Children of void marriages can inherit parents' share in joint family property, but not be coparceners

A child born from a marriage that was legally void—can they inherit ancestral property? The Supreme Court just gave a split answer. On a September morning in 2023, a three-judge bench delivered a verdict that rewrote the inheritance rights of lakhs of children whose parents' marriages were never valid under Hindu law. The courtroom was still, the only sound the rustle of judgment pages as Chief Justice Chandrachud read out the operative order.

The question had hung for over a decade. Could a child from a void or voidable marriage—a marriage the law treats as if it never happened—claim a share in the ancestral joint family property of their parents? Earlier Supreme Court decisions had said no: such children could only inherit what their parents earned themselves, not what flowed through generations of the Hindu Undivided Family (HUF). But a two-judge bench in 2011 had doubted those rulings. Now, the answer was finally here—and it was neither a full yes nor a full no.

When the law declared a marriage void

Under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a marriage can be void (Section 11) if it violates certain conditions—for example, if one party was already married, or if the parties were within prohibited degrees of relationship. A marriage can be voidable (Section 12) if, say, consent was obtained by fraud or force. In both cases, the marriage is defective from the start or can be set aside.

But what about the children? For centuries, Hindu law treated them as illegitimate—they had no inheritance rights at all. Parliament changed that in 1976 by inserting Section 16 into the Hindu Marriage Act. Section 16(1) says children of void marriages are legitimate. Section 16(2) says the same for children of voidable marriages. But Section 16(3) adds a crucial limit: such children "shall have no rights in or to the property of any person other than the parents."

The question was: what did "property of the parents" mean? Did it include only self-acquired property—what the parents earned themselves? Or did it also include their share in the ancestral joint family property, the Mitakshara coparcenary (the undivided family estate held by generations of male heirs)?

Three decisions that closed the door

Between 2003 and 2010, the Supreme Court answered that question three times—and each time, the answer was the same: no. In Jinia Keotin v. Kumar Sitaram Manjhi (2003), a two-judge bench held that children of void marriages could not claim a share in coparcenary property. In Neelamma v. Sarojamma (2006), another two-judge bench followed. In Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan (2010), a three-judge bench affirmed it again. The courtroom had heard these arguments before—the same legal texts, the same citations, the same result. The air in the room felt heavy with precedent.

The logic was simple: a coparcenary interest is acquired by birth. A child born from a void marriage, the courts said, could not have been a coparcener at birth because the marriage itself was invalid. Section 16 gave them legitimacy, but not the status of a coparcener. So they could only inherit self-acquired property.

But the problem was stark: this interpretation punished children for their parents' mistakes. A child from a valid marriage could inherit the father's share in ancestral property. A child from a void marriage—through no fault of their own—could not.

Why the two-judge bench doubted the earlier rulings

In 2011, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court was hearing Revanasiddappa v. Mallikarjun when it noticed a problem. The earlier decisions had read Section 16(3) narrowly, limiting children to self-acquired property. But the bench noted that Section 16(3) itself did not use the words "self-acquired" or "ancestral." It simply said "property of the parents." If a parent had a share in the coparcenary property, why should that share not be considered the parent's property?

The bench referred the question to a larger bench. The case would take twelve years to reach a final answer. The reference order, signed in 2011, sat in the court's files—a quiet reminder of an unresolved question.

The legal turn: what each side argued

When the three-judge bench finally heard the reference in 2023, the arguments were sharply divided. The green-shaded lamp on the bench cast a warm glow over the files as counsel rose to speak.

The children, through their counsel, argued that Section 16 was a beneficial provision—it was meant to protect innocent children. If the court limited them to self-acquired property, the provision would be meaningless for most families, where the bulk of wealth was in ancestral property. They pointed to Article 14 of the Constitution (the right to equality) and argued that discriminating between children based on their parents' marital status was unconstitutional.

The other side—the coparceners who stood to lose their share—argued that coparcenary property was not the same as self-acquired property. A coparcener does not own a specific share; they have an undivided interest in the whole. If a child of a void marriage was given a share, it would affect the rights of other coparceners—uncles, cousins, nephews—who were not the child's parents. Section 16(3) specifically said the child had no rights in the property of "any person other than the parents." Giving them a share in the coparcenary would mean giving them rights in property belonging to other coparceners, which the section expressly forbade.

What the court decided

Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, writing for the three-judge bench, delivered a nuanced answer. The court overruled Jinia Keotin, Neelamma, and Bharatha Matha—but only partly.

The court held that a child born from a void or voidable marriage, legitimized under Section 16, is entitled to a share in the property of their deceased parents which would have been allotted to them on a notional partition (a hypothetical division of the joint family property) of the Hindu coparcenary property. In plain language: if the father had a share in the ancestral property, and if a notional partition were to happen, the child could inherit whatever share the father would have received.

But the court drew a clear line. Such a child cannot be treated as a coparcener by birth in the HUF governed by Mitakshara law. Coparcenary status postulates interest by birth—and the child, born from a void marriage, does not acquire that status. Treating them as coparceners would affect the rights of persons other than their parents, which Section 16(3) explicitly prohibits.

In other words: the child can inherit the parent's notional share, but cannot claim a share in the property of other coparceners—uncles, aunts, cousins—as of right. As the court put it, "such children are entitled to whatever share their parents would receive on partition of joint family property, but cannot themselves be coparceners in the larger Hindu Undivided Family."

Why the distinction matters

The difference is subtle but critical. Under the old law, a child of a void marriage got nothing from the ancestral property. Under the new law, the child gets whatever the parent would have received on partition—but no more. The child does not become a member of the HUF with a right to demand partition. The child does not get a share in property that belongs to other coparceners.

The court's reasoning was grounded in the text of Section 16(3). The section says the child has rights only in the property of the parents. A parent's notional share in the coparcenary is, the court said, the parent's property for the purposes of inheritance. But the coparcenary itself—the larger pool of undivided family property—belongs to all coparceners collectively. The child cannot touch that pool directly.

THE PLAY: When drafting wills or succession plans for clients with children from void or voidable marriages, treat those children as entitled to the parent's notional share in coparcenary property on partition, but not as coparceners with rights against other family members.

What this means for families and practitioners

For family lawyers and estate planners, the judgment provides clarity on a question that has troubled Hindu succession law for decades. The earlier decisions had created a harsh rule: children of void marriages could inherit only self-acquired property, even if the family's wealth was entirely ancestral. The new rule is more equitable: the child gets the parent's share, but no more.

For families, the judgment means that a child born from a marriage that was later declared void—or a marriage that was void from the start—can still claim a piece of the ancestral pie, as long as it is limited to what the parent would have received. The child cannot, however, walk into the family home and demand a partition as a coparcener.

The court ended where it began: with a child born from a marriage the law never recognised, standing at the door of the family home, asking for their share. The judgment pages, still warm from the printer, carried the answer: the child may enter, but only as far as the parent's shadow reaches.