High Court discharged a murder accused. Supreme Court reversed it with a Rs 50,000 cost.
The accused had already failed twice to get discharged. Then he tried a third route—and the High Court surprisingly let him go. The Supreme Court called it an abuse of process.
3
attempts.
The accused had already failed twice to get discharged. Then he tried a third route—and the High Court surprisingly let him go. The Supreme Court called it an abuse of process.
A man accused of murder was discharged by the High Court after his third attempt. The Supreme Court just reversed that order—and slapped him with a Rs 50,000 fine.
The attack erupted over a party dispute in Dharmapuri. On 24 November 2009, during an internal AIADMK clash, a group of men fell upon K. Ravi and his brother Veeramani. The main accused ordered weapons from a car. The second accused, Baskar (Respondent No. 2), brought them from his vehicle and struck Veeramani repeatedly on the head while another man stabbed him. The assault was brutal—the blows came fast, the metal meeting bone in a crowded street. Veeramani died in hospital, his body failing despite treatment.
An FIR was registered against nine accused. A chargesheet eventually implicated 31 people. The Sessions Court framed charges including murder under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC (every member of an unlawful assembly is guilty of an offence committed in prosecution of a common object). Then Baskar began trying to walk free.
He tried three times. The first two failed. The third succeeded—briefly. Then the Supreme Court stepped in.
The first two doors close
Baskar first filed a discharge application under Section 227 of the CrPC (a provision that allows an accused to argue there is no case against them before trial begins). The Sessions Court dismissed it on 1 July 2016. He challenged that dismissal before the Madras High Court in Criminal Revision Case No. 953 of 2016. The High Court confirmed the dismissal on 5 August 2016.
Attempt one. Done.
Then Baskar tried a different route. He filed an application under Section 216 of the CrPC (a provision that allows a court to alter or add charges before judgment). His argument: the charges against him were wrong and should be changed. The Sessions Court dismissed that too on 18 October 2016.
Attempt two. Done.
At this point, most accused would accept that trial was inevitable. Baskar did not.
The third door opens—and slams shut
Baskar filed a revision petition (a request for a higher court to review a lower court's decision) before the Madras High Court against the dismissal of his Section 216 application. A revision petition is a limited remedy. It is not a fresh appeal.
This time, the High Court surprised everyone. On 27 July 2017, it allowed the revision petition. It discharged Baskar from all charges. And it ordered further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC (a provision that allows police to conduct additional investigation after a chargesheet has been filed).
The complainant K. Ravi was stunned. A man who had already failed twice to get discharged had succeeded on a third attempt—through a procedural route that should not have been available to him.
He appealed to the Supreme Court.
Two errors that sank the order
The Supreme Court bench—Justice Bela M. Trivedi and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma—examined the High Court's order. The courtroom was quiet as the judges read out their finding: the order was "ex facie illegal." That means it was illegal on its face, without needing any further inquiry. The words hung in the air, a blunt verdict on a flawed proceeding.
Two fundamental errors stood out.
First, the bar under Section 397(2) CrPC. Section 397 of the CrPC gives High Courts the power to call for records and exercise revisional jurisdiction. But Section 397(2) contains a clear bar: no revision lies against an interlocutory order (an interim order that does not finally decide the case). An order dismissing an application under Section 216 CrPC is an interlocutory order. The High Court simply had no jurisdiction to entertain a revision against it. The court held that "the order under challenge was interlocutory and barred by Section 397(2) CrPC," and the High Court had "exceeded its limited revisional jurisdiction."
Second, the misuse of Section 216 CrPC. Section 216 is an enabling provision. It allows a court to alter or add charges before judgment if the evidence suggests a different offence. It does not give an accused a right to file a fresh discharge application after charges have already been framed—especially when a prior discharge application under Section 227 has already been dismissed and confirmed in revision. The court stated that "Section 216 CrPC is an enabling provision for the court to alter or add to any charge before judgment, but it does not confer any right on the accused to file a fresh application seeking discharge after charge is framed."
The Supreme Court was blunt: Baskar was using Section 216 as a backdoor to get what he could not get through the front door. That was an abuse of process.
The limits of revisional jurisdiction
The court also clarified the boundaries of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC. Citing the precedent in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, the bench held that revisional jurisdiction is extremely limited. It should be exercised only where:
- The decision under challenge is grossly erroneous
- There is non-compliance with provisions of law
- Findings are based on no evidence
- Material evidence is ignored
- Judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily
None of these conditions were met in Baskar's case. The High Court had simply overreached. The Supreme Court emphasized that "the court exercising revisional jurisdiction should be extremely circumspect in interfering with orders relating to charge-framing."
The price of pushing too far
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the Sessions Court's charges against Baskar. But it did not stop there.
The court imposed costs of Rs 50,000 on Baskar, payable to the complainant K. Ravi within two weeks. The message was clear: filing repeated applications to delay trial is not a strategy—it is an abuse of process, and it will cost you. The operative order read: "The appeal is allowed with costs of Rs. 50,000/- to be paid by Respondent No. 2 to the Appellant within two weeks."
The Sessions Court was directed to proceed with the trial against all accused, including Baskar, expeditiously. The court added a warning: non-cooperation by any accused would result in cancellation of bail.
THE PLAY: An accused cannot use Section 216 CrPC as a second discharge application after a Section 227 application has been dismissed—and no revision lies against an order dismissing a Section 216 application because it is an interlocutory order barred by Section 397(2) CrPC.
Three attempts. Two failures. One illegal success. And a Rs 50,000 lesson in what happens when you push the law too far.