Two siblings fought 16 years for their father's ancestral share — and won.

Two shots, one family, and a question that took sixteen years to answer

When Revanasiddappa and his co-appellant approached the Supreme Court, they were not arguing about a crime. They were arguing about a birthright — literally. Born from a marriage that Hindu law considered void, they wanted a share in the ancestral Hindu joint family property that their father had left behind. The trial court had said no. The High Court had said no. Two earlier Supreme Court decisions had said no. But a two-judge bench in 2011 looked at Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and saw something the earlier courts had missed. That doubt set off a chain that ended on 1 September 2023, when Chief Justice Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, writing for a three-judge bench, delivered a judgment that rewrote the inheritance rights of thousands of children across India.

The marriage that wasn't, and the children who were

The facts were straightforward. Revanasiddappa and his sibling were born from a marriage that fell within the scope of Sections 11 and 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act — either void or voidable. Under classical Hindu law, such children were considered illegitimate. They had no right to inherit from their father's ancestral property. But Parliament had stepped in. Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act created a legal fiction: children born from void or voidable marriages would be treated as legitimate. The question was — how far did that fiction extend?

The appellants argued that Section 16(3) did not distinguish between ancestral and self-acquired property. The only restriction in the provision was that the child's rights were confined to the property of the parents — not the property of any other person. If the father had a share in a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) coparcenary, that share was "property of the parent." Why should the child be denied it?

The respondents, representing the other coparceners, argued the opposite. They relied on a line of Supreme Court decisions — Jinia Keotin v. Kumar Sitaram Manjhi (2003) 1 SCC 730, Neelamma v. Sarojamma (2006) 9 SCC 612, and Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan (2010) 11 SCC 483 — which had held that children of void or voidable marriages could only inherit self-acquired property. Ancestral property, they said, belonged to the coparcenary as a whole. Granting a share to such a child would disrupt the rights of other coparceners who had acquired their interest by birth.

The three decisions that had to fall

The referring bench had doubted the correctness of Jinia Keotin, Neelamma, and Bharatha Matha. The three-judge bench agreed with that doubt — and overruled all three, but only in part. The key was the precise reading of Section 16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act. That provision states that a child of a void or voidable marriage "shall have no rights in or to the property of any person other than the parents." The earlier decisions had read this as meaning: the child can only inherit what the parent owned exclusively — self-acquired property. Ancestral property, they reasoned, was not exclusively the parent's; it belonged to the coparcenary.

The Supreme Court disagreed. The Bench observed that Section 16(3) does not qualify the word "property" with the words "ancestral" or "self-acquired." The only restriction is that the rights are confined to the property of the parents — not of any other person. If a parent has a share in a coparcenary, that share is, in law, the parent's property. The question then becomes: how do you determine that share?

The notional partition that unlocked the door

The answer lay in the Explanation to Section 6(3) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. That provision, as interpreted in Gurupad Khandappa v. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum (1978) 3 SCC 383, compels the assumption of a notional partition immediately before the death of the coparcener. The share that would have been allotted to the deceased parent in that notional partition becomes the "property of the parent" for the purposes of Section 16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act.

The Court was careful. It did not grant the child the status of a coparcener by birth. That would have been too broad — it would have given the child rights against every coparcener in the joint family, which Section 16(3) explicitly forbids. Instead, the Court held that the child is entitled only to the share that the parent would have received in a notional partition. That share is then inherited by the child under the ordinary rules of succession.

The distinction is critical. A coparcener by birth has an interest in the entire coparcenary property from the moment of birth. That interest fluctuates as members are born or die. A child under Section 16, by contrast, has no such fluctuating interest. The child's right crystallises only at the parent's death, and only to the extent of the parent's notional share. The other coparceners — uncles, cousins, grandparents — are not affected beyond what the parent would have taken anyway.

THE TRICK: When advising a client born from a void or voidable marriage, do not argue for coparcenary status by birth. Argue for the parent's notional share under Section 6(3) Explanation of the Hindu Succession Act — that is the precise door Section 16(3) leaves open.

What the Court actually said — in plain language

The operative order of the Supreme Court, delivered on 1 September 2023, reads:

"Children born out of void/voidable marriages are entitled to inherit a share in the property of their deceased parents which would have been allotted to them on a notional partition of the Hindu coparcenary property. However, such children are not entitled to the properties of any coparcener other than their parents."

That is the ratio. It is narrower than what the appellants might have hoped for — they wanted full coparcenary rights — but far broader than what the earlier decisions had allowed. The Court overruled Jinia Keotin, Neelamma, and Bharatha Matha only to the extent that they restricted rights to self-acquired property. The core holding of those cases — that Section 16 children cannot claim rights against persons other than parents — remains intact.

The doctrine that mattered — and why it matters for practitioners

For advocates, the key doctrinal move is the Court's interpretation of Section 16(3) in conjunction with the notional partition mechanism under the Hindu Succession Act. The Court held that the phrase "property of the parent" in Section 16(3) includes the parent's interest in coparcenary property, as determined by a notional partition under the Explanation to Section 6(3). This is not a new legal fiction — it is an existing one, applied to a new class of beneficiaries.

For CFOs and founders dealing with family businesses structured as HUFs, this judgment has immediate practical consequences. If a coparcener in your HUF has children from a void or voidable marriage, those children now have a claim to the coparcener's notional share upon death. This affects succession planning, estate valuation, and the distribution of HUF assets. The judgment does not give such children a right to demand partition during the parent's lifetime — they are not coparceners — but it does give them a right to inherit the parent's share after death.

The Court also made an obiter observation that Section 10 Rule 2 of the Hindu Succession Act uses the phrase "surviving sons and daughters" without distinguishing based on legitimacy. This could be used in future arguments to extend equal treatment to Section 16 children in other succession contexts. But for now, the holding is limited to the parent's notional share.

Why this judgment matters beyond the courtroom

This is not a technical correction of an earlier error. It is a recognition that children should not be punished for the marital status of their parents — a principle that the Court itself traced back to the constitutional values of equality and non-discrimination. The earlier decisions in Jinia Keotin and its progeny had created a class of children who were legitimate in name but second-class in inheritance. The Supreme Court has now closed that gap.

But the Court did not go all the way. It stopped short of granting coparcenary status by birth. That would have required a constitutional challenge to Section 16(3) itself, which was not before the Bench. The Court's restraint is notable: it gave the child a share, but not a seat at the coparcenary table. The other coparceners — the uncles, the cousins, the grandparents — remain untouched. Only the parent's share is affected.

For the thousands of families across India where void or voidable marriages exist — whether due to prohibited degrees, sapinda relationships, or other grounds under Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act — this judgment provides clarity. The child is not an outsider. The child inherits what the parent would have taken. Nothing more, nothing less.

The bottom line

If you are advising a client born from a void or voidable marriage, the path is now clear: claim the parent's notional share in the coparcenary under Section 6(3) Explanation of the Hindu Succession Act, but do not ask for coparcenary status by birth — that door remains closed. The Supreme Court has given you the key to one room, not the whole house. Use it wisely.