CIVIL LITIGATION  ·  CRIMINAL

33 kg silver, 3-year deadline: When does the clock start?

The Supreme Court settles a crucial question: Is the limitation period counted from the day you file a complaint or from when the magistrate takes cognizance?

3

years.

Saved. After 33 kg
TL;DR

The Supreme Court settles a crucial question: Is the limitation period counted from the day you file a complaint or from when the magistrate takes cognizance?

In this reading
1. When the accused cried "time's up" 2. The one question that split the courts 3. Why the Constitution Bench's logic mattered 4. The binding force of a Constitution Bench 5. What this means for every criminal practitioner 6. The silver that started it all

A man entrusted 33 kg of silver. When he asked for it back, the other party refused. He filed a complaint after 2 years and 9 months—but the court took cognizance later. On a February morning in 2022, two judges of the Supreme Court of India sat down to answer a question that sounds technical but decides whether thousands of criminal cases live or die: when exactly does the clock stop for a delayed complaint?

Amritlal had handed over 33.139 kilograms of silver to Shantilal Soni. On 4 October 2009, he asked for it back. Shantilal refused. That refusal, the law says, was the moment the offence of criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC — the crime of dishonestly misappropriating property entrusted to you) was committed. For offences punishable with up to three years' imprisonment, the law gives you a three-year window to start prosecution. After that, the case is time-barred — dead on arrival.

Amritlal filed a written complaint with the Superintendent of Police, Khachrod, on 10 July 2012. That was two years, nine months and six days after the refusal. An FIR was registered, police investigated, and a chargesheet was filed on 13 November 2012. The Magistrate took cognizance (the formal act of a judge deciding there is enough material to take the case forward) on 4 December 2012. Charges were framed on 12 September 2013.

When the accused cried "time's up"

The accused — Shantilal Soni and others — argued that the entire prosecution was barred by limitation. Their logic was simple: the offence happened on 4 October 2009. The Magistrate took cognizance on 4 December 2012. That is three years and two months after the offence — beyond the three-year limit. Therefore, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance, and the case should be thrown out.

The trial court and the sessions court both rejected this plea. But the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, sitting at Indore, agreed with the accused. On 6 March 2019, the High Court invoked Section 482 of the CrPC (the High Court's inherent power to prevent abuse of its process) and quashed the entire proceedings. Amritlal, the man who had lost 33 kg of silver, now faced losing his day in court too.

The one question that split the courts

The dispute turned on a single phrase in Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The section says: "No court shall take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation." The question was: does "take cognizance" mean the date the complaint is filed, or the date the Magistrate actually applies her mind and formally takes cognizance?

The High Court read it literally. The Magistrate "took cognizance" on 4 December 2012. That was beyond three years from the offence. Case closed.

But the Supreme Court had already answered this question in a Constitution Bench judgment called Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases (2014). That five-judge bench had held, after examining the scheme of Chapter XXXVI of the CrPC (the chapter dealing with limitation for taking cognizance), that the relevant date for computing limitation is the date of filing of the complaint or institution of prosecution — not the date of taking cognizance.

Why the Constitution Bench's logic mattered

The reasoning in Sarah Mathew was practical. If limitation runs until the date of cognizance, then delays caused by the court system — the time a magistrate takes to examine a complaint, the time police take to file a chargesheet — would unfairly penalise the victim. The victim has no control over how long the court or police take. What the victim controls is when she files the complaint. So the clock should stop at filing, not at cognizance.

The Supreme Court in Amritlal v. Shantilal Soni applied this ratio without hesitation. Justice Dinesh Maheshwari, writing for the bench, noted that the High Court had simply ignored the binding precedent of the Constitution Bench. The High Court had held that cognizance on 4 December 2012 was beyond limitation, but it had failed to consider that the complaint was filed on 10 July 2012 — well within three years from 4 October 2009.

The binding force of a Constitution Bench

The accused's lawyers tried to argue that Sarah Mathew was wrongly decided, or that it did not consider certain provisions of the CrPC. The Supreme Court shut that door firmly. A Constitution Bench judgment, the court said, cannot be questioned on suggestions about different interpretations of the provisions under consideration. Its binding effect does not depend on whether a particular argument was considered — provided the point was actually decided.

The court cited Somawanti v. State of Punjab (1963) for this proposition: a decision of a Constitution Bench is binding until it is overruled by a larger bench. Individual judges or smaller benches cannot refuse to follow it because they think a different view is possible.

What this means for every criminal practitioner

The practical takeaway is sharp and simple. When you file a complaint for an offence with a limitation period — whether it is one year, three years, or six months — the date that matters is the date you file the complaint, not the date the magistrate takes cognizance. If you file within the limitation period, you are safe, even if the magistrate takes six months to apply her mind.

This applies to private complaints filed before a magistrate and to complaints made to the police that result in an FIR. In both cases, the institution of prosecution — the act of setting the legal machinery in motion — is what stops the limitation clock.

THE PLAY: When computing limitation under Section 468 CrPC, always count from the date of filing the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution — never from the date the magistrate takes cognizance.

The silver that started it all

The Supreme Court allowed Amritlal's appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and directed the trial magistrate at Khachrod to proceed with the trial expeditiously. The court added a warning: if any attempt is made to delay or obstruct the trial, the magistrate would be free to adopt coercive proceedings, including cancellation of bail or imposing monetary conditions equivalent to the present value of the property involved. The parties were directed to appear before the magistrate on 1 April 2022.

The 33 kg of silver remains where it was. But the question of when the clock starts — that has been settled.

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Reviewed by Sharad Bansal on 15 · 05 · 2026

Sharad Bansal — Sharad Bansal is an advocate of the Delhi High Court with twenty years of practice in criminal defence and commercial litigation.

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