Threat to withdraw an FIR: no case under this law, says Supreme Court

She filed a gang rape FIR. Then she said someone threatened her to take it back. The Supreme Court just said that threat doesn't count under a key section — here's why.

Husna walked into a police station in Saharanpur, Uttar Pradesh, in August 2022. The counter was worn smooth by decades of complaints. She filed an FIR (a written complaint that starts a police investigation) against her father-in-law Haji Iqbal and others for gang rape and sexual assault. That case — FIR No. 122/2022 — was under investigation. Then, on August 11, 2022, she filed a second FIR. This one said that associates of Iqbal had threatened her to withdraw the first one. She named no one in particular. The police registered it under Section 506 IPC (criminal intimidation — threatening someone with injury to their reputation or property).

The next day, Husna gave a "further statement" to the police under Section 161 CrPC (a witness statement recorded during investigation). The paper of that statement felt thin, almost fragile, as it was filed. This statement was dramatically different from the original FIR. It contained a far more detailed story — including allegations that the accused demanded Rs. 10 lakhs from her. And for the first time, it named a new person: Salib, Iqbal's son-in-law. The police added him as an accused. They also slapped on Sections 147, 148, 149 (rioting and unlawful assembly), 195A (threatening to give false evidence), 386 (extortion by fear of death or grievous hurt), 504 (intentional insult), and 506 IPC.

Salib had nothing to do with the original gang rape case. He was not named in the second FIR either — until that further statement. The Allahabad High Court refused to quash (dismiss) the case against him. So Salib went to the Supreme Court.

When the further statement changed everything

The Supreme Court bench — Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice J.B. Pardiwala — looked at the sequence. The courtroom was still, the only sound the rustle of case files being turned. The second FIR, filed on August 11, did not name Salib. The further statement, recorded the next day, did. And that statement contained a "dramatically different and more detailed story" than the original FIR. The Court found this suspicious. It noted that Salib was roped in "merely because he was the son-in-law of Iqbal" — the main accused in the gang rape case. The implication, the Court said, was "fabricated step by step."

The Court applied the famous test from State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992), which lists seven categories of cases where a criminal proceeding must be quashed. Salib's case fell under three of them: where the allegations are absurd and improbable (category 1), where a criminal proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive (category 5), and where the allegations do not constitute any offence at all (category 7).

The Bhajan Lal guidelines, established in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, have become the bedrock for quashing frivolous criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court has repeatedly applied them, as in M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 2021 SC 1918), where it held that the power to quash must be exercised sparingly but without hesitation when the case is clearly an abuse of process. Here, the Court found that the investigation itself had revealed the fabrication — the further statement contradicted the original FIR so sharply that no reasonable court could proceed.

Why Section 195A didn't apply

The key legal question was whether threatening someone to withdraw an FIR counts as threatening them to give "false evidence" under Section 195A IPC. The Court said no.

Section 195A IPC makes it a crime to threaten someone with injury to their person, reputation, or property with the intent to cause them to give false evidence. But "false evidence" here, the Court held, must be read in the context of Section 191 IPC (which defines false evidence as statements made before a court of law that the maker knows to be false). The entire chapter — Chapter XI of the IPC — deals with false evidence and offences against public justice. So the threat must be aimed at getting someone to lie in court, not at getting them to withdraw a police complaint.

"Threatening a person to withdraw a complaint or FIR or settle a dispute does not attract Section 195A IPC," the Court held. The provision requires threats with intent to cause a person to give false evidence, and 'false evidence' must be read in the context of Section 191 IPC, meaning false evidence before a court of law.

The Court also drew on Ramyad Singh v. Emperor (Criminal Revision No. 125 of 1931, Patna), a colonial-era precedent that had long established the narrow reading of false evidence provisions. That case had held that the term "false evidence" in the IPC is a term of art, confined to judicial proceedings. The Supreme Court in Salib affirmed this interpretation, rejecting any attempt to stretch Section 195A to cover threats made outside the courtroom.

