33 kg silver returned? Court says the clock starts ticking when you file complaint, not when judge signs

A man handed over 33 kg of silver. The other man kept it. Three years later, the police finally filed a charge sheet. The High Court said: too late. The Supreme Court said: you're counting wrong.

Here is the scene. The ceiling fan creaked as the man — Amritlal — placed the written complaint on the wooden counter at the police station on 10 July 2012. He told the officer that three years earlier — on 4 October 2009 — he had entrusted 33.139 kilograms of silver to Shantilal Soni. When he asked for it back, Shantilal refused. The silver was gone. The police registered an FIR (a written complaint that starts a police investigation), investigated, and filed a charge-sheet on 13 November 2012. A magistrate took cognizance (formally accepted the case for trial) on 4 December 2012. It looked like a straightforward criminal breach of trust case. Then Shantilal's lawyers pulled a procedural lever that nearly killed the entire prosecution.

When the High Court said the clock had run out

The lever was Section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) — a provision that bars a court from taking cognizance of an offence if too much time has passed since the crime was committed. For an offence like criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC), the limitation period is three years. Shantilal's argument was clean: the offence happened on 4 October 2009. The magistrate took cognizance on 4 December 2012 — three years and two months later. The case, he said, was dead on arrival.

The trial court rejected this argument on 17 August 2017. The Additional Sessions Judge, Khachrod, then dismissed Shantilal's first revision petition (Criminal Revision No. 288/2013) on 27 July 2015, and a second revision (Criminal Revision No. 181/2017) on 20 February 2018. Both courts held that the limitation challenge had no merit. But the Madhya Pradesh High Court, exercising its powers under Section 482 CrPC (the High Court's inherent power to quash proceedings that are an abuse of process), agreed with Shantilal on 6 March 2019. The High Court held that the relevant date for computing the limitation period was the date the magistrate took cognizance — 4 December 2012. Since that was beyond three years from 4 October 2009, the prosecution was time-barred. The proceedings were quashed.

Amritlal appealed to the Supreme Court.

Why the Supreme Court said the High Court was counting wrong

The bench — Justice Dinesh Maheshwari and Justice Vikram Nath — did something unusual. They did not spend time re-analysing the facts. They went straight to the legal question: when does the limitation clock stop under Section 468 CrPC?

The answer, the bench said, had already been settled by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in a 2014 case called Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases. In that decision, the five-judge bench had held that "the relevant date for computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC is the date of filing the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution, and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence."

Why does this distinction matter? Because there is often a gap between when a complaint is filed with the police and when the magistrate formally takes cognizance. The police need time to investigate. The magistrate needs time to review the charge-sheet. If the clock kept ticking during that gap, a complainant who filed within the limitation period could still lose the case because of administrative delays beyond their control.

The Supreme Court in Sarah Mathew had rejected that interpretation. The Constitution Bench had reasoned that the purpose of limitation in criminal law is to protect accused persons from stale claims — not to punish victims for delays caused by the justice system itself. The bench in Amritlal further observed that "a decision of the Constitution Bench cannot be questioned on suggestions about different interpretation of provisions under consideration; the binding effect does not depend on whether a particular argument was considered, provided the point was actually decided."

The procedural journey: from police station to the Supreme Court

The case had travelled a long road before it reached the Supreme Court. It began at the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Khachrod, District Ujjain, where FIR No. 289/2012 was registered on 10 July 2012. The police filed the charge-sheet on 13 November 2012, and the magistrate took cognizance on 4 December 2012. Charges were framed on 12 September 2013.

The first challenge came when the accused filed a revision before the Additional Sessions Judge, Khachrod (Criminal Revision No. 288/2013), which was dismissed on 27 July 2015. Undeterred, the accused then filed an application under Section 468 CrPC before the trial court itself, arguing that the case was time-barred. The Judicial Magistrate First Class rejected that application on 17 August 2017 in Criminal Case No. 619/2012. A second revision followed — Criminal Revision No. 181/2017 — which was also dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge on 20 February 2018.

Finally, the accused moved the Madhya Pradesh High Court under Section 482 CrPC (the High Court's inherent power to prevent abuse of process). In MCRC No. 26287/2018, the High Court bench at Indore allowed the petition on 6 March 2019, quashing the entire criminal proceedings. That order brought Amritlal to the Supreme Court, which admitted his Special Leave Petition (SLP Criminal No. 5122 of 2019) and converted it into Criminal Appeal No. 301 of 2022.

How the numbers worked in Amritlal's case

Apply the Sarah Mathew ruling to the facts. Amritlal filed his complaint on 10 July 2012. The offence date was 4 October 2009. That is two years, nine months and six days — well within the three-year limitation period. The fact that the magistrate took cognizance on 4 December 2012 — three years and two months after the offence — was irrelevant. The High Court had made a fundamental error by focusing on the wrong date.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the criminal proceedings. The trial magistrate was directed to proceed with the case expeditiously. The bench also warned that if the accused tried to delay or obstruct the trial, the magistrate could cancel their bail or impose monetary conditions. The operative order read: "If any further attempt is made by accused-respondents to delay or obstruct trial, the Magistrate would be free to adopt coercive proceedings including cancellation of bail or imposing monetary conditions." The parties were directed to appear before the JMFC Khachrod on 1 April 2022.

What this means for every lawyer and litigant

This judgment is a reminder that procedural defences are only as strong as the facts they rest on. A limitation challenge under Section 468 CrPC must be calculated from the date the complaint was filed — not the date the magistrate signed the order taking cognizance. A lawyer who argues otherwise is relying on a position that the Supreme Court's Constitution Bench has already rejected.

For practitioners, the takeaway is simple: when you file a criminal complaint near the end of the limitation period, get the date stamp on the complaint. That date is your shield. The magistrate's delay in taking cognizance — whether days, weeks or months — cannot be used against you.

The judgment also reinforces the binding nature of Constitution Bench decisions. The High Court had effectively ignored Sarah Mathew — a decision that directly answered the very question before it. The Supreme Court was unequivocal: a Constitution Bench ruling does not lose its binding force merely because a particular argument was not considered, as long as the point in issue was actually decided.

For litigants, the case offers a practical lesson in perseverance. Amritlal's case was quashed by the High Court in March 2019. He did not give up. He appealed to the Supreme Court, and in February 2022 — nearly three years later — the highest court restored his case. The silver was never returned. But the legal avenue to hold Shantilal accountable was given a second life.

THE PLAY: When computing limitation under Section 468 CrPC, use the date the complaint was filed with the court or police — not the date the magistrate took cognizance.

The ceiling fan in the Khachrod police station had stopped turning by the time the Supreme Court's order was pronounced. But for Amritlal, the case was no longer a cold file gathering dust. As the Supreme Court ordered: "The trial magistrate shall proceed with the trial expeditiously."