TAX LAW  ·  ZONE PREFERENCE

Two SC candidates, one zone — and a board's appeal that rewrote the rules.

The Supreme Court restored a board's selection after the High Court misapplied the local reservation ratio and excluded a candidate on her second zone preference.

16

years.

Reversed. After sixteen years.
TL;DR

The Supreme Court restored a board's selection after the High Court misapplied the local reservation ratio and excluded a candidate on her second zone preference.

In this reading
1. Two women, one zone, and a recruitment board’s appeal that rewrote the rules 2. The notification that started it all 3. What the High Court did 4. The provision that mattered 5. The second question: can a candidate be considered in a zone that is not her first preference? 6. The precedent the Supreme Court applied 7. The obiter that adds a duty on courts 8. Why the High Court got it wrong 9. What this means for practitioners 10. The bottom line

Two women, one zone, and a recruitment board’s appeal that rewrote the rules

When the Telangana Residential Educational Institutions Recruitment Board advertised junior lecturer posts in 2018, two women from the Scheduled Caste category applied. One ranked 35th on merit. The other ranked 49th. Both wanted a post in Zone VI. The board picked the higher-ranked candidate. The lower-ranked candidate went to court. Sixteen years of litigation later, the Supreme Court of India had to answer a single question: did the High Court get the local reservation ratio right?

The stakes were immediate. A government job. A zone preference. A recruitment process that had already selected one candidate. The High Court had ordered the board to redraw the merit list. The Supreme Court had to decide whether that interference was lawful.

The notification that started it all

On 3 March 2018, the Telangana Residential Educational Institutions Recruitment Board issued Notification No. 03/2018. It invited applications for junior lecturer posts in residential educational institutions across the state. The posts were zone-wise. Candidates had to indicate their zone preferences.

Two candidates from the Scheduled Caste category applied. The first, Saluvadi Sumalatha, ranked 49th on the merit list. She was a local of Zone VI and had marked Zone VI as her first preference. The second, the other respondent, ranked 35th. She was also a local of Zone VI, but she had marked Zone VI as her second preference.

The recruitment board prepared the merit list. It applied the 30:70 ratio for local and non-local reservation. Under that ratio, 30% of posts were to be filled first on combined merit of locals and non-locals. The remaining 70% were reserved for locals only. The board selected the candidate ranked 35th for Zone VI. She had higher merit. Her second preference was Zone VI. That was enough.

Saluvadi Sumalatha was not selected. She moved the High Court of Telangana.

What the High Court did

The Single Judge of the Telangana High Court allowed the writ petition. The court held that the correct ratio was 40:60, not 30:70. It also held that the candidate ranked 35th could not be considered for Zone VI because it was her second preference, not her first. The court ordered the recruitment board to redraw the merit list.

The recruitment board appealed to the Division Bench. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal. It approved the Single Judge’s view on the ratio and the exclusion of the higher-ranked candidate from Zone VI consideration.

The board then approached the Supreme Court.

The provision that mattered

The dispute turned on the interpretation of government orders issued under Article 371D of the Constitution. Article 371D provides special provisions for Andhra Pradesh (and now Telangana) relating to local cadres in public employment.

The key order was G.O.P No. 763 dated 15 November 1975, as amended by GOMs No. 124 dated 7 March 2002. The amendment was crucial. It read:

“The Provisional list shall be divided into two parts. The first part shall comprise 30% of the posts consisting of combined merit lists of locals as well as non-locals and the remaining second part shall comprise the balance 70% of the posts consisting of locals only and the posts shall be filled duly following the rule of reservation.”

The Supreme Court examined this provision closely. The sequence was mandatory. First, 30% of posts were to be filled on combined merit of locals and non-locals. Then, the remaining 70% were to be filled with locals only. The 30% was not a reservation for non-locals. It was a merit-based pool that included both locals and non-locals. The 70% was a reservation for locals.

The High Court had applied a 40:60 ratio. That was wrong. The statutory ratio was 30:70.

The second question: can a candidate be considered in a zone that is not her first preference?

The High Court had held that the candidate ranked 35th could not be considered for Zone VI because it was her second preference. The Supreme Court disagreed.

The notification permitted candidates to exercise multiple zone preferences. The candidate ranked 35th had exercised Zone VI as her second preference. She was entitled to be considered for that zone. The board had correctly allotted her to Zone VI based on her higher merit rank.

The Supreme Court observed that a candidate is not barred from being considered in a zone other than her first preference, provided such zone forms part of the options exercised by the candidate. The notification permits allotment based on rank in merit list as per zonal preference exercised.

The precedent the Supreme Court applied

The Supreme Court relied on Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v. B.S. Mahajan, (1990) 1 SCC 305. In that case, the Court held that courts cannot sit in appeal over decisions of Selection Committees or scrutinize relative merits of candidates. Interference is permissible only on limited grounds such as illegality, patent material irregularity in constitution or procedure, or proved mala fides.

The Supreme Court applied this principle firmly. The recruitment board had followed the applicable rules. The High Court had no basis to interfere.

The obiter that adds a duty on courts

In a significant observation, the Supreme Court noted that courts are duty bound to take into consideration the relevant orders, rules and enactments before finally deciding recruitment disputes. Courts cannot rely solely on the submissions of the recruitment agency. They must independently examine the applicable government orders.

This obiter could have future significance. It adds a positive duty on courts in recruitment litigation. Even if the recruitment agency does not press a particular order or rule, the court must examine it. This shifts some burden from the litigant to the court.

Why the High Court got it wrong

The Supreme Court identified two fundamental errors in the High Court’s approach.

First, the High Court applied the wrong ratio. It used 40:60 instead of 30:70. The government orders were clear. The amendment of 2002 had settled the ratio. The High Court had no basis to deviate.

Second, the High Court incorrectly excluded the higher-ranked candidate from Zone VI consideration. The notification permitted multiple preferences. The candidate had exercised Zone VI as her second preference. She was entitled to be considered. The board had correctly applied the rules.

The Supreme Court also noted that the High Court had failed to consider the cascading effect of its order. Redrawing the merit list would affect other candidates who had already been selected. Courts must be cautious before interfering with recruitment processes.

THE PLAY: When challenging a recruitment process, ensure you first verify the exact government order or rule that governs the ratio or preference. The court will not rewrite the rules for you.

What this means for practitioners

This judgment is a reminder of three principles that every recruitment lawyer must keep in mind.

First, the ratio is mandatory. Under GOMs No. 124 dated 07.03.2002, the 30:70 ratio is not a suggestion. It is the law. The 30% merit-based pool must be filled first. The 70% local reservation follows. Any deviation is illegal.

Second, zone preferences are not rigid. A candidate can be considered in any zone she has opted for, regardless of the order of preference. The notification permits allotment based on merit rank as per the preferences exercised. A second preference is still a valid preference.

Third, judicial restraint is real. Courts cannot sit in appeal over recruitment decisions. Interference is limited to illegality, material irregularity, or mala fides. A recruitment agency’s inability to explain its process to the court does not justify extending relief.

The bottom line

The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the Telangana High Court. It restored the recruitment made in favour of the candidate ranked 35th. The board’s original selection stood.

For every recruitment board and every candidate, the message is clear: follow the rules, apply the correct ratio, and courts will not rewrite your merit list.

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Reviewed by Sharad Bansal on 15 · 05 · 2026

Sharad Bansal — Sharad Bansal is an advocate of the Delhi High Court with twenty years of practice in criminal defence and commercial litigation.

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