When a judge used affidavits to reject a police closure report, the Supreme Court said: that changes everything

The police said there was no case. The victim filed affidavits. The judge agreed—but the Supreme Court just flipped the script.

The Chief Judicial Magistrate sat between two piles of paper. One was the police closure report—clean, official, stamped: no evidence. The other was a Protest Petition—sworn by the informant and four witnesses, each affidavit claiming the investigation was a sham. He chose the second pile. He rejected the closure report, summoned the accused, and directed the case to proceed as a State case.

The Supreme Court just told him he did it wrong. Not the result—the route.

When the police said "no case"

An FIR (a written complaint that starts a police investigation) was filed at Police Station Civil Lines, Aligarh. The allegations were serious: rioting, wrongful confinement, hurt, attempt to murder, and criminal intimidation. The police investigated and, under Section 173(2) of the CrPC (the provision that requires the police to submit a report when they finish investigating), filed a closure report. Their conclusion: no evidence.

The informant wasn't buying it. He filed a Protest Petition—a formal objection to the closure report—supported by affidavits from himself and four witnesses. The affidavits said the investigation was unfair. They claimed the Investigating Officer completed the case diary without actually recording witness statements. The case diary, the informant argued, was a fiction.

What the magistrate did—and why it mattered

The Chief Judicial Magistrate rejected the closure report. He took cognizance (the formal act by which a court accepts a case for judicial consideration) under Section 190(1)(b) of the CrPC—the provision that allows a magistrate to take cognizance upon a police report. He directed the case to continue as a State case and summoned the accused.

But here's the catch: the magistrate didn't rely only on the police case diary. He also relied on the affidavits. Those affidavits were additional evidence—material the police never collected.

The accused challenged this before the Allahabad High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC (the High Court's inherent power to prevent abuse of its process or secure the ends of justice). The High Court dismissed the petition. The accused appealed to the Supreme Court.

The legal question that split the path

When a magistrate rejects a police closure report and takes cognizance, can he rely on evidence the police never collected?

The prosecution argued yes—the magistrate had discretion to consider all material before him, including the affidavits.

The defence argued no—the moment the magistrate stepped outside the police report and case diary, he was no longer acting on a police report. He was acting on a private complaint, and the law required a different procedure.

The defence was right.

Why the affidavits changed everything

The Supreme Court, through a bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, held that the magistrate had crossed a line. Section 190(1)(b) allows a magistrate to take cognizance on a police report. But "police report" means the report filed under Section 173(2) and the material collected during the investigation—the case diary. It does not include affidavits filed by the informant after the investigation is complete.

Once the magistrate relied on those affidavits—additional evidence beyond the police report and case diary—cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) became impermissible. The proper course, the Court said, was to treat the Protest Petition as a complaint under Section 190(1)(a) of the CrPC (the provision that allows a magistrate to take cognizance upon receiving a complaint) and follow the procedure under Chapter XV of the CrPC.

Chapter XV requires the magistrate to examine the complainant on oath under Section 200 and, if necessary, postpone the issue of process under Section 202 to inquire into the case. These steps protect the accused from being summoned on flimsy grounds. The magistrate had skipped them entirely.

The Supreme Court's clean fix

The Court set aside both the High Court's order and the Chief Judicial Magistrate's order. But it did not shut the door. It left the magistrate at liberty to treat the Protest Petition as a complaint and proceed afresh under Chapter XV. The Court made no comments on the merits of the case—the allegations of rioting, attempt to murder, and criminal intimidation remain untouched.

The ratio decidendi (the court's central reasoning) is precise: when a magistrate, upon receiving a Protest Petition against a closure report, relies not only on the case diary but also on additional evidence such as affidavits, he must treat the Protest Petition as a complaint and take cognizance under Section 190(1)(a). He cannot take cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) and continue the case as a State case.

The Court also clarified: the magistrate has the liberty to reject the Protest Petition along with all supporting material. If he does, the complainant retains the right to file a fresh complaint under Section 200 CrPC. That right is not extinguished by the magistrate's refusal.

What this means for every magistrate and every accused

If you are defending an accused and the magistrate has taken cognizance on a police report while relying on affidavits filed with a Protest Petition, you have a ground to challenge the summoning order. The case cannot proceed as a State case. It must be treated as a private complaint, with all the procedural protections that entails.

For magistrates, the rule is simple: if you look beyond the police file, you change the legal route. You cannot take the shortcut of Section 190(1)(b). You must follow the full procedure of Chapter XV.

THE PLAY: When a magistrate relies on any evidence beyond the police report and case diary to reject a closure report, the Protest Petition must be treated as a private complaint under Section 190(1)(a) CrPC—and the accused gets the procedural protections of Sections 200-202.

The affidavits were true or false—the Supreme Court never said. But the route the magistrate took to reach them was wrong. And in criminal procedure, the route is the whole game.