered based on this second declaration. But the second Magistrate did not obtain any medical certification before recording the statement. The doctors were available in the hospital. They were not consulted.

The trial that convicted one and acquitted two

The Sessions Court in Bhind (Sessions Case No. 55 of 1998) convicted Makhan Singh under Section 304-B IPC on 13 July 2002. The same court acquitted his parents—co-accused on identical evidence—giving them the benefit of doubt. The trial judge sentenced Makhan Singh to 10 years rigorous imprisonment.

The High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh heard Criminal Appeal No. 1189-SB of 2002 and confirmed the conviction on 15 May 2009. It reduced the sentence from 10 years to 7 years. The High Court found the second dying declaration reliable and the first one suspicious.

Makhan Singh approached the Supreme Court.

What each side argued

The appellant's counsel made a simple but powerful argument: the first dying declaration was recorded with proper medical certification, in the presence of a doctor, without relatives, and with post-statement verification of voluntariness. The second declaration was recorded without any medical examination, in a hospital where doctors were available, and after the deceased's parents had arrived and possibly tutored her. The trial court had acquitted the co-accused parents on the very same evidence. If the evidence was insufficient to convict them, it was insufficient to convict the appellant.

The State of Haryana, through its counsel, relied on a battery of Supreme Court precedents: Harjit Kaur v. State of Punjab (1999) 6 SCC 545, Sayarabano v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 12 SCC 562, Sher Singh v. State of Punjab (2008) 4 SCC 265, Munnawar v. State of U.P. (2010) 5 SCC 451, Shudhakar v. State of M.P. (2012) 7 SCC 569, Raju Devade v. State of Maharashtra (2016) 11 SCC 673, and Kashmira Devi v. State of Uttarakhand (2020) 11 SCC 343. The State argued that a dying declaration, if found to be true and voluntary, can be the sole basis for conviction without corroboration.

The witness rule the Supreme Court applied

Justice B.R. Gavai, writing for the Bench, turned to the settled law on dying declarations. The Court cited Lakhan v. State of M.P. (2010) 8 SCC 514, which summarised the legal framework: a dying declaration can be the sole basis for conviction if it is true, reliable, recorded when the deceased was fit, and not under tutoring or duress. When multiple inconsistent declarations exist, the one recorded by a higher officer like a Magistrate can be relied upon if no suspicion about its truthfulness exists.

The Court then applied this framework to the facts. The first dying declaration (Ex. DO/C) had three safeguards that the second lacked:

• It was preceded by a medical certificate certifying the deceased's fitness.
• It was recorded in the presence of a doctor.
• After recording, the Magistrate verified that the statement was made voluntarily.

The second dying declaration (Ex. PE) had none of these safeguards. The doctor was available in the hospital but was not consulted. The deceased's parents were present. The Court found this troubling.

THE TEST: When two contradictory dying declarations exist, both recorded by Judicial Magistrates, the declaration preceded by medical examination certifying fitness is more reliable than one recorded without such certification—especially when doctors were available but not consulted.

Why the trial court's own logic defeated the conviction

The Supreme Court identified a deeper problem. The trial court had acquitted Makhan Singh's parents—the co-accused—on the very same evidence. The parents were charged with the same offence under Section 304-B IPC. The evidence against them was identical to the evidence against Makhan Singh. Yet the trial court gave them the benefit of doubt while convicting the husband.

Justice Gavai observed that this was legally unsustainable. When co-accused are acquitted on benefit of doubt on identical evidence, the remaining accused cannot be convicted on that same evidence. The benefit of doubt must be extended equally. This principle, the Court held, applied squarely to Makhan Singh.

The Court also noted a troubling aspect of the investigation. The prosecution had not examined the Judicial Magistrate who recorded the first dying declaration. It had also not examined the DSP who, after investigation, had found the accused innocent. The Court observed that this non-examination created a serious doubt regarding the fairness and impartiality of the Investigating Officer.

The operative order: acquittal after sixteen years

On 16 August 2022, the Supreme Court allowed Criminal Appeal No. 1290 of 2010. The judgment of the High Court dated 15 May 2009 and the trial court's judgment dated 13/16 July 2002 were quashed and set aside. Makhan Singh was acquitted of all charges. His bail bonds stood discharged.

The Court did not mince words. The first dying declaration was more reliable. The second was recorded without medical certification and possibly after tutoring. The benefit of doubt given to the co-accused should have been extended to the appellant. The conviction could not stand.

What this means for practitioners

This judgment is a masterclass in how to attack a conviction based on contradictory dying declarations. For defence counsel, the playbook is now clear: if the first declaration was recorded with medical certification and the second without, argue that the first is more reliable. If co-accused were acquitted on identical evidence, argue parity. If the prosecution failed to examine the Magistrate who recorded the favourable declaration, argue that the investigation was biased.

For prosecutors, the lesson is equally stark: never rely on a dying declaration recorded without medical certification when a certified one exists. And never seek conviction of one accused while accepting acquittal of co-accused on identical evidence—the Supreme Court will not allow it.

For founders and CFOs reading this: the case is a reminder that procedural safeguards matter. A statement recorded without proper certification, in the presence of interested parties, may be worthless. In criminal law, as in business, the process is the product.

THE PLAY: When challenging a conviction based on contradictory dying declarations, always lead with the medical certification—or the lack of it—and always check whether co-accused were acquitted on the same evidence.

The bottom line: If the first dying declaration was recorded with medical certification and the second without, and co-accused were acquitted on identical evidence, the conviction of the remaining accused cannot stand—the Supreme Court said so in Makhan Singh v. The State of Haryana, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 677.