The practical implication is significant. Section 195A was enacted in 2006 as part of a broader effort to combat witness intimidation in criminal trials. But the Court made clear that its scope is limited to threats aimed at corrupting the judicial process itself — not threats aimed at settling disputes through withdrawal of police complaints. A threat to withdraw an FIR may still constitute criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC, but it cannot be elevated to the more serious offence under Section 195A.

Why extortion didn't apply either

Section 386 IPC punishes extortion — putting someone in fear of death or grievous hurt to get them to deliver property or valuable security. The Court looked at the definition of extortion under Section 383 IPC. For extortion to occur, the victim must be induced to actually deliver property. The threat alone is not enough. There must be an actual delivery of property induced by fear.

In this case, there was no allegation that Husna actually gave anyone any money or property. The further statement mentioned a demand for Rs. 10 lakhs, but no delivery. "In the absence of actual delivery of property by the person put in fear, no offence under Section 386 IPC is made out," the Court said. "Forcible taking of property without inducement to deliver does not constitute extortion."

The Court cited Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2019) 11 SCC 706, where it had held that the essence of extortion is the inducement to deliver property through fear. Without delivery, the offence remains incomplete. The distinction is crucial: robbery involves taking property by force, while extortion requires the victim to be induced to part with it voluntarily — albeit under duress. Here, there was neither force nor delivery, only a demand.

What the court did with the rest

The remaining charges — rioting (Sections 147, 148, 149 IPC), unlawful assembly, criminal intimidation (Section 506 IPC), intentional insult (Section 504 IPC) — all collapsed once the core allegations failed. The Court quashed the entire FIR and all proceedings against Salib. It set aside the Allahabad High Court's order and allowed the appeal.

The Court also made an important procedural point. When an accused seeks quashing of an FIR on grounds of frivolous or malicious prosecution, the court must look beyond the averments of the FIR. It must examine the attending circumstances from the record, read between the lines, and consider the overall circumstances — including materials collected during investigation. It cannot restrict itself to whether the FIR on its face discloses ingredients of the offence.

This procedural direction is a significant departure from the traditional approach, where courts often refused to look beyond the FIR at the quashing stage. The Supreme Court clarified that when the allegation is that the prosecution is malicious or fabricated, the court must examine the investigation materials to determine whether the case is an abuse of process. In Salib, the further statement itself — with its dramatically different story and the belated naming of the appellant — provided the evidence of fabrication that justified quashing.

The Court's order was categorical: "This appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is hereby set aside. The criminal proceedings arising from FIR No. 175 of 2022 dated 11.08.2022 registered at Police Station Mirzapur, Saharanpur, State of U.P. are hereby quashed."

Why this matters

This judgment draws a clear line. Threatening someone to withdraw a police complaint is not the same as threatening them to lie in court. The first may be criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC. The second is a different offence under Section 195A IPC — and it requires a threat aimed at court testimony, not police complaints.

For practitioners, the takeaway is this: if your client is charged under Section 195A for threatening to withdraw an FIR, the charge is legally unsustainable. The provision only covers threats to give false evidence in court.

The judgment also reinforces the importance of the Bhajan Lal framework in checking malicious prosecutions. By applying categories 1, 5, and 7, the Court sent a message that fabricated cases — where the investigation itself reveals the fabrication — will not be allowed to proceed. The Court's willingness to look beyond the FIR and examine the investigation materials is a powerful tool for accused persons facing vengeful or frivolous prosecutions.

For the woman, Husna, the original gang rape case continues. But the case against Salib — built on a single further statement that contradicted the original FIR — is over. The thin paper of that statement, which had seemed to carry such weight, could not withstand the scrutiny of the Supreme Court.

THE PLAY: When defending a Section 195A charge, check whether the alleged threat was to withdraw a police complaint — if yes, the charge fails because the section only covers threats to give false evidence in court.

The woman's gang rape case continues. But the case against Salib is over.