Threat to withdraw FIR is not threat to give false evidence: SC
Supreme Court quashes case against man roped in only because he was son-in-law of main accused, holds Section 195A IPC applies only to threats to lie in court.
195A
IPC.
Supreme Court quashes case against man roped in only because he was son-in-law of main accused, holds Section 195A IPC applies only to threats to lie in court.
She was told to take back her gang-rape complaint or face consequences. The Supreme Court just said that threat doesn't count as 'false evidence' — and here's why.
Husna had done the hardest thing a survivor can do. She walked into a police station in Saharanpur, Uttar Pradesh, and filed an FIR (a written complaint that starts a police investigation) naming Haji Iqbal alias Bala and others for serious offences including gang rape. The handwritten complaint, pressed across a crowded desk, set the machinery of the law in motion. While that case was being investigated, she filed a second FIR. This time, she said associates of Iqbal had threatened her — withdraw the first complaint, or else.
The police added a man named Salib to the second FIR. He was Iqbal's son-in-law. He had not been named in the original complaint. He was not accused of threatening Husna himself. His only connection to the case was his marriage to the daughter of the main accused. The question the Supreme Court had to answer was simple: can a man be prosecuted for threatening to give false evidence when the threat was about withdrawing an FIR, not about lying in court?
When the son-in-law became an accused
The first FIR, registered on August 11, 2022, at Police Station Mirzapur Paul, District Saharanpur, was under Section 506 IPC (criminal intimidation — threatening someone with injury to their person or reputation). The next day, during investigation, Husna gave a further statement under Section 161 CrPC (a witness statement recorded by police during investigation). In that statement, she added more names and more sections: 147, 148, 149 (rioting), 195A (threatening to give false evidence), 386 (extortion by putting someone in fear of death or grievous hurt), 504 (intentional insult to provoke breach of peace), and 506 again.
Salib's name appeared in this second statement. Not because he had threatened Husna himself. Not because he was present when the threats were made. But because he was the son-in-law of Haji Iqbal, the main accused in the gang-rape case. He was added during investigation based on a further statement by Husna and an eyewitness statement — a typed list of names, a signature at the bottom, and suddenly he was an accused.
Salib went to the Allahabad High Court asking for the FIR to be quashed (cancelled or thrown out). The High Court refused. He appealed to the Supreme Court.
What Section 195A actually says
The core of the case turned on the meaning of Section 195A IPC. That section makes it a crime to threaten someone with injury to their person or reputation with the intent to cause that person to give false evidence (a false statement made under oath in a court proceeding).
The prosecution's position was straightforward: Husna was threatened to withdraw her gang-rape complaint. Withdrawing a complaint would mean the case collapses. That, the prosecution argued, was equivalent to forcing her to give false evidence — because the truth would never come out.
Salib's lawyers argued the opposite. They said Section 195A is about threats to make someone lie in court — to swear a false affidavit, to give false testimony on the witness stand. A threat to withdraw an FIR is not a threat to give false evidence. It is a threat to stop pursuing a case. Those are two different things.
Why the Supreme Court looked at the word 'false'
The bench of Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice J.B. Pardiwala examined the language of Section 195A closely. The courtroom fell silent as the judgment was read. The section uses the phrase "threatening any person to give false evidence." The word 'false', the court said, must be read contextually with Chapter XI of the IPC (False Evidence and Offences Against Public Justice).
Section 191 IPC defines giving false evidence. It means a person who is legally bound by an oath or by law to tell the truth makes a statement that they know or believe to be false, or does not believe to be true. The key phrase is "legally bound by an oath or by law." That points to a court proceeding — a witness on the stand, an affidavit filed in court, a deposition recorded by a judge.
The bench held: "The word 'false' in Section 195A must be read contextually with Chapter XI of the IPC." A threat to withdraw an FIR, the court held, does not involve any oath, any court proceeding, any legal obligation to tell the truth. It is a threat to stop a police investigation. That is not the same as threatening to make someone lie in court.
The court also examined Section 386 IPC (extortion by putting someone in fear of death or grievous hurt). For extortion to be made out under Sections 383 and 386, the prosecution must show that the victim was induced to part with property — that there was actual or attempted delivery of property. Mere demands accompanied by threats, without any delivery or parting of property, do not constitute extortion. In this case, there was no allegation that Husna had given any property to anyone. The extortion charge collapsed.
When the FIR itself looks fabricated
The court went further. It applied the parameters laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992), a landmark judgment that lists seven categories of cases where an FIR can be quashed. The court found that three of those parameters applied to Salib's case:
Parameter 1: The allegations in the FIR, even if taken at face value, do not constitute any offence. The threat to withdraw an FIR does not meet the definition of threatening to give false evidence under Section 195A.
Parameter 5: The allegations are so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person could ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding. The court noted that Salib was added to the FIR solely because of his familial relationship with the main accused. There was no allegation that he personally threatened Husna.
Parameter 7: A criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide (bad faith) and the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive. The court observed that the implication of Salib appeared "concocted" — fabricated or invented — based on nothing more than his being the son-in-law of Haji Iqbal.
The court also cited its own judgment in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021), which held that when an accused seeks quashing on grounds of frivolous or vexatious prosecution, the court must look beyond the FIR averments. It must examine the attending circumstances, the materials collected during investigation, and read between the lines — because a motivated complainant would ensure the FIR is well-drafted to disclose offence ingredients on paper, even if the real story is different.
The file before the bench felt thin — a single case built on a relationship, not on any evidence of a threat. The smell of old paper filled the chamber as the judges turned the pages.
What this means for every criminal lawyer
This judgment draws a clear line. Section 195A IPC is not a catch-all provision for every threat made during a dispute. It applies only when the threat is specifically intended to make someone lie under oath in a court of law. A threat to withdraw a complaint, to settle a case, or to stop cooperating with police does not attract this section.
THE PLAY: When your client is accused under Section 195A for threatening to withdraw an FIR, argue that the section requires intent to cause false evidence before a court — not intent to stop a police investigation.
The court allowed Salib's appeal, set aside the Allahabad High Court order, and quashed the criminal proceedings arising from FIR No. 175 of 2022 — but only insofar as Salib was concerned. The case against Haji Iqbal and the others continued.
The son-in-law walked free. The survivor's case moved forward. And the law on false evidence stayed exactly where the Supreme Court drew the line: in the courtroom, not the police station.