He treated patients for decades. A single 'or' in a Bye-Law ended his case.

Dr. Das, the AYUSH Ministry, and the 65-year retirement that wasn't

Dr. Bikartan Das was a Research Assistant at the Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences (CCRAS) — an autonomous body under the Ministry of AYUSH. He had treated patients for decades. In 2017, the Union Cabinet raised the retirement age for AYUSH doctors from 60 to 65. Dr. Das, due to retire in April 2018 at 60, argued he deserved the same. The Orissa High Court agreed. The Supreme Court did not. The stakes were simple: five more years of service, or none. The answer turned on a single word in a Bye-Law — "or".

How a Cabinet decision became a courtroom fight

Dr. Das joined CCRAS in 1985 as a Research Assistant. His service was governed by the CCRAS Bye-Laws and Memorandum of Association. In 2017, the Union Cabinet enhanced the superannuation age of AYUSH doctors under the Ministry of AYUSH from 60 to 65 years, amending Rule 56(bb) of the Fundamental Rules, 1922. The Ministry promptly clarified: this benefit applied only to AYUSH doctors directly under the Ministry, not to employees of autonomous bodies like CCRAS.

Dr. Das approached the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Cuttack Bench, in 2020. He claimed that since he treated patients just like AYUSH doctors, he was entitled to the same retirement age. The CAT dismissed his Original Application on 2 November 2020. The Tribunal held that Clause 34 of the CCRAS Bye-Laws specifically governed superannuation, and the Governing Body had fixed retirement at 60 years. Dr. Das could not claim parity with government doctors.

He then moved the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack under Article 226. On 17 December 2020, a learned Single Judge allowed his writ petition, setting aside the CAT order. The High Court held that Dr. Das's devotion to patient care and the nature of his duties entitled him to the enhanced retirement age of 65. The Court read Clauses 34 and 35 of the CCRAS Bye-Laws together to reach this conclusion.

CCRAS appealed to the Supreme Court of India. On 16 August 2023, a Bench of Chief Justice Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud and Justice J.B. Pardiwala (who authored the judgment) allowed the appeal in Civil Appeal No. 3339 of 2023. The High Court's order was set aside. The CAT's order was restored. Dr. Das retired at 60.

What the Bye-Laws actually said

The entire case turned on two clauses of the CCRAS Bye-Laws. Clause 34 dealt with superannuation. It read: "The age of superannuation of the employees of the Council shall be 60 years or as may be decided by the Central Government from time to time or as may be desired by the Governing Body."

Clause 35 stated: "The Fundamental Rules and Supplementary Rules as amended from time to time shall apply mutatis mutandis to the employees of the Council."

The High Court had read Clause 35 as importing the amended Rule 56(bb) — which raised the retirement age to 65 for AYUSH doctors — into the CCRAS service conditions. The Supreme Court disagreed. The key was the disjunctive "or" in Clause 34.

Justice Pardiwala observed that Clause 34 contained three distinct alternatives: (a) 60 years, (b) as decided by the Central Government, or (c) as desired by the Governing Body. The word "or" separated each alternative. The Governing Body of CCRAS had exercised its power under Clause 34 and fixed the retirement age at 60 years. This specific provision, the Court held, could not be overridden by the general provision in Clause 35 applying FRs mutatis mutandis.

THE PLAY: When a service Bye-Law contains a specific provision on superannuation (Clause 34) and a general provision importing government rules (Clause 35), the specific provision prevails — especially when the word "or" creates independent alternatives.

Why the High Court's reasoning failed

The Supreme Court identified two fundamental errors in the High Court's approach. First, the High Court treated Clauses 34 and 35 as complementary, when in fact Clause 34 was the governing provision. Second, the High Court relied on the nature of duties performed by Dr. Das — his patient care — to justify parity with AYUSH doctors. The Supreme Court held that retirement age is always governed by statutory rules governing appointment to a particular post, not by the nature of duties performed.

The Court cited Kerala Assistant Public Prosecutors Association v. State of Kerala (AIR 2018 SC 2652), which held that similarity in nature of duties cannot be the basis to claim parity in superannuation age between different posts with different service conditions.

The Article 14 argument that failed

Dr. Das argued that denying him the enhanced retirement age violated Article 14 of the Constitution — that he was being treated differently from similarly situated AYUSH doctors. The Supreme Court rejected this argument on two grounds.

First, Dr. Das was an employee of an autonomous body governed by its own Bye-Laws, while AYUSH doctors were Central Government employees governed by the Fundamental Rules. The Court cited State of Bihar v. Teachers' Association of Govt. Engineering College ((2000) 10 SCC 527) for the principle that employees governed by different service codes cannot claim parity in superannuation age with employees of a different institution governed by different rules.

Second, the Court followed T.M. Sampath v. Secretary, Ministry of Water Resources ((2015) 5 SCC 333) and State of Maharashtra v. Bhagwan ((2022) 4 SCC 193), both holding that employees of autonomous bodies cannot as a matter of right claim the same service benefits as government employees, even if the autonomous body is funded by the government.

The scope of High Court review under Article 226

The Supreme Court also took the opportunity to remind High Courts of the limits of certiorari jurisdiction. In proceedings under Article 226 against an order of the CAT, the High Court does not exercise appellate powers. It cannot substitute its own views for those of the Tribunal merely because a different view is possible.

The High Court had re-appreciated the evidence and reached a different conclusion on the interpretation of the Bye-Laws. The Supreme Court held this was impermissible. The CAT's interpretation of Clause 34 was a plausible one, and the High Court should not have interfered unless the CAT's order was perverse or illegal.

This observation — though technically obiter — may have significant practical implications. It reinforces the limited scope of judicial review of CAT orders by High Courts, a point often contested in service litigation.

What this means for autonomous body employees

For advocates, CFOs, and founders managing autonomous bodies or working in the public sector, this judgment delivers a clear message. Employees of autonomous bodies — whether research councils, development authorities, or regulatory bodies — cannot claim parity with government employees on service conditions, even if they perform similar duties. Their service conditions are governed by their own Bye-Laws, rules, and regulations.

The specific provision in the Bye-Laws will prevail over any general incorporation of government rules. If the Bye-Laws fix a retirement age, that is the retirement age — unless the Governing Body or the competent authority changes it. The nature of duties performed is irrelevant to the question of superannuation age.

For employers, the judgment is a reminder to ensure that Bye-Laws are drafted with precision. The disjunctive "or" in Clause 34 was the decisive factor. Had the clause read "as may be decided by the Central Government and as may be desired by the Governing Body," the outcome might have been different. Drafting matters.

The bottom line

If you work for an autonomous body, your retirement age is what your Bye-Laws say it is — not what the government decides for its own employees, and not what a court might think is fair based on the work you do.