Supreme Court allows Jallikattu, bullock cart races with safeguards

In 2014, the Supreme Court banned Jallikattu as cruel. Last week, it said—wait for it—the sport can go on. The Constitution Bench of five judges was not reversing its own order; it was upholding three state laws that had rewritten the rules of the game, and in doing so, it drew a line between what courts decide and what legislatures decide.

The question that hung over the silent courtroom was simple: Can a state pass a law that overrides a Supreme Court judgment, as long as it fixes the problems the judgment identified? The answer, the Court said, is yes—provided the state has the constitutional power to do so and the fixes are real.

When the bull was banned

In 2014, the Supreme Court banned Jallikattu (a traditional bull-taming sport in Tamil Nadu) and bullock cart racing in Maharashtra. The judgment in Animal Welfare Board of India v. A. Nagaraja found these sports inherently cruel to animals. Bulls were being prodded, pulled, and frightened for entertainment—the smell of sweat and dust mixing with the crowd's roar. The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 (PCA Act) did not allow it, the Court said.

But the ban did not sit well with the states. Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, and Karnataka argued that these were not just sports—they were cultural heritage, centuries old. So they did something unusual. Each state passed an amendment to the PCA Act, specifically legalising Jallikattu, bullock cart racing, and Kambala (a buffalo race in Karnataka). The amendments came with regulatory safeguards: handwritten rules about how the animals must be treated, how the events must be conducted, and what penalties apply for cruelty.

These amendments received Presidential assent under Article 254(2) of the Constitution (a provision that allows a state law to override a central law if the President approves it). Animal welfare organisations challenged them, arguing that the states were trying to bypass the 2014 judgment through a legislative backdoor. They also argued that animals have fundamental rights under Articles 14 (right to equality) and 21 (right to life and personal liberty).

Five questions, one Constitution Bench

The case landed before a Division Bench of the Supreme Court in 2018. The judges realised the issues were too big for two judges to decide. They referred five questions to a Constitution Bench of five judges. The questions included: Are these amendments valid? Is Jallikattu really cultural heritage? Do animals have fundamental rights? And did the states have the power to pass these laws at all?

The Bench that heard the case comprised Justices K.M. Joseph, Ajay Rastogi, Aniruddha Bose, Hrishikesh Roy, and C.T. Ravikumar. On May 18, 2023, they delivered a unanimous judgment that upheld all three state amendments. As the judgment was read, the courtroom fell into a deep silence, the only sound the rustle of paper as each page turned.

Why the states won

The Court's reasoning had three main pillars. First, the states had the legislative competence to pass these amendments. The subject of "prevention of cruelty to animals" falls under Entry 17 of the Concurrent List (List III of the Seventh Schedule), meaning both Parliament and state legislatures can make laws on it. When a state law conflicts with a central law, the state law can still operate if it receives Presidential assent under Article 254(2). The Court found that these amendments did exactly that.

Second, the amendments were not "colourable legislation" (a law that pretends to do one thing but actually does another to get around a constitutional restriction). The 2014 judgment had banned Jallikattu because the sport, as then conducted, caused unnecessary pain. The state amendments did not simply ignore that judgment. They created a regulatory framework—rules about how bulls must be handled, how the events must be supervised, and what constitutes cruelty. The Court said these rules cured the defects the 2014 judgment had identified.

Third, the Court refused to declare that animals have fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21. It said: "There is no precedent to show the Constitution recognizes fundamental rights for animals." Whether animals should have rights is a question for the legislature, not the judiciary. The Court noted that the PCA Act already provides for animal welfare, and the amendments added further protections. That was enough.

Who decides what is cultural heritage?

One of the most interesting parts of the judgment deals with cultural heritage. The animal welfare groups argued that Jallikattu is not really cultural heritage—it is just a cruel sport dressed up in tradition. The Court disagreed. It said that whether a practice is cultural heritage is a matter best determined by the legislature. When the Tamil Nadu legislature declared Jallikattu as part of the state's cultural heritage, the judiciary should not take a different view.

This is a significant statement about the separation of powers. The Court was saying: we decide what is constitutional; you decide what is cultural. The two are different questions.

