The farmer who leased a farm, never touched heroin, and got life in jail before trial.

Yogendra leased a farm. Two men were caught with heroin on it. He got life in jail — before trial.

Yogendra was not carrying drugs. He was not seen handling them. He was not even present when the police arrived. On August 9, 2024, acting on secret information, officers from a Gurugram police station raided a farm that Yogendra had leased. They found two other men — Mohit and Ankit — carrying 9.72 grams and 8.16 grams of heroin respectively. Total: 17.88 grams. An intermediate quantity under the NDPS Act. No contraband was recovered from Yogendra. Yet, two days later, on August 11, 2024, he was arrested. And then, three times, the trial court refused him bail. The primary reason: he had seven other pending criminal cases. Meanwhile, Mohit and Ankit — the men from whom the actual drugs were recovered — were granted bail by the same court. Yogendra had spent over four months in custody when he approached the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. On December 17, 2024, Justice Anoop Chitkara granted him bail. The judgment is a sharp reminder: bail cannot be denied on criminal history alone, especially when the quantity of contraband is not commercial, and especially when the accused is not caught red-handed.

The three bail rejections — and the one that stuck

Yogendra’s first regular bail application was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurugram, on August 29, 2024. The second was dismissed on October 21, 2024. The third on November 13, 2024. Each time, the trial court cited his criminal antecedents — seven pending cases — and the likelihood of him tampering with evidence or fleeing. The court did not engage with the fact that the quantity of heroin was intermediate, not commercial. It did not consider that no drugs were found on Yogendra. It did not explain why the co-accused, from whom the drugs were actually recovered, were granted bail while Yogendra was not.

By the time Yogendra moved the High Court under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, he had been in custody for over four months. The trial was yet to begin.

What the State argued — and what it didn't

The State opposed bail on two grounds: the criminal antecedents and the possibility that Yogendra, if released, would tamper with evidence or influence witnesses. But the State did not argue that Section 37 of the NDPS Act applied. It could not. The total quantity of heroin — 17.88 grams — fell between the small quantity (5 grams) and the commercial quantity (250 grams). For intermediate quantities, the Supreme Court has held that the stringent bail restrictions under Section 37 do not apply. The State did not contest this.

The doctrine that mattered: Section 37 NDPS Act — when it bites and when it doesn't

Section 37 of the NDPS Act imposes a near-blanket bar on bail for offenses involving commercial quantities. For such cases, the court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and that he is not likely to commit any offense while on bail. But for intermediate quantities — quantities between small and commercial — the rigors of Section 37 do not apply. The court must consider bail on general principles, as it would for any regular offense.

Justice Chitkara relied on Sami Ullaha v. Superintendent Narcotic Control Bureau, (2008) 16 SCC 471, where the Supreme Court held that in intermediate quantity NDPS cases, the restrictions of Section 37 may not be justified. The High Court concluded that since the total quantity of heroin was 17.88 grams — well below the commercial threshold of 250 grams — Section 37 did not apply. Bail was to be considered on ordinary principles.

The witness rule the Supreme Court applied — and the trial court ignored

The trial court had denied bail primarily on the basis of Yogendra’s seven pending criminal cases. Justice Chitkara rejected this approach, citing Maulana Mohd Amir Rashadi v. State of U.P., (2012) 3 SCC 382. In that case, the Supreme Court held that merely on the basis of criminal antecedents, the claim of the accused for bail cannot be rejected. The court must assess the accused's role in the specific case charged.

Justice Chitkara went further. He laid down a clear rule: for bail purposes, an accused's criminal history must be limited to cases with convictions (including suspended sentences) and pending FIRs where the accused is formally arraigned. Acquittals, discharges, quashed FIRs, prosecution withdrawals, and closure reports must be excluded from consideration. This is a significant clarification. Trial courts often rely on a laundry list of pending cases — many of which may be stale, frivolous, or closed — to deny bail. The High Court has now said: that is not enough.

Why the trial court got it wrong — the three errors

First, the trial court treated Yogendra’s criminal antecedents as a disqualifier without assessing his role in the specific case. Second, it ignored the fact that no drugs were recovered from Yogendra personally. Third, it granted bail to the co-accused from whom the drugs were actually recovered, while denying bail to Yogendra — an inconsistency that the High Court found inexplicable.

Justice Chitkara observed that the evidence against Yogendra was "sketchy." The prosecution's case rested on the fact that he had leased the farm. But mere ownership or lease of premises where contraband is found, without more, is not sufficient to justify pre-trial detention — especially when the quantity is intermediate and the actual recovery is from others.

Pre-trial incarceration is not a substitute for conviction

The High Court made a broader point: pre-trial incarceration cannot be a replica of post-conviction sentencing. Where the offense is of a nature where bail would ordinarily be the norm, courts must not deny bail solely as a punitive pre-trial deterrent. This principle, drawn from Rabi Prakash v. The State of Odisha, SLP (Crl) 4169-2023, reinforces the constitutional right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. Prolonged incarceration, even in NDPS cases, militates against this right.

THE PLAY: If your client is arrested in an NDPS case involving an intermediate quantity, and no contraband is recovered from their person, move for bail immediately. The Section 37 bar does not apply. The trial court cannot deny bail solely on criminal antecedents. Cite Sami Ullaha and Maulana Mohd Amir Rashadi. And if the trial court has granted bail to co-accused from whom recovery was made, that is your strongest card.

The obiter that matters: a systemic critique of trial courts

Justice Chitkara did not stop at granting bail. He used the judgment to critique a systemic problem: trial courts' reluctance to grant bail even in deserving cases. He observed that this reluctance exacerbates the burden on High Courts, delays adjudication of appeals, revisions, and quashing petitions, and creates a domino effect that undermines criminal justice administration. He also noted that the bail influx to High Courts deprives lawyers of essential courtroom experience in criminal trials and creates systemic inefficiencies where delay tactics gain undue advantage.

This is not binding law, but it is a strong signal. Trial courts across Punjab and Haryana — and perhaps beyond — will take note. The message is clear: bail is the rule, not the exception. Criminal antecedents are not a magic wand to deny bail. And the High Court is watching.

What this means for you — the practitioner's takeaway

If you are defending an accused in an NDPS case involving an intermediate quantity, this judgment is your blueprint. First, establish that the quantity is intermediate — not commercial. Second, argue that Section 37 does not apply. Third, if the trial court cites criminal antecedents, counter with Maulana Mohd Amir Rashadi and the rule laid down in this judgment: only convictions and pending cases where the accused is formally arraigned count. Acquittals, discharges, and closed cases are irrelevant. Fourth, if co-accused from whom recovery was made have been granted bail, highlight the inconsistency. Fifth, if your client has been in custody for a significant period, invoke Article 21 and Rabi Prakash.

For founders and CFOs: this judgment is a reminder that the criminal justice system does not treat all accused alike. If you or someone in your organization is implicated in a case where the evidence is circumstantial or the quantity is intermediate, bail is a realistic option — even if there are other pending cases. The key is to act quickly and to ensure that the bail application addresses the specific legal points that matter.

The bottom line

Yogendra walked out of jail because the High Court applied the law as it stands: no drugs on him, intermediate quantity, no Section 37 bar, and criminal antecedents alone cannot hold a man in pre-trial detention. The judgment is a template for every NDPS bail case where the quantity is not commercial and the evidence is thin. Use it.