Nine theft cases, 18-year sentence — then the Supreme Court stepped in
Iqram pleaded guilty to stealing electricity equipment in nine separate cases. The trial judge gave him two years for each — and said nothing about whether they'd run together. The jail added them up. The High Court said that's the law.
18
years.
Iqram pleaded guilty to stealing electricity equipment in nine separate cases. The trial judge gave him two years for each — and said nothing about whether they'd run together. The jail added them up. The High Court said that's the law.
He stole electricity equipment nine times. He pleaded guilty each time. The judge gave him two years per case — and never said they'd run together. The jail added them up: 18 years.
Iqram, a man from Hapur in western Uttar Pradesh, had already spent three years in jail when he realised what the arithmetic meant. Nine theft cases. Nine two-year sentences. No instruction from the judge about whether those sentences would run at the same time or one after another. The jail authorities made the choice for him: consecutive. Eighteen years behind bars for stealing electricity equipment belonging to the UP Electricity Department.
Could a man who pleaded guilty to nine minor thefts really serve 18 years — more than most murder sentences — simply because a judge forgot to say the magic words?
One judge, one day, a silence that trapped a man
Iqram was charged in nine separate sessions trials for theft of electricity equipment. All nine cases were heard by the same Additional District and Sessions Judge in Hapur. On 5 November 2020, Iqram opted for a plea bargain under Chapter XXI-A of the CrPC (a legal process where the accused agrees to plead guilty in exchange for a negotiated sentence). The judge convicted him in all nine cases on the same day, under Section 136 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (the law that criminalises theft of electricity or its equipment).
The sentence in each case was identical: two years of simple imprisonment plus a fine of Rs 1,000. The judge also granted set-off under Section 428 CrPC (a provision that counts the time already spent in jail during the trial against the final sentence). But on one critical point, the judge was silent. He did not issue a direction under Section 427(1) CrPC — the provision that allows a judge to order that multiple sentences run concurrently (at the same time) rather than consecutively (one after another).
That silence became a trap.
When the jail does the math
The jail authorities looked at the nine separate sentencing orders. Each order said "two years." None said "to run concurrently." Under Section 427 CrPC, the default rule is that when a person already serving a sentence is sentenced to another term, the new sentence begins only after the previous one ends. The jail applied this default. Nine times two. Eighteen years.
Iqram had already spent three years in custody. He was looking at fifteen more. He filed a habeas corpus petition (a legal request asking the court: "is this detention lawful?") before the Allahabad High Court. His argument was simple: the total sentence was grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offences. The thefts were not violent. He had pleaded guilty. He had cooperated. The judge had simply forgotten to exercise his discretion under Section 427(1).
The High Court disagreed. It held that under Section 427 CrPC, consecutive sentences were the default. If the trial judge did not order concurrent running, the jail was right to add them up. The petition was dismissed.
"The law was the law" — but whose duty was it?
Iqram appealed to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution (the provision that allows the Supreme Court to hear appeals from any court or tribunal in the country). The case landed before a bench of Chief Justice Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud and Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha.
The prosecution argued that the High Court was correct: Section 427 CrPC mandates consecutive sentences unless the court specifically directs otherwise. The trial judge had not done so. The law was the law.
Iqram's counsel argued that the High Court had failed to exercise its constitutional duty under Article 226 (the power of High Courts to issue writs to protect fundamental rights). The aggregate sentence of 18 years for nine non-violent thefts was a serious miscarriage of justice. The High Court should have intervened to correct the trial court's omission, not hide behind a technical reading of Section 427.
When the Supreme Court stepped in
The Supreme Court found the situation deeply troubling. "Where a trial court fails to exercise its discretion under Section 427(1) CrPC to direct concurrent running of sentences, and the resulting aggregate consecutive sentence is grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offences committed," the bench observed, "the High Court exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 must intervene to correct the serious miscarriage of justice."
The court held that the High Court had erred in treating Section 427 as an inflexible rule. The provision gives a judge discretion — not a command. When that discretion is not exercised, and the result is a sentence that shocks the conscience, the High Court and the Supreme Court have a constitutional duty to step in. The court cited its own precedent in Mohd Zahid v. State through NCB (2021) to support this principle.
The bench also invoked Article 21 of the Constitution (the right to life and personal liberty) and Article 32 (the right to approach the Supreme Court directly for enforcement of fundamental rights). "The Supreme Court's intervention to protect the personal liberty of citizens, even in seemingly small and routine matters," the judgment stated, "is founded on sound constitutional principles embodied in Part III and is a plain constitutional duty."
What the court ordered
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. It set aside the High Court's judgment of 24 March 2022. It directed that all nine sentences imposed on Iqram shall run concurrently. The jail authorities were ordered to act immediately on production of a certified copy of the order.
The practical effect: Iqram, who had already served three years, would likely be released soon. Instead of 18 years, his total sentence would be two years — the longest single sentence — minus the time already served.
THE PLAY: If a trial court imposes multiple sentences without specifying whether they run concurrently, and the resulting total is disproportionate, the High Court must intervene under Article 226 — it cannot hide behind the default rule of Section 427 CrPC.
The arithmetic of justice
Nine thefts. Nine guilty pleas. One judge who forgot to say the words "concurrent." Eighteen years that should have been two. The Supreme Court did not change the law. It simply reminded every court in the country that the law exists to serve justice — not to trap a man in a math problem no one intended.