Husband refuses paternity test. Supreme Court says no adverse inference.

He refused the DNA test. The court said: that's fine—here's why.

In a matrimonial court, the air was thick with the weight of a manila folder—medical reports untouched—that lay on the table before the husband. The marriage was over. The question that remained was whether the child was his. The husband refused to take a blood test. The wife did not ask him to. The court had to decide: can a judge force a man to give blood, and if he says no, does that mean he is hiding something?

The Supreme Court answered both questions in Gautama Khandu v. State of West Bengal & Anr. The answer was not simple. It turned on a single distinction: whether the couple was living together when the child was conceived.

When the husband said no to a blood test

The case began in a matrimonial court—a family court that handles divorce, custody, and maintenance disputes. The husband, Gautama Khandu, was disputing paternity. He wanted the court to order a DNA test. But when the court considered ordering one, the husband himself refused to cooperate.

The question before the Supreme Court was twofold. First, does a matrimonial court have the power to order a person to undergo a medical test? Second, if a person refuses such an order, can the court assume the worst about them—what lawyers call an "adverse inference" (a conclusion that the refusal hides a damaging truth)?

The Court held that a matrimonial court does have the power to order a medical test. Such an order, the Court said, does not violate the Right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. A person cannot simply say "my body, my choice" to block a court from seeking the truth in a paternity dispute.

But the Court added a crucial condition: this power can only be used when there is a strong prima facie case (enough initial evidence to justify the order). A judge cannot order a DNA test on a whim. There must be solid material before the court that makes the test necessary.

The Court observed that if the respondent refuses medical examination despite the court's order—which was issued after establishing a strong prima facie case—then the court will be entitled to draw an adverse inference against him. This prerequisite, the Court made clear, is the critical gatekeeper: without a strong prima facie case, the power to order a test does not arise, and no adverse inference can follow.

The presumption that protects a child

This is where the case took a sharp turn. The Court then examined a different situation—one where the husband and wife were living together at the time of conception.

Section 112 of the Evidence Act creates a powerful legal rule: a child born during a valid marriage is conclusively presumed to be the child of the husband. This is not a weak guess. It is a legal wall. To break it, the husband must prove "non-access"—meaning he must show that he and his wife had no sexual relationship during the period when the child was conceived.

If the couple was living in the same house, eating meals together, sharing a bedroom—if there was what the law calls "admitted access"—then the presumption stands. The husband cannot simply demand a DNA test to knock it down.

The Court observed: if a husband and wife were living together during conception, and the Section 112 presumption has not been rebutted (overcome by proof of non-access), then no adverse inference can be drawn against the party who refuses a blood test.

In plain language: if you were living with your wife when the child was conceived, the law already assumes the child is yours. Refusing a DNA test changes nothing. The court cannot punish you for saying no.

Why the distinction matters

This creates two different paths for paternity disputes.

Path One: The couple was not living together during conception. There is no presumption of legitimacy. The court can order a DNA test if there is a strong prima facie case. If the husband refuses, the court can draw an adverse inference—meaning it can assume the test would have proved paternity. The Court stated: "the court will be entitled to draw adverse inference against him"—a close paraphrase of the judgment's reasoning.

Path Two: The couple was living together during conception. Section 112 applies. The child is presumed legitimate. The husband cannot demand a DNA test to break that presumption unless he first proves non-access. And if he refuses a test, the court cannot hold it against him.

The Supreme Court made this clear: the power to order a medical test exists, but it must be exercised only when there is sufficient material to justify it. And where a strong legal presumption already exists—based on the fact of cohabitation—refusal to undergo a test carries no adverse weight.

What this means for family court battles

For lawyers and litigants, the takeaway is practical. If you are a husband disputing paternity, your first move is not to demand a DNA test. Your first move is to prove that you and your wife were not living together during the period of conception. If you cannot prove that, the law presumes the child is yours—and no amount of refusal or demand for testing will change that.

If you are a wife defending your child's legitimacy, your strongest card is Section 112. Show the court that you and your husband lived together during conception. The presumption does the rest. A DNA test becomes unnecessary.

THE PLAY: Before asking a court to order a DNA test in a paternity dispute, first establish whether the couple was living together during conception—if they were, Section 112's presumption blocks the test unless non-access is proven first.

The Court ended where it began: with a man who refused a test, and a law that did not punish him for it. The manila folder of medical reports remained untouched on the table, its silence speaking louder than any test result ever could.