The dissenting arguments the Court rejected

The animal welfare organisations did not go quietly. They raised several powerful arguments that the Court had to confront head-on. First, they argued that the state amendments were a classic case of "colourable legislation"—that the states had dressed up a law to legalise cruelty in the garb of cultural preservation. The states, they said, had not merely amended the PCA Act but had gutted its core protections for animals.

Second, the challengers argued that the amendments violated the fundamental duties under Article 51A(g) and (h) of the Constitution. Article 51A(g) requires every citizen to have compassion for living creatures, while Article 51A(h) requires citizens to develop a scientific temper and humanism. Allowing bulls to be subjected to fear and pain for entertainment, they argued, was the opposite of compassion and scientific temper. The Court, however, found that the regulatory safeguards in the amendments—when read together with the parent Act—were sufficient to meet these constitutional expectations.

Third, the animal welfare groups advanced a bold constitutional argument: that animals themselves have fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21. They pointed to the Uttarakhand High Court's judgment in Narayan Dutt Bhatt v. Union of India, which had declared that animals have rights akin to fundamental rights. The Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument categorically. It said there is no precedent in Indian constitutional law that recognises fundamental rights for animals. Article 21, the Court held, cannot be extended to bulls through judicial interpretation—that is a task for the legislature.

Fourth, the challengers argued that the amendments were repugnant to the parent PCA Act and to the 2014 Supreme Court judgment. The Court rejected this by noting that the amendments had received Presidential assent under Article 254(2), which resolves repugnancy in favour of the state law. The amendments were not a backdoor override of the judgment—they were a legislative response that addressed the specific defects the judgment had identified.

These arguments, though ultimately unsuccessful, forced the Court to clarify several important constitutional principles. The judgment is as notable for what it rejected as for what it upheld.

What the Court did not decide

The judgment left some questions open. It did not rule on whether the amendments violated Article 29 (protection of interests of minorities) or whether Entry 15 of the State List (preservation of stock) could also support these laws. It also did not say that all animal sports are now legal. The judgment is specific to Jallikattu, bullock cart racing, and Kambala, and only as regulated by the state amendments.

The Court also made clear that its decision does not give states a blank cheque. If the regulatory safeguards are not enforced—if bulls are still being hurt, their nose ropes pulled too tight—the courts can step in again. The judgment is conditional on the rules being followed.

What this means for lawyers and litigants

For practitioners, the key takeaway is about the relationship between judicial precedent and legislative power. A Supreme Court judgment that strikes down a practice as illegal does not forever freeze the law. The legislature can step in, change the law, and address the defects the court identified—provided it has the constitutional authority to do so and the changes are genuine.

The case also clarifies that Article 254(2) is a powerful tool for states that want to diverge from central law on concurrent list subjects. But the tool works only if the state law is "in pith and substance" about a subject in the Concurrent List, and only if the President approves it.

The procedural journey itself tells a story. From the 2014 ban by a Division Bench, to the Ministry of Environment's 2016 notification allowing bulls as performing animals, to the state amendments in 2017, to the Bombay High Court's restraint on bullock cart races later that year, to the reference to a Constitution Bench in 2018—each step added a layer of legal texture. By the time the five-judge Bench heard the matter, the file had grown thick with arguments, notifications, and counter-notifications. The smell of old paper and ink filled the courtroom as the judges read through the history.

The Court's ratio on legislative competence is worth noting: the state amendments are relatable in pith and substance to Entry 17 of List III (Prevention of cruelty to animals). The states had the power to enact them with Presidential assent under Article 254(2). The amendments were not colourable legislation because they cured the defects pointed out in A. Nagaraja through rules and notifications that regulate the conduct of bovine sports to minimise pain and suffering. These rules must be read together with the parent Act.

On the question of animal rights, the Court was categorical. Article 21 protection cannot be extended to bulls through judicial interpretation; this exercise is for the legislature. The amendments having received Presidential assent under Article 254(2) cannot be faulted, as they are relatable to Entry 17 List III of the Seventh Schedule.

THE PLAY: When challenging a state amendment that overrides a Supreme Court judgment, focus on whether the amendment actually cures the defects the judgment identified—not on whether it contradicts the judgment.

The bull was banned. Then the bull came back. The Court ended where it began: with a sport, a culture, and a Constitution that lets legislatures decide what tradition means.