He dropped the case but still ruled on possession. The Supreme Court said no.
A Magistrate revoked his own Section 145 notice but still recorded findings on possession, and the Supreme Court annulled those findings for want of jurisdiction.
16
years.
A Magistrate revoked his own Section 145 notice but still recorded findings on possession, and the Supreme Court annulled those findings for want of jurisdiction.
One property, two courts, and a Magistrate who went too far
Mohd. Shakir and Gaurishankar Chaturvedi were locked in a property dispute in Mathura. Civil suits were already pending. The City Magistrate, Mathura, initiated proceedings under Section 145 CrPC — the provision that lets a Magistrate step in when a land dispute threatens public order. But then the Magistrate did something curious: he dropped the proceedings, yet simultaneously recorded findings on who was in possession and directed the other party not to interfere. That extra step cost the order its legal life.
Shakir had been the second party in those proceedings. When the Magistrate revoked the notice under Section 145(1) CrPC but went on to declare that Chaturvedi was in possession and restrained Shakir from interfering, Shakir had a problem. The order looked like an injunction — issued by a criminal court that had just said it had no business being there. He challenged it in the Allahabad High Court via Criminal Revision No. 209/2012. The High Court declined to interfere. Sixteen years after the dispute began, Shakir approached the Supreme Court through a Special Leave Petition.
The Supreme Court took one look at the Magistrate's order and saw the error immediately.
What the Magistrate actually did
On 7 January 2012, the City Magistrate, Mathura, passed an order under Section 145 CrPC. The background was straightforward: a property in Mathura was disputed between Shakir and Chaturvedi. Both sides claimed possession. The Magistrate, apprehending a breach of peace, had issued a notice under Section 145(1) CrPC calling upon the parties to file written statements.
But here's the catch — civil suits were already pending between the same parties over the same property. In Civil Suit No. 1161/2007 (Zakir Ali v. Vaamanji), the Trial Court had even granted a temporary injunction, and an appeal had been disposed of on 29 October 2012. The civil court was actively seized of the possession dispute.
The Magistrate recognised this. He revoked the notice under Section 145(1) CrPC, accepting that the civil court was the appropriate forum. So far, so good.
Then he went further.
In the same order, the Magistrate recorded findings on possession — in favour of Chaturvedi — and directed Shakir not to interfere with that possession until the civil court decided the matter. He effectively granted an injunction, the very kind of relief that belongs to civil courts, not criminal Magistrates acting under Section 145 CrPC.
The legal trap the Magistrate fell into
Section 145 CrPC is a limited tool. It exists to prevent breaches of peace by allowing a Magistrate to determine which party was in actual possession of disputed land at a particular point in time. The Magistrate does not decide title. He does not decide who has the better right to possess. He merely decides who was in possession on the date of the order, and then passes a temporary order to keep the peace until a civil court decides the matter.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that once civil proceedings are pending, the Magistrate's role under Section 145 CrPC shrinks further. The civil court is the master of possession disputes. The criminal court must defer.
In this case, the Magistrate did the right thing by dropping the proceedings. But then he did the wrong thing by recording findings on possession and issuing directions. The Supreme Court called this a jurisdictional error.
THE RULE: When dropping Section 145 CrPC proceedings because civil suits are pending, the Magistrate cannot record any finding on possession or issue any injunctive direction. The only proper order is to revoke the notice and leave everything to the civil court.
What each side argued
Before the Supreme Court, Mohd. Shakir's counsel argued that the Magistrate had exceeded his jurisdiction. The learned Counsel submitted that once the Magistrate decided to drop the proceedings under Section 145 CrPC, he had no authority to make any observations or return any findings regarding the rights of the parties over the property. Those findings, it was argued, were beyond the scope of Section 145 CrPC and directly interfered with the pending civil suits.
On the other side, the respondents defended the Magistrate's order. They argued that the Magistrate had merely recorded the existing state of possession to maintain status quo until the civil court decided the matter. The High Court had agreed with this reasoning and dismissed the revision.
The Supreme Court was not persuaded.
What the Supreme Court held
Justice Dinesh Maheshwari, writing for the Bench that also included Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia, delivered a crisp judgment on 26 August 2022.
The Court held that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to record findings on possession or issue directions while dropping Section 145 proceedings. The ratio was clear: when civil suits are already pending in relation to the disputed property, the Magistrate dropping Section 145 proceedings ought to leave all relevant aspects for consideration of the competent civil court without recording any finding.
The Court noted that in Civil Suit No. 1161/2007, the Trial Court had already granted a temporary injunction and an appeal had been disposed of. The civil court was actively adjudicating the possession dispute. The Magistrate's findings directly cut across that process.
The operative order was precise. The Supreme Court modified the Magistrate's order dated 7 January 2012. The revocation of the notice under Section 145(1) CrPC was upheld — that part was correct. But all observations, findings on possession, and injunctive directions that appeared in the last part of the penultimate paragraph of the Magistrate's order were annulled. The Court clarified that no observations in its order would have any bearing on the merits of the pending civil suits.
The SLP was disposed of without granting leave. All pending applications were also disposed of.
Why this matters in practice
For advocates practising in criminal courts, this judgment is a reminder of a basic but frequently violated principle: a Magistrate under Section 145 CrPC is not a civil court. The provision is about preventing breaches of peace, not about deciding who should possess what.
The trap is easy to fall into. A Magistrate sees a property dispute, hears both sides, forms an opinion about who is in possession, and wants to maintain the status quo. The instinct is to record that opinion in the order. But the moment the Magistrate records a finding on possession — even while dropping proceedings — he steps outside his jurisdiction.
This is especially dangerous when civil suits are pending. The civil court is the appropriate forum to decide possession and title. Any finding by a criminal court, even if labelled as "prima facie" or "for the limited purpose of maintaining status quo," can prejudice the civil proceedings. Parties can use it as a weapon. The Supreme Court has now made it clear: no such findings are permissible.
For CFOs and founders dealing with property disputes, the lesson is practical. If you are involved in a civil suit over land or a building, and the other side initiates criminal proceedings under Section 145 CrPC, you can take comfort in this judgment. The criminal court cannot pre-judge your possession. If the Magistrate tries to record findings, you have a clear ground to challenge the order.
The bottom line
When a Magistrate drops Section 145 CrPC proceedings because civil suits are pending, the only lawful order is to revoke the notice and say nothing more. Any finding on possession or any injunctive direction is void for lack of jurisdiction.