Why the Supreme Court dismissed a reservation writ without a single direction.

When the Government Beats You to the Punch: The Case of Temporary Job Reservations

Md Imran Ahmad and others walked into the Supreme Court of India with a straightforward grievance. They wanted reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes in temporary government appointments. The petitioners invoked Article 32 of the Constitution. Asking the Court to enforce a right they believed was being systematically ignored. What happened next was unusual — the Government had already done the work.

The stakes were concrete. Temporary appointments in government — often lasting months or even years — have historically been a loophole. Permanent posts carry clear reservation mandates. Temporary ones? Not always. The petitioners argued that this gap was leaving SC, ST, and OBC candidates out of jobs that, in practice, were anything but temporary, and the Supreme Court had to decide whether to step in or let the executive handle it.

The Office Memorandum That Changed Everything

During the hearing before a two-judge Bench of Justice Sanjiv Khanna and Justice S.V.N. Bhatti, the Union of India dropped a document that reshaped the entire case. It was an Office Memorandum dated 21.11.2022 — OM No. 41034/4/2022-Estt.(RES-I) — issued by the Department of Personnel and Training. The memorandum directed all Ministries and Departments to ensure that reservation for SC, ST, and OBC categories "shall be made in all temporary appointments which are to last for 45 days or more."

The Government had not merely acknowledged the problem. It had issued a binding instruction. The memorandum did not create new law; it reiterated and recirculated earlier instructions, including OM No. 27/4/67(II)-Estt.(SCT) dated 24.09.1968 and OM No. 36036/3/2018-Estt.(Res.) dated 15.5.2018. But the 2022 memorandum was explicit. It closed the loophole. Any temporary appointment crossing the 45-day threshold now carried the same reservation obligations as a permanent post.

What the Petitioners Actually Wanted

The petitioners were not asking for a declaration of rights. They were asking for enforcement. Their writ petition under Article 32 argued that despite existing instructions, temporary appointments were being made without any regard for reservation. The Government's own data, they contended, showed a pattern of exclusion. The remedy they sought was a court order compelling compliance.

The learned Counsel for the Union of India responded by placing the 21.11.2022 Office Memorandum on record. More importantly, the Government stated that a mechanism was already in place to deal with cases of failure to follow or abide by the memorandum. The Court recorded this statement. It was not a vague assurance. It was a concrete representation that the executive had both a policy and a process for enforcement.

The Supreme Court's One-Paragraph Disposal

Justice Sanjiv Khanna, writing for the Bench, did not write a lengthy judgment. The operative order is contained in two short paragraphs. The Court noted the Office Memorandum, recorded the Government's statement about the enforcement mechanism, and disposed of the writ petition. The order reads: "The writ petition is disposed of. In case there is violation of the Office Memorandum, it will be open to the petitioners or an aggrieved party to take recourse to appropriate remedy in accordance with law."

That was it. No directions. No monitoring. No further hearings. The Court essentially said: the Government has addressed your grievance. If it fails to implement its own policy, you can come back — but not necessarily to us. You can go to the appropriate forum.

The Doctrine That Mattered: When Executive Action Moots a Writ

The ratio decidendi in this case is deceptively simple. Where the Government has already issued an Office Memorandum addressing the grievance raised in a writ petition, the Court need not pass further orders. The petition may be disposed of with liberty to seek appropriate remedy in case of violation.

This is not a surrender of judicial power. It is a recognition of judicial economy. The Supreme Court is not a super-administrator. If the executive has acted — genuinely acted, not merely promised — the Court's role shifts from enforcement to oversight. The liberty granted to the petitioners is the safety valve. If the Office Memorandum becomes a dead letter, the aggrieved party can move the appropriate forum. That forum could be the High Court under Article 226, or the Central Administrative Tribunal, or even the Supreme Court again if the violation is systemic.

THE PLAY: When challenging a policy gap in government appointments, first check whether the executive has already issued a binding instruction. If it has, your writ may be moot — but your liberty to enforce that instruction is preserved.

What the Court Did Not Say

The judgment is notable for what it leaves unsaid. The Court did not examine whether the 45-day threshold is adequate. It did not discuss whether temporary appointments that are repeatedly renewed for 44 days each time could circumvent the rule. It did not address the enforcement mechanism's effectiveness. The obiter dictum — the recorded statement about the mechanism — is significant only as a future accountability tool. If the mechanism proves non-functional, that recorded statement could be used to argue that the Government misrepresented its position.

The Court also did not cite any precedents. The precedent registry in this case is empty. That is unusual for a Supreme Court judgment, but it reflects the nature of the dispute. This was not a case about interpreting a constitutional provision or resolving conflicting High Court decisions. It was a case about whether the Court should intervene when the executive has already acted. The answer was no.

Why This Matters for Practitioners

For advocates handling service law or reservation matters, this judgment is a tactical reminder. Before filing a writ petition under Article 32, check whether the Department of Personnel and Training or the relevant Ministry has issued an Office Memorandum on the subject. The Government's own instructions can sometimes be more powerful than a court order — because they are already binding on all departments.

For CFOs and founders dealing with government contracts or public sector appointments, the takeaway is different. Temporary appointments of 45 days or more now carry a clear reservation mandate. If your organization is hiring temporary staff for government-related work, you need to ensure compliance. The Office Memorandum dated 21.11.2022 is not a suggestion. It is an instruction to all Ministries and Departments. Non-compliance could lead to litigation, and the Supreme Court has already signaled that it will not hesitate to let aggrieved parties seek remedies.

The Bottom Line

Md Imran Ahmad & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. is a short judgment with a long tail. The Supreme Court did not create new law. It did something more practical: it held the Government to its own word. The Office Memorandum of 21.11.2022 is now the governing rule for temporary appointments of 45 days or more. If it is violated, the petitioners — and anyone else in their position — have the Court's express permission to seek a remedy. The judgment is a reminder that sometimes the best litigation strategy is to wait for the executive to act, and then hold them to it.