He was told his case wasn't 'rarest of rare' enough for review. The Supreme Court disagreed.

A journalist said a gas agency partner threatened to shoot him. The accused said it was a fabrication. The trial court refused to drop the case. The High Court said it couldn't interfere because of a 'rarest of rare' rule. The Supreme Court just told them to look again.

The phone call changed everything — or nothing. A newspaper correspondent said he was investigating malpractices at a gas agency. He had filed RTI applications. He said he called the agency partner to ask questions. What he heard next, he alleged, was a stream of abuse followed by a threat: the partner would shoot him so badly his face would be unrecognizable. Two witnesses, the correspondent said, overheard the call on speakerphone — their ears straining toward the tinny, angry voice from the device.

The accused denied everything. He said the complaint was a fabrication, the investigation was one-sided, and the police had not even bothered to obtain call records — the one piece of evidence that could prove or disprove the entire story. He asked the trial court to discharge him (drop the case before trial). The trial court refused. He appealed to the High Court. The High Court also refused, citing a single reason: it could only interfere in the 'rarest of rare' cases. The Supreme Court just told them that was wrong.

When a 'rarest of rare' rule became a wall

The High Court's reasoning came from a 2018 Supreme Court judgment called Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation. In that case, the Supreme Court had said that High Courts should not routinely interfere with orders framing charges or refusing discharge. The idea was to prevent endless delays in trials. The High Court in the gas agency case read that to mean it could only step in if the case was 'rarest of rare' — a standard so high that almost no case qualifies. The courtroom fell silent as the judges considered the implications of that wall.

But the Supreme Court noticed a problem. Asian Resurfacing dealt with a very specific law — the Prevention of Corruption Act, which contains a statutory bar under Section 19 that limits when courts can interfere. That case was about corruption cases, not about a threat made over a phone call. The High Court had mechanically applied a standard meant for one context to an entirely different case. The file on the bench felt thin — the procedural error was stark.

The Supreme Court clarified: the 'rarest of rare' standard from Asian Resurfacing cannot be mechanically applied to bar all revisional or inherent jurisdiction examination of discharge refusals across all criminal cases. Each case must be examined on its own facts.

What the High Court should have done

The Supreme Court went back to an older, foundational judgment: Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1977). That case established a crucial principle about how High Courts should handle orders that are neither purely interlocutory (temporary, not final) nor purely final. An order refusing to discharge an accused person — refusing to drop the case — falls into this middle zone. It is not a final judgment because the trial hasn't happened yet. But it is not a purely procedural order either, because it decides whether a person must face the ordeal of a trial.

For such orders, the bar under Section 397(2) of the CrPC (which prevents High Courts from revising 'interlocutory orders') does not apply. The High Court retains its inherent power under Section 482 CrPC (the power to prevent abuse of process) and its constitutional power under Article 227 (the power of superintendence over lower courts). These powers must be exercised carefully — only in exceptional cases where there is a likelihood of serious prejudice to a citizen's rights — but they exist. The High Court cannot simply say it has no jurisdiction to look at the merits. The judges' expressions were intent as they laid out this legal architecture.

Why the trial court's job matters

The Supreme Court also reminded trial courts of their duty when considering a discharge application under Section 239 CrPC. A trial court is not a 'post office' that simply forwards charges. It must sift through the evidence, consider broad probabilities, look at the total effect of the evidence, and identify basic infirmities in the prosecution's case. Discharge is a valuable right of the accused — a protection against being forced to undergo a trial when the prosecution's case is too weak to proceed.

In this case, the accused had argued that the entire case rested on a phone call for which no call records were produced. The police had not obtained the very evidence that could confirm or refute the allegation. The trial court had not grappled with this argument. The High Court had not examined it either, because it thought it could not. The silence in the Supreme Court chamber was heavy as this procedural gap was exposed.

What the Supreme Court did

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and sent the case back for fresh consideration on its merits. The bench — Justice Surya Kant and Justice Aniruddha Bose — did not decide whether the accused should be discharged or not. That decision now rests with the High Court, which must examine the case properly, without hiding behind the 'rarest of rare' wall.

The Court also left the charges under Sections 504 and 506 IPC (intentional insult and criminal intimidation) undisturbed for now. The question is not whether the charges exist, but whether the evidence is strong enough to justify putting the accused through a trial.

THE PLAY: When a High Court refuses to examine the merits of a discharge refusal by citing the 'rarest of rare' standard from Asian Resurfacing, argue that the standard applies only to cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act and does not bar inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC or Article 227.

The phone call was never recorded. The threat was never heard by anyone except two witnesses who said they overheard it on speakerphone. The accused says the whole thing is a lie. The journalist says he was threatened for asking questions. The Supreme Court has now said: someone must actually look at the evidence and decide.

Procedural background and legal context

The case, Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., arose from an NCR filed on May 8, 2012, at a police station in Sant Kabir Nagar. An application under Section 155(2) CrPC was filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, who directed an investigation. The police filed a chargesheet on July 21, 2012, under Sections 504 and 506 IPC. Cognizance was taken by the CJM on November 8, 2012. The accused filed a discharge application on March 13, 2014, which was rejected. He then filed a criminal revision before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, which was dismissed on November 28, 2018. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal on May 7, 2021, and remanded the matter back to the High Court.

The case engaged several key legal provisions. Section 504 IPC deals with intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace. Section 506 IPC deals with criminal intimidation. Section 239 CrPC governs discharge in warrant cases. Section 397 CrPC allows High Courts to call for records to exercise powers of revision. Section 397(2) CrPC bars revision of interlocutory orders. Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the High Court. Article 227 of the Constitution gives High Courts power of superintendence over all courts. Section 155(2) CrPC deals with information as to non-cognizable cases. Section 161 CrPC governs examination of witnesses by police.

The Supreme Court also cited several precedents beyond Asian Resurfacing and Madhu Limaye. These included Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal (1979), State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath (2019), and Srilekha Sentelkumar v. CBI (2019). Each of these cases reinforced the principle that trial courts must carefully sift through evidence at the discharge stage and that High Courts retain jurisdiction to correct serious errors.

Ratio decidendi and key legal principles

The Supreme Court laid down three key principles. First, orders framing charges or refusing discharge are neither purely interlocutory nor final in nature and are therefore not affected by the bar under Section 397(2) CrPC. The High Court retains inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC and Article 227 to prevent abuse of process or secure ends of justice, though this power must be exercised circumspectly and in exceptional cases where there is likelihood of serious prejudice to citizens' rights.

Second, the 'rarest of rare' standard articulated in Asian Resurfacing must be understood in the context of that case, which dealt with the Prevention of Corruption Act containing a specific statutory bar under Section 19. It cannot be mechanically applied to bar all revisional or inherent jurisdiction examination of discharge refusals across all criminal cases.

Third, the trial court considering discharge under Section 239 CrPC is not to act as a mere post office but must sift through evidence, consider broad probabilities, the total effect of evidence, and basic infirmities in the case. Discharge is a valuable right of the accused.

The operative order set aside the impugned High Court order dated November 28, 2018, and remanded the case back to the High Court for reconsideration in accordance with law. The Supreme Court did not express any opinion on the merits of the discharge application itself, leaving that determination to the High Court.