The 'reasonable likelihood of bias' test that killed 14 appointments in MP.

When a Selection Committee Picks Its Own Family

In 1998, the Janpad Panchayat of Gaurihar, Madhya Pradesh, advertised 249 posts for Shiksha Karmi Grade-III teachers. The selection committee had two key members: chairperson Smt. Pushpa Dwivedi and member Shri Swami Singh. When the final list was published on September 16, 1998, fourteen of the selected candidates were close relatives of these two committee members. Eight were related to the chairperson. Three to the member. The appointments were issued the very next day.

A rival candidate, Smt. Archana Mishra, approached the Collector of Chhatarpur district. She argued that the selection was a family affair. The Collector agreed, cancelling the appointments of the relatives. That order triggered a sixteen-year legal battle that ended only on March 19, 2024, when the Supreme Court of India, in Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (2024 INSC 252), dismissed the appeals of the selected candidates. The stakes were simple: fourteen government jobs, and the principle that a public selection committee cannot be a vehicle for nepotism.

What the Collector Found

The Collector, acting under the M.P. Panchayat Raj Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993, examined the selection. He found that the chairperson and the member had actively participated in the selection process that resulted in their own relatives being appointed. This, the Collector held, was contrary to Sections 40(c) and 100 of the Adhiniyam. Section 40(c) defines misconduct to include securing employment for relatives. Section 100 imposes a penalty for acquiring an interest in a contract. The Collector cancelled the appointments of the fourteen relatives.

The selected candidates — Krishnadatt Awasthy and others — were not parties to the proceedings before the Collector. They had not been impleaded. This became the central plank of their defence for the next two decades.

The Revision That Failed

The candidates moved a revision before the Commissioner Revenue (the Revisional Authority) under Rule 5 of the M.P. Panchayat (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1995. On March 14, 2000, the Commissioner dismissed the revision. The Commissioner held that the non-joinder of the candidates before the Collector had caused them no prejudice. The bias that vitiated the selection was evident on the face of the record. The relatives had been selected by a committee whose members were their own kin. That was enough.

The candidates then approached the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under Article 226 of the Constitution. A Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, affirming the findings of bias and holding that the candidates had been afforded sufficient opportunity at the revisional stage. A Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ appeal, citing J. Mohapatra & Co. v. State of Orissa (1984) 4 SCC 103 and Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana (1985) 4 SCC 417. The Division Bench held that the reasonable likelihood of bias was established, and the non-joinder had not prejudiced the appellants.

The Argument That Almost Worked

Before the Supreme Court, the appellants argued one point with force: the Collector had passed an order cancelling their appointments without giving them a hearing. They were not impleaded. The order was passed behind their backs. This, they said, was a fundamental violation of the principle of audi alteram partem — the right to be heard. The entire proceeding, they argued, was vitiated.

The Court did not buy it. Justice J.K. Maheshwari, writing the lead opinion, applied the test from State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma (1996) 3 SCC 364. That case held that a violation of natural justice does not automatically vitiate proceedings. The party complaining must show prejudice. Here, the appellants had been given full opportunity at every subsequent stage — the revision, the writ petition, and the writ appeal. They had argued their case. They had not shown how the outcome would have been different had they been heard before the Collector.

Justice Maheshwari observed: "The element of bias in the mind of authority is the initial step to observe principle of natural justice; nemo judex precedes audi alteram partem." In plain language: the rule against bias comes first. If the selection itself is poisoned by bias, the right to a hearing on the cancellation of that selection is a secondary concern.

The Bias That Was Obvious

The Court then turned to the substance of the case. The selection committee had two members who were office-bearers of the Panchayat. The chairperson, Smt. Pushpa Dwivedi, had eight relatives selected. The member, Shri Swami Singh, had three. The Court applied the foundational principle from R v. Sussex JJ, ex parte McCarthy (1924) 1 KB 256: "Justice must not only be done but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done."

The test for bias, the Court noted, is not whether the decision-maker was actually biased. It is whether a reasonable person, looking at the facts, would think there was a real likelihood of bias. The Court cited Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) Ltd. v. Lannon (1969) 1 QB 577 and R v. Gough (1993) AC 646. The test is objective. A reasonable person would look at a selection committee where the chairperson's eight relatives and the member's three relatives were selected and conclude that the process was tainted.

The Court also applied A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 262, the landmark case that extended the principles of natural justice to administrative actions. In Kraipak, a selection board member was himself a candidate. Here, the committee members were not candidates, but their relatives were. The principle was the same: the decision-maker cannot have a personal interest in the outcome.

The Statutory Bar

The Court also examined the statutory framework. Section 40(c) of the M.P. Panchayat Raj Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993, defines misconduct to include an office-bearer securing employment for a relative. Section 100 imposes a penalty for acquiring an interest in a contract. The selection of relatives by committee members fell squarely within this prohibition. The Court held that the conduct of the office-bearers in giving undue benefits to their relatives in an orchestrated manner amounted to misconduct under the Adhiniyam, warranting their removal.

THE PLAY: If you are challenging a selection on grounds of nepotism, you do not need to prove actual bias. You only need to show a reasonable likelihood of bias from the familial relationship. The burden then shifts to the selected candidates to show that the process was fair.

Why This Matters for Practitioners

This judgment is a masterclass in two doctrines that every administrative lawyer must know: the rule against bias and the prejudice requirement for natural justice violations.

First, the rule against bias. The Court reaffirmed that the test is not whether bias actually existed, but whether a reasonable person would think it existed. This is a low threshold. If a selection committee member's relative is selected, the selection is presumptively vitiated. The Court cited R v. Rand (1866) LR 1 QB 230, one of the earliest English authorities on bias from family relationship, to underscore that this principle is as old as the common law itself.

Second, the prejudice requirement. The appellants argued that their right to be heard was violated. The Court held that even if there was a technical violation, the appellants had not shown prejudice. They had been heard at every subsequent stage. They had not demonstrated how the outcome would have been different. This is a critical point for litigators: if you are challenging an order on natural justice grounds, you must show that the violation actually harmed your case. A bare allegation of non-hearing is not enough.

Third, the conceptual priority of bias. Justice Maheshwari's observation that "nemo judex precedes audi alteram partem" is significant. It means that if the decision-maker is biased, the entire proceeding is void from the start. The right to a hearing becomes irrelevant because the decision-maker was never competent to hear the matter. This is a powerful argument for challengers: attack the composition of the decision-making body first.

The Bottom Line

If you are a public body conducting a selection, ensure that no member of the selection committee has a relative in the candidate pool. If you are a candidate challenging a selection, you do not need to prove actual bias — only a reasonable likelihood of it. And if you are defending a selection, you cannot hide behind a technical plea of non-hearing if the bias is evident on the face of the record. The Supreme Court has made it clear: nepotism in public employment will not be tolerated, and the appearance of bias is as fatal as bias itself.