Bought a house after a decree? You can't object to its execution

He bought a house from a legal heir. But the court had already ordered it be handed to someone else. When he tried to object, the judge said — you can't.

Late Shri N.D. Mishra owned Kothi No. 27, Ishwar Nagar, New Delhi. In 1992, he signed a Will bequeathing the property to Omesh Mishra Memorial Charitable Trust, named after his deceased son. He also leased part of the property to a tenant, who refused to vacate. A lawsuit followed. On February 1, 2003, the Trial Court in New Delhi passed a decree — a court order — for possession, injunction, and mesne profits (compensation for wrongful occupation) in favour of the trust.

But the story did not end there. One of the legal heirs, Mr. Yogesh Mishra, sold the property to Sriram Housing Finance and Investment India Ltd. through a registered sale deed in 2004 — a full year after the decree had been passed. The registered sale deed, crisp on stamp paper and final on its face, transferred ownership. Sriram Housing took physical possession. And when the trust tried to execute the decree (enforce the court order to take possession), Sriram Housing stood in the way.

The question that reached the Supreme Court was deceptively simple: could a person who bought property after a court had already ordered it to someone else object to that order being carried out? The answer, delivered by a bench of Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Indira Banerjee on July 6, 2022, shut the door firmly on such objections.

When a sale deed collides with a court order

The original owner, N.D. Mishra, had made his intentions clear in 1992. The Will, dated August 29, 1992, bequeathed the property to the trust. All legal heirs admitted the Will. In fact, the trust was impleaded (added as a party) as co-plaintiff in the original suit against the tenant. The decree of 2003 was passed with everyone on notice.

Yet in 2004, Yogesh Mishra — one of the legal heirs — executed a registered sale deed transferring the property to Sriram Housing Finance. The company took possession. When the trust moved the Executing Court (the court that enforces decrees) to take possession, Sriram Housing raised objections.

The company's first move was an application under Order XXI Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (a provision that allows a third party to object when property is attached by a court). On November 27, 2004, the Executing Court dismissed it as non-maintainable — meaning the company had no legal right to even file that objection. A review petition was dismissed on December 24, 2004. A civil revision (a challenge before the High Court) failed on November 27, 2008. A Special Leave Petition (SLP) to the Supreme Court was dismissed on January 12, 2009.

The second attempt — and why it also failed

Undeterred, Sriram Housing filed an independent suit, CS(OS) No. 434 of 2009, in the Delhi High Court. On December 22, 2010, that suit was withdrawn with liberty to file fresh objections under Order XXI Rules 97-101 of the CPC (provisions that deal with resistance to possession and dispossession during execution of a decree).

On January 13, 2012, the Executing Court entertained these fresh objections in Execution Petition No. 46 of 2006. The court's order, thick with legal questions and carrying the weight of a file number, meant the trust would have to prove its case all over again — years after the original decree.

The trust challenged this order before the Delhi High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution (the High Court's power of superintendence over subordinate courts). On April 16, 2014, the High Court set aside the Executing Court's order, holding that the objections were not maintainable. The High Court's reasoning was clear: the Executing Court had no jurisdiction to frame issues in the absence of a valid application. Sriram Housing appealed to the Supreme Court.

What the law actually says — and who can use it

The Supreme Court examined the provisions thread by thread.

Order XXI Rule 97 allows a person to complain when someone resists or obstructs delivery of possession. But the court held that only two categories of people can invoke this rule: the decree holder (the person in whose favour the decree was passed) or a purchaser of property sold in execution of a decree. Sriram Housing was neither. It had bought the property from a legal heir, not from a court auction. It was not the decree holder. It had no standing under Rule 97. The court observed that "the appellant, not being a decree holder, cannot invoke the provisions of Rule 97 of Order XXI."

Order XXI Rule 99 allows a person who has been dispossessed (forcibly removed from property) by the decree holder or an auction purchaser to apply for restoration of possession. But Sriram Housing was in possession. It had never been dispossessed. The court held that a person who remains in possession cannot invoke Rule 99. The judgment noted that "Rule 99 can only be invoked by a person who has been actually dispossessed of immovable property," and since the appellant was in possession, the rule did not apply.

Order XXI Rule 101 says that when a valid application is made under Rule 97 or Rule 99, the Executing Court can determine all questions of right, title, or interest in the property. But the court made clear: Rule 101 is triggered only when a valid application exists under Rule 97 or Rule 99. Since neither rule applied to Sriram Housing, the Executing Court had no jurisdiction to frame issues or conduct a trial under Rule 101.

The court also noted Order XXI Rule 102, which says that Rules 98 and 100 (which provide relief to dispossessed persons) do not apply to a transferee pendente lite — a person who buys property while a lawsuit is pending. Sriram Housing had bought the property after the decree was passed, which is even worse than buying during a pending suit.

Why the company's arguments collapsed

Sriram Housing argued that it had purchased the property through a registered sale deed and had a legitimate claim to ownership. The court rejected this reasoning. The Will of 1992 had already bequeathed the property to the trust. All legal heirs had admitted the Will. The trust had been impleaded as co-plaintiff in the original suit. The decree of 2003 was passed with full knowledge of the trust's rights.

The company's purchase from one legal heir — after the decree — could not override the court's order. The court cited Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust and Another (1998) and Vateena Begum v. Shamim Zafar & Anr. (2020) to support its position that a purchaser from a legal heir who is not a decree holder has no locus (legal standing) to resist execution.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It directed the Executing Court to decide the execution case as expeditiously as possible — within six months. The operative order carried a finality that the company's decade-long litigation could not shake.

THE PLAY: If you buy property from a legal heir after a court has already decreed possession in someone else's favour, you cannot object to that decree being executed — you are neither a decree holder nor a dispossessed person under Order XXI Rules 97 and 99 of the CPC.

The Will sat in a drawer for eleven years before the court enforced it. The sale deed could not erase it. The property had been promised in 1992. The court ordered it delivered in 2003. A sale deed in 2004 could not change that. The Supreme Court ended where the story began: with a Will, a trust, and a decree that no subsequent buyer could undo.