When 'arbitration' in a contract doesn't mean arbitration
A clause said disputes would be resolved by arbitration—unless certain conditions were met. The Supreme Court had to decide: who gets to decide?
"Any expression in an arbitration clause must unequivocally express the intent of arbitration"
The Supreme Court's threshold test for conditional arbitration clausesOriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Narbheram Power and Steel (P) Ltd. — 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 123
A clause said disputes would be resolved by arbitration—unless certain conditions were met. The Supreme Court had to decide: who gets to decide?
The contract said 'arbitration'. But it also said: not if this happens. So when the dispute arose, the insurer said—no arbitration.
Two companies signed a contract. One clause said disputes would be resolved by arbitration. Another part of the same clause said: unless certain conditions are met. When the dispute arrived, the insurer refused to go to arbitration. The other side went to court asking for an arbitrator to be appointed. The question was simple: who gets to decide—the arbitrator or the court—whether this dispute can be arbitrated at all?
The clause itself was typed in a single, dense paragraph. The condition was buried in the middle, almost as an afterthought. The insurer's letter refusing arbitration was a single line: no arbitration, because the condition applies. The court's order would later run to several pages, parsing that one paragraph.
When the clause said 'arbitration' but also said 'no'
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. had issued a policy to Narbheram Power and Steel (P) Ltd. The policy contained a dispute resolution clause. On a plain reading, it looked like an arbitration clause—it said disputes would be referred to arbitration. But it also contained a condition: if certain defined circumstances existed, arbitration would not happen. Those circumstances were written into the clause itself, not left to implication.
When a dispute arose, Narbheram Power invoked the clause and asked for arbitration. Oriental Insurance refused, pointing to the condition in the same clause. Narbheram Power then approached the court under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the provision that allows a party to ask the court to appoint an arbitrator when the other side refuses). The insurer argued that the court should not appoint an arbitrator because the clause itself barred arbitration in this situation.
The courtroom fell silent as the insurer's counsel read out the condition. The condition was not ambiguous—it was specific. It said: under these circumstances, no arbitration. The other side's counsel countered: the court's role is limited. The court should only check whether an arbitration agreement exists on paper, not whether the condition applies. The judge asked a pointed question: if the condition is clear, why should the court ignore it and send the parties to an arbitrator who will only be told he has no jurisdiction?
The question the court had to answer
The Supreme Court was asked to decide one thing: when a contract has a clause that looks like an arbitration clause but also says arbitration cannot happen in certain defined circumstances, does the court appoint an arbitrator anyway and let the arbitrator decide whether the dispute is arbitrable? Or does the court itself decide at the threshold whether the condition applies?
Narbheram Power argued that the court's role under Section 11 is limited. The court should only check whether an arbitration agreement exists on paper. If it does, the court should appoint an arbitrator and leave all other questions—including whether the condition bars arbitration—to the arbitrator. This is the standard position under the Arbitration Act: the court does a prima facie (preliminary) review and then lets the arbitrator decide the rest. The file, they argued, was thin—the clause existed, the dispute existed, the arbitrator should be appointed.
Oriental Insurance took the opposite position. It said the clause was not a true arbitration clause at all. The condition was so central that it destroyed the very intent to arbitrate. If the condition was triggered, the clause stopped being an arbitration clause. The court, not the arbitrator, must decide this at the outset. The insurer's counsel pointed to the clause: the condition was not hidden; it was right there, in the same sentence. The smell of old paper filled the room as the judges examined the contract.
Why the Supreme Court stopped at the threshold
The Supreme Court examined the language of the clause. It observed that "Any expression in an arbitration clause must unequivocally express the intent of arbitration". This means the clause must be clear and unambiguous. If the language leaves room for doubt about whether the parties actually intended to arbitrate, the court must resolve that doubt before sending the parties to arbitration.
The Court found that the clause in this case did not simply say "disputes shall be referred to arbitration". It went further—it said that under certain defined circumstances, no arbitration can take place. Those circumstances were clearly stated in the clause itself. The Court held that if a clause clearly stipulates that, under certain defined circumstances, no arbitration can take place, and those circumstances are demonstrably clear, then the controversy concerning the appointment of an arbitrator must be "put to rest".
In other words, the court does not appoint an arbitrator and then let the arbitrator decide whether the condition applies. The court itself decides at the threshold whether the condition is triggered. If it is, the court refuses to appoint an arbitrator. The dispute stays in court or goes wherever the contract says it should go—but not to arbitration.
The Court's reasoning was precise. It examined the clause word by word. The condition was not a vague exception—it was a defined circumstance. The parties had agreed: if this happens, no arbitration. The Court said: we must give effect to that agreement. The arbitrator cannot be appointed because the parties themselves said the arbitrator has no role in this situation. The principle is one of strict construction: the clause must unequivocally express the intent of arbitration. If the clause itself says "but not if", the intent is not unequivocal—it is conditional.
The Court also considered the practical consequences. If it appointed an arbitrator despite the condition, the arbitrator would have to decide whether the condition applied. If the arbitrator decided the condition applied, he would have to declare that he had no jurisdiction—a wasteful exercise. If the arbitrator decided the condition did not apply, the insurer would challenge that decision in court, leading to further delay. The better course, the Court held, was to decide the issue at the threshold itself.
What this means for every contract drafter
The impact of this decision is straightforward: the judicial authority, in its prima facie review, must confirm the explicit and unambiguous intent of the parties to submit disputes to arbitration. If the clause contains exceptions or conditions that could prevent arbitration, the court will examine those conditions at the appointment stage itself.
For lawyers drafting arbitration clauses, the lesson is clear: if you want arbitration, write a clean clause. Do not attach conditions that say "but not if X happens". If you do, the court may decide that X has happened and refuse to send the dispute to arbitration. The arbitrator never gets to decide anything. The clause should be a single, unambiguous statement: all disputes arising out of this contract shall be referred to arbitration. Nothing more, nothing less.
For litigators, the takeaway is equally practical: when the other side refuses arbitration citing a condition in the clause, do not assume the court will appoint an arbitrator anyway. The court may agree with the other side and shut the door to arbitration before it opens. The litigator must be prepared to argue not just that the clause exists, but that the condition does not apply—and that argument must be made to the court, not to the arbitrator.
For insurers and other parties who include such conditions in their contracts, the decision is a validation. If you write a clause that says "arbitration, but not if", and the condition is clear, the court will enforce it. The insurer in this case did not have to go through arbitration and then challenge the award. The court stopped the process at the threshold.
The decision also has implications for the broader arbitration landscape. It confirms that the court's prima facie review under Section 11 is not a rubber stamp. The court must actually examine the clause and decide whether the parties intended to arbitrate. If the clause is conditional, the court must decide whether the condition applies. This is a significant check on the automatic appointment of arbitrators.
THE PLAY: If your arbitration clause contains exceptions that could bar arbitration, expect the court to decide whether those exceptions apply—and potentially refuse to appoint an arbitrator—before the dispute ever reaches an arbitrator.
THE TEST: Read your arbitration clause. Does it say "all disputes shall be referred to arbitration" without any qualification? Or does it say "disputes shall be referred to arbitration, except when"? If the latter, the court will decide the exception—not the arbitrator.
WHAT THIS MEANS: A conditional arbitration clause is not an arbitration clause at all—it is a clause that says "arbitration only if the condition is not met". The court will enforce the condition at the threshold. The arbitrator only gets the dispute if the condition is not triggered. Draft accordingly.
The clause said arbitration. But it also said: not if this happens. The court decided that "this" had happened. The arbitrator never got the call.